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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 824688 |
Time | |
Date | 200902 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Elevator Trim System |
Person 1 | |
Function | Single Pilot Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Private |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13 Flight Crew Total 153 Flight Crew Type 140 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control |
Narrative:
Day prior; filed 2 flight plans from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and return. Day prior; verified weight and balance within the limits and verified forecast is VFR. Received standard briefing from FSS in the morning prior cross-country: VFR along the route in both ways; parachute jumping at CCC VOR; runway 4/22 closed at destination. Received ground training/information by CFI to use the autopilot GFC700 as prerequisite prior to renting the plane. Performed the preflight inspection and verified the trim is in takeoff position. Performed the started engine checklist after passengers were installed; 4 passengers: 1 pilot and 1 child at the front; 1 adult and 1 child at the back seats pursuant advisory circular 91-62 and was validated a few months before with CFI from the same FBO which provided the plane for the best passengers seat assignment in a case of emergency. Request taxi clearance to ground; received clearance to taxi toward runway 34. Read back clearance twice but discovered was pressing autopilot disengage button instead of mike talk button on the wheel and corrected immediately after ground ATC request performed before takeoff checklist including autopilot check; flight control free and correct including proper trim position; verified autopilot engage/disengage and probably by inadvertence omit to verify again that trim is still in takeoff position. This is assumed based on afterward autopilot check by mechanic from the FBO. Requested tower clearance on runway 34 for eastbound departure; tower cleared with advisory to wake turbulence; requested delay takeoff to avoid wake turbulence; requested takeoff clearance approximately 2 minutes later and received clearance for departure runway 34. Started takeoff phase with rotation speed at 10 KTS above published vr 55 KTS for caution to probable gust wind; pulled back the wheel at 65 KTS. As soon as the airplane was airborne; the plane had tendency to sink toward runway at speed above 70 KTS; overpowered pitch to climb as probability to abort takeoff would lead that the airplane hit the ground and flip over with substantial consequences (injuries and airplane damages). At altitude cleared from any obstacles (trees) requested tower assistance as precaution for an emergency landing with possibility to use a full length of runway. Immediately after the tower request; pull autopilot fuse and trim airplane for takeoff position. In the meanwhile; tower cleared my aircraft to land at any runway during the troubleshooting and requested another airplane on final runway 34 few miles out to climb above traffic pattern altitude (approximately 1;000 ft above). Informed immediately tower that emergency request can be canceled as full control of the airplane is regained; request tower to land on runway 34 for safety precaution (to verify no electrical nor mechanical problem with the airplane). Tower provided clearance for landing at runway 34. After landing; tower cleared to taxi to FBO; emergency vehicle followed the plane to FBO; FBO mechanical check the airplane with no apparent mechanical/electrical failure which conclude to inadvertent failure to verify trim position during the before checklist phase. Any deviation from far; aim; poh and ATC clearance was totally inadvertent. A safe pilot is not an incident or accident free pilot; but someone who performed recurrent training; participate frequently to safety seminars and learn through experiences. This event could be avoided if trim position was verified at the run-up area prior takeoff; additional check during takeoff roll and prior airplane rotation could open the option for a takeoff abort with limited consequences. Finally; probable focus on the new autopilot as training was provided just prior the cross-country flight may inadvertence diverted pilot from the checklist.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: C172 pilot suffered control problems during takeoff and returns to departure airport.
Narrative: Day prior; filed 2 flight plans from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and return. Day prior; verified weight and balance within the limits and verified forecast is VFR. Received standard briefing from FSS in the morning prior cross-country: VFR along the route in both ways; parachute jumping at CCC VOR; Runway 4/22 closed at destination. Received ground training/information by CFI to use the autopilot GFC700 as prerequisite prior to renting the plane. Performed the preflight inspection and verified the trim is in takeoff position. Performed the Started Engine checklist after passengers were installed; 4 passengers: 1 pilot and 1 child at the front; 1 adult and 1 child at the back seats pursuant Advisory Circular 91-62 and was validated a few months before with CFI from the same FBO which provided the plane for the best passengers seat assignment in a case of emergency. Request taxi clearance to ground; received clearance to taxi toward Runway 34. Read back clearance twice but discovered was pressing autopilot disengage button instead of mike talk button on the wheel and corrected immediately after Ground ATC request performed before takeoff checklist including autopilot check; flight control free and correct including proper trim position; verified autopilot engage/disengage and probably by inadvertence omit to verify again that trim is still in takeoff position. This is assumed based on afterward autopilot check by Mechanic from the FBO. Requested Tower clearance on Runway 34 for eastbound departure; Tower cleared with advisory to wake turbulence; requested delay takeoff to avoid wake turbulence; requested takeoff clearance approximately 2 minutes later and received clearance for departure Runway 34. Started takeoff phase with rotation speed at 10 KTS above published Vr 55 KTS for caution to probable gust wind; pulled back the wheel at 65 KTS. As soon as the airplane was airborne; the plane had tendency to sink toward runway at speed above 70 KTS; overpowered pitch to climb as probability to abort takeoff would lead that the airplane hit the ground and flip over with substantial consequences (injuries and airplane damages). At altitude cleared from any obstacles (trees) requested Tower assistance as precaution for an emergency landing with possibility to use a full length of runway. Immediately after the Tower request; pull autopilot fuse and trim airplane for takeoff position. In the meanwhile; Tower cleared my aircraft to land at any runway during the troubleshooting and requested another airplane on final Runway 34 few miles out to climb above traffic pattern altitude (approximately 1;000 FT above). Informed immediately Tower that emergency request can be canceled as full control of the airplane is regained; request Tower to land on Runway 34 for safety precaution (to verify no electrical nor mechanical problem with the airplane). Tower provided clearance for landing at Runway 34. After landing; Tower cleared to taxi to FBO; emergency vehicle followed the plane to FBO; FBO mechanical check the airplane with no apparent mechanical/electrical failure which conclude to inadvertent failure to verify trim position during the before checklist phase. Any deviation from FAR; AIM; POH and ATC clearance was totally inadvertent. A safe pilot is not an incident or accident free pilot; but someone who performed recurrent training; participate frequently to safety seminars and learn through experiences. This event could be avoided if trim position was verified at the run-up area prior takeoff; additional check during takeoff roll and prior airplane rotation could open the option for a takeoff abort with limited consequences. Finally; probable focus on the new autopilot as training was provided just prior the cross-country flight may inadvertence diverted pilot from the checklist.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.