Narrative:

During the maintenance review; it was discovered that the #1 fuel boost pump in the center fuel tank was deferred inoperative. I reviewed the placard information with regard to flight planning restrictions and any impacts that they would have on the morning's flight. After I had determined that there were no negative impacts; I reviewed the operational procedure for the deferral. I conferred with the first officer; we agreed on the fuel load; and I signed the release. When I got to the cockpit; the new release was on the printer. I verified that it was current and placed it in the release pouch in the logbook. I then went into ACARS and requested a copy of the MEL card; using the deferral number referenced on the release so that I could have a copy of the procedure to reference during the departure without having to use the release for this purpose. The procedures on both the release and the MEL card are identical until you get to item D 'cockpit preparation.' the procedure on the release is as follows: 'D. Cockpit preparation: 1. Fuel crossfeed switch 'off' (blank). 2. Fuel center tank pumps 1 and 2 'off.' example: if fuel in center tank: 1. Inflight; after takeoff checklist complete: (a) fuel crossfeed switch 'on.' (B) operable center tank pump 'on.' the release and MEL card are identical again after this point. The MEL card procedure is as follows: D. Cockpit preparation; 1. Fuel crossfeed switch 'off' (blank). (B) affected center tank pump 'off.' example: if fuel in center tank: 1. Inflight; after takeoff checklist complete: (a) fuel crossfeed switch 'on.' (B) verify operable center tank pump 'on.' as before; the MEL card is identical to the release procedure from this point on. During the initial cockpit setup; I referenced the release procedure and selected both center tank pump switches to 'off' and verified that the crossfeed switch was 'off.' we pushed back from the gate. The first officer was starting the engines. I was given a salute and release from guidance. While the first officer was completing the engine start; I took the time to review the boost pump inoperative MEL procedure. This time; with the release properly stowed in the logbook; I referenced the MEL card that I had requested from ACARS. This time I noticed that the procedure called for the operative boost pump to be 'on.' this is where the human factors issues come into play. We are a ZZZ based crew. It is XA30L. I was able to go to sleep early and got 6 hours of sleep prior to getting up for the trip and I felt well rested. I would like to say that I caught the discrepancy at this point; investigated deeper; and through available resources; determined the correct procedure to be used. However; that is not the case. I chalked the difference up to the fact that it was very early in the morning; that I must have made a mistake or misread the procedure earlier; and that since I had the written step-by-step instructions right in my hand; that the error was mine and I proceeded to follow the MEL card procedure. It was not until after we were airborne that my brain kept gnawing at the fact that something just didn't add up. Once we were established in cruise flight; I began a complete mental review of what had occurred. I then reviewed the MEL card again and then I reviewed the release. It was during this process that I discovered the discrepancy between the 2 documents. After arrival; I contacted the maintenance controller on duty; and explained to him the discrepancy. He made note of it and asked me to contact the A320 fleet coordinator at a phone number that he provided. I contacted the A320 fleet coordinator. We went over the problem in detail. He advised me that he would contact operations engineering to investigate why the correct references were not being pulled up properly in the computer and that he would contact the maintenance A320 desk to ensure that the crews currently flying the aircraft were advised as to the proper/current procedure to use for

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 Captain reports discrepancy between procedures for one center tank fuel pump inoperative contained in the MEL and printed on the Maintenance Release.

Narrative: During the maintenance review; it was discovered that the #1 fuel boost pump in the center fuel tank was deferred inoperative. I reviewed the placard information with regard to flight planning restrictions and any impacts that they would have on the morning's flight. After I had determined that there were no negative impacts; I reviewed the operational procedure for the deferral. I conferred with the First Officer; we agreed on the fuel load; and I signed the release. When I got to the cockpit; the new release was on the printer. I verified that it was current and placed it in the release pouch in the logbook. I then went into ACARS and requested a copy of the MEL card; using the deferral number referenced on the release so that I could have a copy of the procedure to reference during the departure without having to use the release for this purpose. The procedures on both the release and the MEL card are identical until you get to item D 'Cockpit Preparation.' The procedure on the release is as follows: 'D. Cockpit Preparation: 1. Fuel crossfeed switch 'off' (blank). 2. Fuel center tank pumps 1 and 2 'off.' Example: If fuel in center tank: 1. Inflight; after takeoff checklist complete: (A) Fuel crossfeed switch 'on.' (B) Operable center tank pump 'on.' The release and MEL card are identical again after this point. The MEL card procedure is as follows: D. Cockpit Preparation; 1. Fuel crossfeed switch 'off' (blank). (b) Affected center tank pump 'off.' Example: If fuel in center tank: 1. Inflight; after takeoff checklist complete: (A) Fuel crossfeed switch 'on.' (B) Verify operable center tank pump 'on.' As before; the MEL card is identical to the release procedure from this point on. During the initial cockpit setup; I referenced the release procedure and selected both center tank pump switches to 'off' and verified that the crossfeed switch was 'off.' We pushed back from the gate. The First Officer was starting the engines. I was given a salute and release from guidance. While the First Officer was completing the engine start; I took the time to review the boost pump inoperative MEL procedure. This time; with the release properly stowed in the logbook; I referenced the MEL card that I had requested from ACARS. This time I noticed that the procedure called for the operative boost pump to be 'on.' This is where the human factors issues come into play. We are a ZZZ based crew. It is XA30L. I was able to go to sleep early and got 6 hours of sleep prior to getting up for the trip and I felt well rested. I would like to say that I caught the discrepancy at this point; investigated deeper; and through available resources; determined the correct procedure to be used. However; that is not the case. I chalked the difference up to the fact that it was very early in the morning; that I must have made a mistake or misread the procedure earlier; and that since I had the written step-by-step instructions right in my hand; that the error was mine and I proceeded to follow the MEL card procedure. It was not until after we were airborne that my brain kept gnawing at the fact that something just didn't add up. Once we were established in cruise flight; I began a complete mental review of what had occurred. I then reviewed the MEL card again and then I reviewed the release. It was during this process that I discovered the discrepancy between the 2 documents. After arrival; I contacted the Maintenance Controller on duty; and explained to him the discrepancy. He made note of it and asked me to contact the A320 Fleet Coordinator at a phone number that he provided. I contacted the A320 Fleet Coordinator. We went over the problem in detail. He advised me that he would contact Operations Engineering to investigate why the correct references were not being pulled up properly in the computer and that he would contact the Maintenance A320 desk to ensure that the crews currently flying the aircraft were advised as to the proper/current procedure to use for

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.