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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 832879 |
Time | |
Date | 200904 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A319 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240 Flight Crew Total 17000 Flight Crew Type 6000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural MEL Deviation - Procedural Maintenance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Flight was dispatched with an inoperative adr #3. The captain anticipated that the proper switch configuration for this flight would be with the adiru #3 selector on and the adr #3 switch selected off. When the crew arrived at the airplane they found a deferred sticker applied over the adr #3 switch. During cockpit setup; the captain selected adiru #3 to 'on' and pushed adr #2 to 'off' (lifting the deferred sticker in order to push the switch). At this point; the adiru on battery illuminated steady and the nose gear (adiru on battery power) horn sounded. The captain then selected the adiru #3 to off and inferred that the proper switch position must be adiru #3 to off. The remainder of the crew pre-departure requirements for the adr inoperative corresponded to the text in the mrd. During cruise; the captain was preparing a message to maintenance concerning the proper nomenclature for the adiru switches and discovered that maintenance had incorrectly collared the 115VAC adiru circuit breaker rather than the 26 vac and aoa specified in the mrd. Maintenance uploaded the MEL card for adiru #3 inoperative which was essentially the same as the MEL card for an adr #3 inoperative. After a few messages back and forth to maintenance; the captain elected to leave all the switches and cbs in their current positions.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A319 Captain is flummoxed by the ADIRU switch positions when dispatched with the #3 ADR deferred inoperative. Ultimately determined maintenance had pulled and collared the incorrect circuit breaker.
Narrative: Flight was dispatched with an inoperative ADR #3. The Captain anticipated that the proper switch configuration for this flight would be with the ADIRU #3 selector on and the ADR #3 switch selected off. When the crew arrived at the airplane they found a deferred sticker applied over the ADR #3 switch. During cockpit setup; the Captain selected ADIRU #3 to 'on' and pushed ADR #2 to 'off' (lifting the deferred sticker in order to push the switch). At this point; the ADIRU on battery illuminated steady and the nose gear (ADIRU on battery power) horn sounded. The Captain then selected the ADIRU #3 to off and inferred that the proper switch position must be ADIRU #3 to off. The remainder of the crew pre-departure requirements for the ADR inoperative corresponded to the text in the MRD. During cruise; the Captain was preparing a message to maintenance concerning the proper nomenclature for the ADIRU switches and discovered that maintenance had incorrectly collared the 115VAC ADIRU CB rather than the 26 VAC and AOA specified in the MRD. Maintenance uploaded the MEL card for ADIRU #3 inoperative which was essentially the same as the MEL card for an ADR #3 inoperative. After a few messages back and forth to maintenance; the Captain elected to leave all the switches and CBs in their current positions.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.