Narrative:

We were flying the arrival to ZZZ and were level at FL330; with a clearance to cross intersection at FL230. I was the captain and the pilot flying. I programmed the FMS for the ILS xxr approach to ZZZ and conducted the approach briefing. Then the first officer went over to the #2 VHF radio to contact company for our arrival gate information. At that point; center called to ask if I would be able to make the intersection crossing restriction. I realized I was too close to xxxxx with too much altitude to lose; had missed the top-of-descent point; and would not make the restriction. Center then cleared me to cross a subsequent intersection at FL190 and 250 KTS. I was able to make the second crossing restriction. ATC didn't indicate that my lapse had caused any traffic conflicts. I don't know why I missed the top-of-descent point. I was very tired. I had not slept well the night before; and this particular flight was full of distractions including a passenger medical problem; a missed frequency change from ATC and several aircraft maintenance issues. Another possible factor was that this particular first officer and I don't seem to mesh that well as a crew. Supplemental information from acn 827716: during the time I would normally have been focused on backing up the pilot flying; my attention shifted to calling station operations for our gate assignment and special requirements for coordinating medical attention for a passenger that was ill during the first hour of the flight. By the time I finished and returned to the ATC frequency; ATC was querying if we were going to make our restriction. The captain realized he would not. We were then given another restriction to cross yyyyy at FL190. This event occurred on day 3 of a 4-day trip and I believe crew fatigue was a major factor. I had completed 2 days of ground training followed by a red-eye home only to turn around the next day to travel to the simulator for 6 straight days of training that included a shift to back side of the clock training for the last 2 events. After just 1 day at home; I commuted to my domicile to fly this trip the following day. A 1-leg transcontinental was flown each day of the 2 days prior to the incident with a 3-hour change of body clock. During the first hour of the trip on the day of occurrence; the entire crew dealt with an on-board medical issue that had the potential to result in a divert. Crew coordination during that event was outstanding. The captain and I spent a great deal of time analyzing all aspects of CRM during this period and discussed the necessary action required prior to landing even though the status of the passenger had stabilized. The combination of fatigue and the distraction of calling company prior to landing even though the status of the passenger had stabilized. The combination of fatigue and the distraction of calling company prior to/during a critical phase of flight contributed to a situation where I failed to properly back up the pilot flying. I have long believed that the requirement to call company when in range; when ACARS is readily available; always presented the opportunity for a mistake like this to happen when one pilot is out of the loop.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reports missing crossing restriction during arrival. Fatigue and one pilot talking on company radio are cited as factors.

Narrative: We were flying the arrival to ZZZ and were level at FL330; with a clearance to cross intersection at FL230. I was the Captain and the pilot flying. I programmed the FMS for the ILS XXR approach to ZZZ and conducted the approach briefing. Then the First Officer went over to the #2 VHF radio to contact company for our arrival gate information. At that point; Center called to ask if I would be able to make the intersection crossing restriction. I realized I was too close to XXXXX with too much altitude to lose; had missed the top-of-descent point; and would not make the restriction. Center then cleared me to cross a subsequent intersection at FL190 and 250 KTS. I was able to make the second crossing restriction. ATC didn't indicate that my lapse had caused any traffic conflicts. I don't know why I missed the top-of-descent point. I was very tired. I had not slept well the night before; and this particular flight was full of distractions including a passenger medical problem; a missed frequency change from ATC and several aircraft maintenance issues. Another possible factor was that this particular First Officer and I don't seem to mesh that well as a crew. Supplemental information from ACN 827716: During the time I would normally have been focused on backing up the pilot flying; my attention shifted to calling station operations for our gate assignment and special requirements for coordinating medical attention for a passenger that was ill during the first hour of the flight. By the time I finished and returned to the ATC frequency; ATC was querying if we were going to make our restriction. The Captain realized he would not. We were then given another restriction to cross YYYYY at FL190. This event occurred on day 3 of a 4-day trip and I believe crew fatigue was a major factor. I had completed 2 days of ground training followed by a red-eye home only to turn around the next day to travel to the simulator for 6 straight days of training that included a shift to back side of the clock training for the last 2 events. After just 1 day at home; I commuted to my domicile to fly this trip the following day. A 1-leg transcontinental was flown each day of the 2 days prior to the incident with a 3-hour change of body clock. During the first hour of the trip on the day of occurrence; the entire crew dealt with an on-board medical issue that had the potential to result in a divert. Crew coordination during that event was outstanding. The Captain and I spent a great deal of time analyzing all aspects of CRM during this period and discussed the necessary action required prior to landing even though the status of the passenger had stabilized. The combination of fatigue and the distraction of calling company prior to landing even though the status of the passenger had stabilized. The combination of fatigue and the distraction of calling company prior to/during a critical phase of flight contributed to a situation where I failed to properly back up the Pilot Flying. I have long believed that the requirement to call company when in range; when ACARS is readily available; always presented the opportunity for a mistake like this to happen when one pilot is out of the loop.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.