Narrative:

Approximately 1 to 2 hours after departure; ECAM alerted us to a popped circuit breaker on the overhead panel. Circuit breaker location A1 (1 hp fuel sov) was confirmed tripped. After consulting the flight manual; the decision was made to not reset the circuit breaker as it was not a component or system critical to safe continuation of the flight. A code was sent via ACARS as well as a separate message to maintenance advising them that we did not attempt a reset . We received an acknowledgement of the message with a simple response of either copy or thanks with no additional information. Upon arrival at the gate; an attempt to shut down the number 1 engine was unsuccessful. ECAM then directed us to push the number 1 fire push button which was accomplished but was also ineffective. The first officer suggested resetting the tripped circuit breaker to which I alternatively recommended conferring with line maintenance. Line maintenance was contacted via radio to advise that the number 1 engine could not be shut down by the normal or alternate methods. In the course of the conversation; fuel flow was noted fluctuating erratically and egt initiated an increase to exceed temperature limits. With passengers still aboard and what I considered to be an imminent engine fire condition; I discharged agent 1 into the engine and the engine consequently shutdown. I then opened the cockpit door to confirm no smoke or fire and the aircraft continued to be deplaned uneventfully by use of the jetway. A message was received (routed to the outbound flight) from maintenance. 'Regarding 1hpfuelsov fault. FYI on arrival and at engine shutdown; please closely monitor the #1 engine shutdown to ensure that it does shutdown. The popped circuit breaker for that system may prevent normal shutdown and an alternate procedure may be needed -- T handle.' this information along with supplementary insight into the situation may have been useful if provided in a timely manner. However; the equivalent outcome may have occurred regardless. I was later informed by the assistant chief pilot that an attempt to deliver this information via ACARS in-flight was made but was inadvertently sent to another aircraft.callback conversation with reporter acn 824419 revealed the following information: the first officer was not surprised when the engine failed to shut down with the hp fuel sov circuit breaker tripped but was surprised by the lack of immediate effect when the fire switch was pushed. He believes that current air carrier systems training is inadequate; requiring individual pilot initiative to learn aircraft systems.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 flight crew reports #1 HP fuel SOV circuit breaker trip in cruise. Engine shut down at gate is unsuccessful with fuel master switch and fire switch. They experienced fuel flow surges and engine over-temps. The engine eventually did shut down some time after the fire switch was activated.

Narrative: Approximately 1 to 2 hours after departure; ECAM alerted us to a popped circuit breaker on the overhead panel. Circuit breaker location A1 (1 HP FUEL SOV) was confirmed tripped. After consulting the flight manual; the decision was made to not reset the circuit breaker as it was not a component or system critical to safe continuation of the flight. A code was sent via ACARS as well as a separate message to maintenance advising them that we did not attempt a reset . We received an acknowledgement of the message with a simple response of either copy or thanks with no additional information. Upon arrival at the gate; an attempt to shut down the number 1 engine was unsuccessful. ECAM then directed us to push the number 1 fire push button which was accomplished but was also ineffective. The First Officer suggested resetting the tripped circuit breaker to which I alternatively recommended conferring with Line Maintenance. Line Maintenance was contacted via radio to advise that the number 1 engine could not be shut down by the normal or alternate methods. In the course of the conversation; fuel flow was noted fluctuating erratically and EGT initiated an increase to exceed temperature limits. With passengers still aboard and what I considered to be an imminent engine fire condition; I discharged Agent 1 into the engine and the engine consequently shutdown. I then opened the cockpit door to confirm no smoke or fire and the aircraft continued to be deplaned uneventfully by use of the jetway. A message was received (routed to the outbound flight) from maintenance. 'Regarding 1hpfuelsov fault. FYI on arrival and at engine shutdown; please closely monitor the #1 engine shutdown to ensure that it does shutdown. The popped circuit breaker for that system may prevent normal shutdown and an alternate procedure may be needed -- T handle.' This information along with supplementary insight into the situation may have been useful if provided in a timely manner. However; the equivalent outcome may have occurred regardless. I was later informed by the Assistant Chief Pilot that an attempt to deliver this information via ACARS in-flight was made but was inadvertently sent to another aircraft.Callback conversation with reporter ACN 824419 revealed the following information: The First Officer was not surprised when the engine failed to shut down with the HP Fuel SOV circuit breaker tripped but was surprised by the lack of immediate effect when the fire switch was pushed. He believes that current air carrier systems training is inadequate; requiring individual pilot initiative to learn aircraft systems.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.