Narrative:

I issued an approach clearance for a PA-34 to proceed direct keslr for the RNAV runway 34 approach at dab. The aircraft was observed navigating toward the fix. Shortly thereafter; the aircraft was observed deviating to the northeast; about 60 degrees off course. I quickly determined that the pilot was having some difficulty with navigating and began issuing instructions for an ASR approach to runway 34. As a rule of thumb and safe operating habit; I looked up to the backlit overhead which contains various need-to-know information to verify the MDA which is 480 ft for that approach. Another controller entered the TRACON to relieve me; and I asked him to set up the adjacent scope for that approach so that I could reference it. He also pulled the information for that approach up on the ids 4 display. Prior to his arrival in the room; I had issued the MDA to the pilot. As I was issuing the instruction for the pilot to descend to the MDA of 480 ft; he observed that the ids 4 indicated that the MDA was 580 ft. The pilot concurrently reported the field in sight and was instructed to proceed visually. However; upon further investigation; there was at least one other approach that had a different published MDA than what is currently displayed on the overhead charts. So; apparently there is no management control at dab ATCT to review the published information every 56 days and correct all information sources accordingly. In addition; this is need-to-know information that should be briefed to the workforce. Fortunately; the chain of events allowed for a safe landing. There was and is a potential for loss of life and property until appropriate management controls are put in place to display the correct information.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DAB controller described inaccurate approach procedure information displayed in the control room.

Narrative: I issued an approach clearance for a PA-34 to proceed direct KESLR for the RNAV Runway 34 approach at DAB. The aircraft was observed navigating toward the fix. Shortly thereafter; the aircraft was observed deviating to the northeast; about 60 degrees off course. I quickly determined that the pilot was having some difficulty with navigating and began issuing instructions for an ASR approach to Runway 34. As a rule of thumb and safe operating habit; I looked up to the backlit overhead which contains various need-to-know information to verify the MDA which is 480 FT for that approach. Another Controller entered the TRACON to relieve me; and I asked him to set up the adjacent scope for that approach so that I could reference it. He also pulled the information for that approach up on the IDS 4 display. Prior to his arrival in the room; I had issued the MDA to the pilot. As I was issuing the instruction for the pilot to descend to the MDA of 480 FT; he observed that the IDS 4 indicated that the MDA was 580 FT. The pilot concurrently reported the field in sight and was instructed to proceed visually. However; upon further investigation; there was at least one other approach that had a different published MDA than what is currently displayed on the overhead charts. So; apparently there is no management control at DAB ATCT to review the published information every 56 days and correct all information sources accordingly. In addition; this is need-to-know information that should be briefed to the workforce. Fortunately; the chain of events allowed for a safe landing. There was and is a potential for loss of life and property until appropriate management controls are put in place to display the correct information.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.