Narrative:

Immediately after rotation (prior to gear lever actuation); with captain flying; ECAM display illuminated with avionics vent ECAM displayed. Captain continued with normal takeoff profile and initial ECAM procedures were handled by first officer after aircraft was flown to a safe altitude. In accordance with ECAM warning; first officer switched 'extract' fan switch to 'off' position (the extract switch did not have a fault light in the switch illuminated; so the first officer pushed to switch to the 'out' position). About 45 seconds after the initial ECAM warning and after the extract fan switch was released; electronics 'dc bus shed' ECAM illuminated along with circuit breaker tripped on left electronics bay. At this time; captain engaged autopilot #2 because autopilot #1 would not engage. While captain and first officer viewed the affected systems on the ECAM pages; the purser buzzed the cockpit to notify us that the emergency exit lights were on and/or flashing above the doors and the emergency lighting was illuminating intermittently. The ECAM displayed 'wing anti-ice; vent extraction; fcdc 1' and multiple other systems were inoperative. After a quick evaluation of the situation; the captain contacted dispatch and was patched through to maintenance control. After describing the ECAM display and system losses to the maintenance controller; maintenance control had 'no inflight fixes' for us because of the tripped electronics bay circuit breaker and suggested landing so that ground maintenance could fix the problem. After a short discussion in the cockpit; captain and first officer agreed that a return would be the most prudent course of action in light of the multitude of degraded aircraft systems. Captain notified dispatch of her decision and ATC was notified. Despite multiple calls from purser with reports of cabin emergency lights flashing on and off; captain performed an uneventful landing and rollout. Mechanic met the airplane and reported that he would be changing the dc ess bus schedule. Captain and first officer were contacted by crew desk and notified that our scheduled flight could not be flown without exceeding our legal crew day limits. Captain and first officer were reassigned to new flights and dispatched to hotel for crew rest. Although we were flying our last leg of the day after a long sit in ZZZ; it is my opinion that human factors did not play a role in this event. Crew communication and coordination were excellent throughout this event and I cannot recall any errors of omission or commission in the handling of this malfunctioning aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 flight crew experiences DC ESS BUS shed failure after rotation and after consulting with maintenance; they elect to return for uneventful landing.

Narrative: Immediately after rotation (prior to gear lever actuation); with Captain flying; ECAM display illuminated with Avionics Vent ECAM displayed. Captain continued with normal takeoff profile and initial ECAM procedures were handled by First Officer after aircraft was flown to a safe altitude. In accordance with ECAM warning; First Officer switched 'Extract' fan switch to 'off' position (the extract switch did not have a fault light in the switch illuminated; so the First Officer pushed to switch to the 'out' position). About 45 seconds after the initial ECAM warning and after the extract fan switch was released; electronics 'DC BUS SHED' ECAM illuminated along with CB tripped on left electronics bay. At this time; Captain engaged Autopilot #2 because Autopilot #1 would not engage. While Captain and First Officer viewed the affected systems on the ECAM pages; the Purser buzzed the cockpit to notify us that the emergency exit lights were on and/or flashing above the doors and the emergency lighting was illuminating intermittently. The ECAM displayed 'WING ANTI-ICE; VENT EXTRACTION; FCDC 1' and multiple other systems were inoperative. After a quick evaluation of the situation; the Captain contacted Dispatch and was patched through to Maintenance Control. After describing the ECAM display and system losses to the Maintenance Controller; Maintenance Control had 'no inflight fixes' for us because of the tripped electronics bay CB and suggested landing so that Ground Maintenance could fix the problem. After a short discussion in the cockpit; Captain and First Officer agreed that a return would be the most prudent course of action in light of the multitude of degraded aircraft systems. Captain notified Dispatch of her decision and ATC was notified. Despite multiple calls from Purser with reports of cabin emergency lights flashing on and off; Captain performed an uneventful landing and rollout. Mechanic met the airplane and reported that he would be changing the DC ESS BUS Schedule. Captain and First Officer were contacted by crew desk and notified that our scheduled flight could not be flown without exceeding our legal crew day limits. Captain and First Officer were reassigned to new flights and dispatched to hotel for crew rest. Although we were flying our last leg of the day after a long sit in ZZZ; it is my opinion that human factors did not play a role in this event. Crew communication and coordination were excellent throughout this event and I cannot recall any errors of omission or commission in the handling of this malfunctioning aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.