Narrative:

This incident occurred while being radar vectored for a landing in visual flight conditions. The last acknowledged clearance/transmission from detroit approach control to my flight before the incident was to turn right to 180 degrees, descend to 4000' and maintain a speed of 190 KTS. I acknowledged this clearance and the first officer who was flying complied. Both the first officer and myself observed this heading was taking us through the localizer course the previous controller had told us to expect (21R). Frequency congestion was such that I was unable to query the controller about this impending situation. The controller then called us and said we appeared to be lining up for runway 21L, and to turn to a heading of 240 degrees. The first officer started the turn, but before I could acknowledge the transmission, another controller came on the frequency abruptly and told us to turn to a heading of 250 degrees and descend to 3000' immediately. The first officer continued his turn and began a descent to comply with the clearance. I then commented to the controller that we had not been cleared for an approach. As we were in our turn I noticed air carrier Y at our 10 O'clock position, about 1 mi away in a left banked turn to a south westerly heading, and he appeared to be in a climb. I then commented to the controller that I had air carrier Y in sight and the airport in sight but we still had not been cleared for the visual approach to runway 21R. At this time, the controller cleared us for the approach to runway 21R and air carrier Y resumed his approach to runway 12L. Contributing factors: large vol of traffic in approach area, rapid nonceasing radio xmissions, major airline push in progress, and controller training in progress. I fully understand the need for controller training under actual conditions, however supervisors must not let actual conditions deteriorate to this point in order to make a lesson plan point. It was unnerving enough to the flight crews involved, not to mention the passenger who obviously saw what had happened. Supplemental information from acn 83059: after flying approximately 1/2 mi east of the runway 21R extended centerline and 8 ILS DME, the controller directed us to turn to a 240 degree heading and said we were lined up with runway 21L, and to check our ILS frequency as if he thought we had been told to intercept the localizer to runway 21R.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION BETWEEN 2 ACR MAKING PARALLEL APCHS. OPERATIONAL ERROR.

Narrative: THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED WHILE BEING RADAR VECTORED FOR A LNDG IN VISUAL FLT CONDITIONS. THE LAST ACKNOWLEDGED CLRNC/XMISSION FROM DETROIT APCH CTL TO MY FLT BEFORE THE INCIDENT WAS TO TURN RIGHT TO 180 DEGS, DSND TO 4000' AND MAINTAIN A SPD OF 190 KTS. I ACKNOWLEDGED THIS CLRNC AND THE F/O WHO WAS FLYING COMPLIED. BOTH THE F/O AND MYSELF OBSERVED THIS HDG WAS TAKING US THROUGH THE LOC COURSE THE PREVIOUS CTLR HAD TOLD US TO EXPECT (21R). FREQ CONGESTION WAS SUCH THAT I WAS UNABLE TO QUERY THE CTLR ABOUT THIS IMPENDING SITUATION. THE CTLR THEN CALLED US AND SAID WE APPEARED TO BE LINING UP FOR RWY 21L, AND TO TURN TO A HDG OF 240 DEGS. THE F/O STARTED THE TURN, BUT BEFORE I COULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE XMISSION, ANOTHER CTLR CAME ON THE FREQ ABRUPTLY AND TOLD US TO TURN TO A HDG OF 250 DEGS AND DSND TO 3000' IMMEDIATELY. THE F/O CONTINUED HIS TURN AND BEGAN A DSCNT TO COMPLY WITH THE CLRNC. I THEN COMMENTED TO THE CTLR THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN CLRED FOR AN APCH. AS WE WERE IN OUR TURN I NOTICED ACR Y AT OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS, ABOUT 1 MI AWAY IN A LEFT BANKED TURN TO A S WESTERLY HDG, AND HE APPEARED TO BE IN A CLB. I THEN COMMENTED TO THE CTLR THAT I HAD ACR Y IN SIGHT AND THE ARPT IN SIGHT BUT WE STILL HAD NOT BEEN CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 21R. AT THIS TIME, THE CTLR CLRED US FOR THE APCH TO RWY 21R AND ACR Y RESUMED HIS APCH TO RWY 12L. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: LARGE VOL OF TFC IN APCH AREA, RAPID NONCEASING RADIO XMISSIONS, MAJOR AIRLINE PUSH IN PROGRESS, AND CTLR TRNING IN PROGRESS. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR CTLR TRNING UNDER ACTUAL CONDITIONS, HOWEVER SUPVRS MUST NOT LET ACTUAL CONDITIONS DETERIORATE TO THIS POINT IN ORDER TO MAKE A LESSON PLAN POINT. IT WAS UNNERVING ENOUGH TO THE FLT CREWS INVOLVED, NOT TO MENTION THE PAX WHO OBVIOUSLY SAW WHAT HAD HAPPENED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 83059: AFTER FLYING APPROX 1/2 MI E OF THE RWY 21R EXTENDED CENTERLINE AND 8 ILS DME, THE CTLR DIRECTED US TO TURN TO A 240 DEG HDG AND SAID WE WERE LINED UP WITH RWY 21L, AND TO CHK OUR ILS FREQ AS IF HE THOUGHT WE HAD BEEN TOLD TO INTERCEPT THE LOC TO RWY 21R.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.