Narrative:

During the takeoff roll at approximately 100 KTS and while on the ground; the TCAS system activated and issued a 'traffic; traffic' TA alert. A few seconds later; and prior to reaching rotation speed; the TCAS issued an RA of 'climb; climb;' and the FD changed to TCAS avoidance mode; indicating a steep pitch-up attitude. Upon reaching the proper rotation speed the captain; who was flying pitched up to normal takeoff attitude using the attitude indicator for guidance; and continued with a normal climb profile. Approximately 5 seconds after liftoff; the TCAS warning ended and the FD returned to the normal takeoff profile. The captain noted these items with the intent of reporting them postflight; they are mentioned here because of the possibility that they may be related to the main incident which now follows. Shortly after leveling off at FL340; the triple-chime master warning activated and the following messages displayed in rapid succession on the EICAS display: 'door cargo forward open door service forward open door passenger forward open landing gear nose door open landing gear wow system fail break control fault.' the captain directed the first officer to begin the QRH checklists on what were perceived to be the most critical messages -- the 'door open' warning messages; which were displayed in red. As per the procedure; the flight attendants were immediately contacted and asked to verify the security of the forward doors via the visual door indicators. They determined that the doors appeared secured. The pressurization system was also noted to be operating within normal limits. The 'landing gear nose door open' checklist was consulted next. This procedure states that if this message is displayed inflight; that airspeed should be kept below 250 KIAS. The captain promptly reduced speed to less than 250 KTS for the remainder of the flight. Next; the QRH procedure for 'landing gear wow system fail' was executed. This checklist begins with 'land as soon as possible.' it also specifies that icing conditions should be avoided; landing should be made with slat/flap full; and the thrust reverse; steering; spoilers; wing anti-ice; and ground idle may not be available. With this in mind; the crew discussed landing options and decided that ZZZ was an appropriate location with services available; VMC weather; and a 9;000 ft runway. The crew also completed the brake control fault checklist; which indicated that degraded braking capability could be expected on landing. The captain then contacted dispatch via the comrdo network. A phone patch to maintenance was also requested. The captain informed both dispatch and maintenance of the EICAS messages displayed; the checklist actions taken; and the QRH directive to land as soon as possible. He reported that ZZZ seemed to be the most appropriate landing site at this time. Both maintenance and dispatch concurred with the action taken and the selection of ZZZ as a diversionary site. Dispatch stated that they would contact ZZZ operations via telephone. ATC was next advised that the aircraft would be diverting to ZZZ for landing. An emergency was declared because of the uncertainty of whether steering or braking capability would be available on landing. The flight attendants were briefed on the situation and told to prepare for landing under the conditions stated. An announcement was also made to the passengers; informing them of the need for the unscheduled landing. The flight proceeded toward ZZZ; and completed an overhead 360 degree turn to lose altitude for landing. During the descent; the first officer verified required landing distance; field conditions and weather; and set up the aircraft avionics for an approach to runway xx. A visual approach was conducted to runway xx with the captain flying. Emergency equipment was standing by at the airport; and they were advised of the potential for steering and braking problems. The touchdown was normal and the brakes seemed to operate properly. th

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: E170 flight crew experienced numerous system faults ultimately determined to have been the result of a single; unspecified; electronic system component. Declared an emergency and diverted to the nearest suitable airport for a safe landing.

Narrative: During the takeoff roll at approximately 100 KTS and while on the ground; the TCAS system activated and issued a 'traffic; Traffic' TA alert. A few seconds later; and prior to reaching rotation speed; the TCAS issued an RA of 'climb; climb;' and the FD changed to TCAS avoidance mode; indicating a steep pitch-up attitude. Upon reaching the proper rotation speed the Captain; who was flying pitched up to normal takeoff attitude using the attitude indicator for guidance; and continued with a normal climb profile. Approximately 5 seconds after liftoff; the TCAS warning ended and the FD returned to the normal takeoff profile. The Captain noted these items with the intent of reporting them postflight; they are mentioned here because of the possibility that they may be related to the main incident which now follows. Shortly after leveling off at FL340; the Triple-Chime Master warning activated and the following messages displayed in rapid succession on the EICAS display: 'Door Cargo Forward Open Door Service Forward Open Door Passenger Forward Open Landing Gear Nose Door Open Landing Gear WOW System Fail Break Control Fault.' The Captain directed the First Officer to begin the QRH checklists on what were perceived to be the most critical messages -- the 'Door Open' warning messages; which were displayed in red. As per the procedure; the Flight Attendants were immediately contacted and asked to verify the security of the forward doors via the visual door indicators. They determined that the doors appeared secured. The pressurization system was also noted to be operating within normal limits. The 'Landing Gear Nose Door Open' checklist was consulted next. This procedure states that if this message is displayed inflight; that airspeed should be kept below 250 KIAS. The Captain promptly reduced speed to less than 250 KTS for the remainder of the flight. Next; the QRH procedure for 'Landing Gear WOW System Fail' was executed. This checklist begins with 'Land as soon as possible.' It also specifies that icing conditions should be avoided; landing should be made with Slat/Flap Full; and the thrust reverse; steering; spoilers; wing anti-ice; and ground idle may not be available. With this in mind; the crew discussed landing options and decided that ZZZ was an appropriate location with services available; VMC weather; and a 9;000 FT runway. The crew also completed the Brake Control Fault checklist; which indicated that degraded braking capability could be expected on landing. The Captain then contacted Dispatch via the COMRDO network. A phone patch to Maintenance was also requested. The Captain informed both Dispatch and Maintenance of the EICAS messages displayed; the checklist actions taken; and the QRH directive to land as soon as possible. He reported that ZZZ seemed to be the most appropriate landing site at this time. Both Maintenance and Dispatch concurred with the action taken and the selection of ZZZ as a diversionary site. Dispatch stated that they would contact ZZZ Operations via telephone. ATC was next advised that the aircraft would be diverting to ZZZ for landing. An emergency was declared because of the uncertainty of whether steering or braking capability would be available on landing. The Flight Attendants were briefed on the situation and told to prepare for landing under the conditions stated. An announcement was also made to the passengers; informing them of the need for the unscheduled landing. The flight proceeded toward ZZZ; and completed an overhead 360 degree turn to lose altitude for landing. During the descent; the First Officer verified required landing distance; field conditions and weather; and set up the aircraft avionics for an approach to Runway XX. A visual approach was conducted to Runway XX with the Captain flying. Emergency equipment was standing by at the airport; and they were advised of the potential for steering and braking problems. The touchdown was normal and the brakes seemed to operate properly. Th

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.