Narrative:

Descending towards new york we were given a hold at boton intersection (approximately over acy); we were holding at FL220. Holding was for volume into new york; weather was clear. I pulled up weather for acy in case of divert. We only did one turn and was told to descend quickly to 11;000 ft. The controller said 'it did not work' and gave another hold at camrn intersection at 11;000 ft with an efc in 30 minutes. I sent a message to my company asking if atlantic city looked good for a divert. They replied 'it did...' we were holding with about 7;500 pounds of fuel. I wanted to be on the ground with 5;000; 4;500 pounds absolute minimum. I looked up information on acy on computer and had first officer pull up new weather for acy and jfk. Holding at camrn; we were 40 miles from both acy and jfk. I told first officer that we probably had 20-30 of holding fuel; he agreed. I waited till we got to 5;800 pounds and asked first officer what he thought. We discussed it. I asked the first officer to declare 'minimum fuel' and tell new york that 'we need an immediate turn to jfk or we need to go to our alternate.' they gave us a turn towards jfk. I figured it would be a thousand pound burn to acy or jfk. I programmed FMS for direct route to jfk and FMS indicated we would have 4;600 pounds on landing. As we approached jfk they did not bring us straight in. They put us behind several other aircraft and also gave us vectors of 090 degrees; 340 degrees; 030 degrees. As this was happening our predicted fuel went down to 4;000 pounds. Acy was now too far away; lga would be an option if something unpredicted happened at jfk. We were not at emergency fuel; but definitely past minimum fuel. I told first officer that if we went around to declare an emergency immediately; he agreed. We landed and started taxiing with 4;000 pounds; certainly below what I'm comfortable with. Lessons learned: I was too focused on landing fuel and not enough on a 'bingo' fuel. Had I decided 6;200-6;500 was my decision threshold; we could have declared 'minimum fuel then' and probably have avoided this situation. Also I should have asked for his opinion more. I asked him twice; he answered once; but I could have discussed it more with him.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Unanticipated hold due to traffic volume combined with passive decision making resulted in a landing with less than desired fuel on board for an A320 flight crew.

Narrative: Descending towards New York we were given a hold at BOTON Intersection (approximately over ACY); we were holding at FL220. Holding was for volume into New York; weather was clear. I pulled up weather for ACY in case of divert. We only did one turn and was told to descend quickly to 11;000 FT. The Controller said 'it did not work' and gave another hold at CAMRN Intersection at 11;000 FT with an EFC in 30 minutes. I sent a message to my company asking if Atlantic City looked good for a divert. They replied 'it did...' We were holding with about 7;500 LBS of fuel. I wanted to be on the ground with 5;000; 4;500 LBS absolute minimum. I looked up information on ACY on computer and had First Officer pull up new weather for ACY and JFK. Holding at CAMRN; we were 40 miles from both ACY and JFK. I told First Officer that we probably had 20-30 of holding fuel; he agreed. I waited till we got to 5;800 LBS and asked First Officer what he thought. We discussed it. I asked the First Officer to declare 'Minimum Fuel' and tell New York that 'We need an immediate turn to JFK or we need to go to our alternate.' They gave us a turn towards JFK. I figured it would be a thousand pound burn to ACY or JFK. I programmed FMS for direct route to JFK and FMS indicated we would have 4;600 LBS on landing. As we approached JFK they did not bring us straight in. They put us behind several other aircraft and also gave us vectors of 090 degrees; 340 degrees; 030 degrees. As this was happening our predicted fuel went down to 4;000 LBS. ACY was now too far away; LGA would be an option if something unpredicted happened at JFK. We were not at emergency fuel; but definitely past minimum fuel. I told First Officer that if we went around to declare an emergency immediately; he agreed. We landed and started taxiing with 4;000 LBS; certainly below what I'm comfortable with. Lessons learned: I was too focused on landing fuel and not enough on a 'Bingo' fuel. Had I decided 6;200-6;500 was my decision threshold; we could have declared 'minimum fuel then' and probably have avoided this situation. Also I should have asked for his opinion more. I asked him twice; he answered once; but I could have discussed it more with him.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.