Narrative:

The ILS to runway 36L was notamed out of service; so we expected to do a visual to runway 36L. We came in fairly high on a left downwind and reported the field in sight. Approach cleared us for the visual and told us to maintain 3;600 ft until '&north of the air base&.' (I think -- this is the best I remember it but I'm not entirely sure what they said -- we were a good bit high so I didn't think altitude would be as problem.) the captain called for 'gear down' and entered a very steep bank to turn left base. I called 'bank angle' and he corrected back to a shallower bank; but I realized we would be rolling out well left of the centerline; and we were starting to get low with a high descent rate. The captain seemed totally flustered and I was sure he was looking at something other than the actual runway. On about a 5 miles final; could see the PAPI and all the lights were red; and our airspeed was at the lowest allowable speed (vls). I said 'I show you well left of centerline and very low.' just then; the airbus voice called out 'speed; speed.' the captain added lots of power and was trying to climb when I realized that the speed brakes were deployed to the full up position. I told the captain this as I immediately retracted them and then things went back to normal. The contributing factors were: 1) the lack of an ILS approach to a 'black hole approach' over water at night. 2) our relative unfamiliarity with the airport led to confusion about where the 'air base' was and what altitude we should be at. I think approach should always reference approach fixes; dmes or 'miles from the field' when giving altitudes. 3) the speed brakes cause virtually no vibration on the airbus. The only indication that they were out was the small amber 'speed brake' indication on the ECAM page. During this approach we never saw the message since we were primarily looking outside and at the ever decreasing altitude and airspeed. An audio 'speed brake' voice would be much more effective than the amber message.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A320 flight crew got low and slow on a night visual to TPA; the First Officer noticed the speed brakes were still extended.

Narrative: The ILS to Runway 36L was NOTAMed out of service; so we expected to do a visual to Runway 36L. We came in fairly high on a left downwind and reported the field in sight. Approach cleared us for the visual and told us to maintain 3;600 FT until '&north of the air base&.' (I think -- this is the best I remember it but I'm not entirely sure what they said -- we were a good bit high so I didn't think altitude would be as problem.) The Captain called for 'gear down' and entered a very steep bank to turn left base. I called 'bank angle' and he corrected back to a shallower bank; but I realized we would be rolling out WELL left of the centerline; and we were starting to get low with a high descent rate. The Captain seemed totally flustered and I was sure he was looking at something other than the actual runway. On about a 5 miles final; could see the PAPI and all the lights were red; and our airspeed was at the lowest allowable speed (Vls). I said 'I show you WELL left of centerline and very low.' Just then; the Airbus voice called out 'Speed; Speed.' The Captain added lots of power and was trying to climb when I realized that the speed brakes were deployed to the Full Up position. I told the Captain this as I immediately retracted them and then things went back to normal. The contributing factors were: 1) The lack of an ILS approach to a 'black hole approach' over water at night. 2) Our relative unfamiliarity with the airport led to confusion about where the 'air base' was and what altitude we should be at. I think Approach should always reference approach fixes; DMEs or 'miles from the field' when giving altitudes. 3) The speed brakes cause virtually no vibration on the Airbus. The only indication that they were out was the small amber 'Speed Brake' indication on the ECAM page. during this approach we never saw the message since we were primarily looking outside and at the ever decreasing altitude and airspeed. An audio 'Speed Brake' voice would be much more effective than the amber message.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.