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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 821510 |
Time | |
Date | 200901 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | MIA.Airport |
State Reference | FL |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B767-300 and 300 ER |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | B737-800 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Local |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Developmental |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict |
Miss Distance | Horizontal 1000 Vertical 5 |
Narrative:
While working local control south for 1 hour and 40 minutes right up to my go-home time for the shift; on a predominantly arrival favored runway; the south final approach controller was running successive arrivals very tight down to minimum separation. Wake turbulence was involved in nearly every arrival seeing that nearly every arrival was either a heavy jet or B757. Compression factor from a 5 mile final inbound was extra cumbersome due to strong headwinds and gusts; and it seemed like pilots were just overall slowing way down inside the 5 mile final. For a benchmark; it states in our local sops that local control shall 'when the tdw is operational (which it was); separate IFR arrivals from the FAF/5 miles; to the runway; except when simultaneous approaches are in use.' simultaneous approaches were not being used; but in any case I like to work as a team to try to protect the approach controller as well if it appears separation is about to be lost. A few instances prior to the one in this report; I observed aircraft creep up to the preceding heavy jet they were in trail of and had them acquire visual contact in turn to have the aircraft 'follow the traffic cleared visual approach.' all of the aircraft I applied this to only needed one traffic call to see the preceding aircraft and to report it in sight. The B737 that this report applies to checked onto my frequency at a 16 mile final and I initially issued traffic 6 miles ahead; heavy B767; report it in sight. The B737 began to search for traffic while I continued working other aircraft on the frequency. The preceding heavy B767 began to slow way down at this point as he reached the FAF and I saw that indeed the following B737 would need to either slow down as well or call the traffic in sight for a visual approach just like all the other aircraft I had been handling in that fashion. At this point I did not use speed control on the B737 because he was well outside of my 'FAF/5 miles' jurisdiction; not to mention approach was filling the final behind him very tight as well; and I did not want to interrupt the sequence with a very slow aircraft on a 15 mile final. Once the B737 reached a 10 mile final I made an additional traffic call to see if he had the heavy in sight and the B737 reported the field in sight and again I prompted that I needed him to 'report traffic only please.' at this point the preceding heavy B767 had reached a 2 mile final and the B737 was at a 7 mile final all according to the tdw radar scope; when I canceled the trailing B737 approach clearance; told to maintain 1;500 ft and fly present heading. I gave the B737 one last chance while he was still in a position to land safely to see the heavy on a short final; and when he still said in a snooty manner that he 'had the field' I told him to climb and maintain 3;000 and turn right heading 120 to break him away from the approach sequence. Some key facts to look at are that I never did issue a landing clearance to the B737 nor had he yet entered my area of jurisdiction;'FAF/5 miles;' from which I am required to separate IFR arrivals. I merely was trying to help out the approach controller to prevent him from having a possible loss of separation since he had switched the aircraft at a 16 mile final. The captain of the B737 proceeded later on by calling the control tower to complain about all the traffic calls I was issuing him when he claimed that in fact he never saw the preceding heavy B767. Again; no other aircraft in the nearly 2 hours I worked before that had any problem sighting traffic to follow. Quality assurance at my facility proceeded to investigate the situation only to find that a loss of separation did indeed occur as I was about 20 seconds late in canceling the B737's approach clearance allowing him to get within 4.7 miles of the heavy B767 instead of the required 5 miles. Management continued by pinning the operational error on myself and discounting any other party involved whether it be the a
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MIA Local Controller described operational error; during an attempt to establish visual separation with two closely spaced arrival aircraft; go-around issued but automation review detected error.
Narrative: While working Local Control south for 1 hour and 40 minutes right up to my go-home time for the shift; on a predominantly arrival favored runway; the South Final Approach Controller was running successive arrivals very tight down to minimum separation. Wake turbulence was involved in nearly every arrival seeing that nearly every arrival was either a heavy jet or B757. Compression factor from a 5 mile final inbound was extra cumbersome due to strong headwinds and gusts; and it seemed like pilots were just overall slowing way down inside the 5 mile final. For a benchmark; it states in our local SOPs that Local Control shall 'when the TDW is operational (which it was); separate IFR arrivals from the FAF/5 miles; to the runway; except when simultaneous approaches are in use.' Simultaneous approaches were not being used; but in any case I like to work as a team to try to protect the Approach Controller as well if it appears separation is about to be lost. A few instances prior to the one in this report; I observed aircraft creep up to the preceding heavy jet they were in trail of and had them acquire visual contact in turn to have the aircraft 'follow the traffic cleared visual approach.' All of the aircraft I applied this to only needed one traffic call to see the preceding aircraft and to report it in sight. The B737 that this report applies to checked onto my frequency at a 16 mile final and I initially issued traffic 6 miles ahead; heavy B767; report it in sight. The B737 began to search for traffic while I continued working other aircraft on the frequency. The preceding heavy B767 began to slow way down at this point as he reached the FAF and I saw that indeed the following B737 would need to either slow down as well or call the traffic in sight for a visual approach just like all the other aircraft I had been handling in that fashion. At this point I did not use speed control on the B737 because he was well outside of my 'FAF/5 miles' jurisdiction; not to mention Approach was filling the Final behind him very tight as well; and I did not want to interrupt the sequence with a very slow aircraft on a 15 mile final. Once the B737 reached a 10 mile final I made an additional traffic call to see if he had the heavy in sight and the B737 reported the field in sight and again I prompted that I needed him to 'report traffic only please.' At this point the preceding heavy B767 had reached a 2 mile final and the B737 was at a 7 mile final all according to the TDW radar scope; when I canceled the trailing B737 approach clearance; told to maintain 1;500 FT and fly present heading. I gave the B737 one last chance while he was still in a position to land safely to see the heavy on a short final; and when he still said in a snooty manner that he 'had the field' I told him to climb and maintain 3;000 and turn right heading 120 to break him away from the approach sequence. Some key facts to look at are that I never did issue a landing clearance to the B737 nor had he yet entered my area of jurisdiction;'FAF/5 miles;' from which I am required to separate IFR arrivals. I merely was trying to help out the Approach Controller to prevent him from having a possible loss of separation since he had switched the aircraft at a 16 mile final. The Captain of the B737 proceeded later on by calling the Control Tower to complain about all the traffic calls I was issuing him when he claimed that in fact he never saw the preceding heavy B767. Again; no other aircraft in the nearly 2 hours I worked before that had any problem sighting traffic to follow. Quality Assurance at my facility proceeded to investigate the situation only to find that a loss of separation did indeed occur as I was about 20 seconds late in canceling the B737's approach clearance allowing him to get within 4.7 miles of the heavy B767 instead of the required 5 miles. Management continued by pinning the Operational Error on myself and discounting any other party involved whether it be the A
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.