Narrative:

The reasons for the incident are numerous. One; the jet bridge had not moved since the night before. The jet bridge was out of position by several feet; which I could not deduce from my position in the cockpit; as my main focus was the marshaller guiding the aircraft into the space. The whole jet bridge resides under the red striped non-movement area. None of the ramp personnel verified the position of the jet bridge prior to my taxi and park. The individual that guided the aircraft into gate never questioned how close we were to the jet bridge until it was too late. The wing walker on the left wing became a non-participant once out of my line of sight. Any warning he/she could have given would have been blocked from view by the aircraft or jet bridge. The gate agent standing near the jet bridge controls at the time of the incident did not give the marshaller any physical or aural warning at the time of impact. Ironically; the nose wheel was parked right on top of the parking T as evidenced by photos taken twenty minutes after the incident. Flight from had just landed and taxied to our assigned gate. We waited for a marshalling crew to arrive outside of the gate. Two ramp personnel marshaled us in both with wands; one on my left wing to clear ramp traffic the other individual to clear directly ahead into the gate. My first officer was heads up and cleared to the right. With both engines operating I taxied into the gate at a walking pace and slowed as I approached the marshaller ahead. The jet bridge was turned away from the aircraft and my focus was on the marshaller ahead to verify distance remaining for the final brake application and eventual park. As the marshaller's hands were crossing the wands; the left propeller started striking the jet bridge; jet bridge guide wire; and some insulation on the jet bridge. The propellers were not yet in feather; and the power levers were ground idle. I visually confirmed that the propeller was indeed striking the bridge; and immediately loosened the friction lock and placed both condition levers to fuel off. Both feet were depressing the brakes. The gate agent who was in the jet bridge ran for safety and the marshaller who guided the aircraft into the jet bridge ran west away from the aircraft. The engines gauges did not show any abnormal reading during the shutdown. Once the engines were shutdown ramp; gate; and maintenance personnel arrived to assess the damage and de-plane passengers. No individuals were injured during the incident; except for the propeller no other damage was apparent to the aircraft; and the jet bridge suffered minor sheet metal damage. Be willing to question the situation when it does not appear safe to equipment or people. General situational awareness on the part of the ground personnel could have remedied the situation. The jet bridge non-movement area for gate is poorly marked; a single white line is all the separates two distinct parts of the non-movement area for reasons that I can only assume are for different types of the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A SF340's left propeller contacted a jet bridge; which had not been properly repositioned from the night before; and left wing walker's signal was blocked by the jet bridge.

Narrative: The reasons for the incident are numerous. One; the jet bridge had not moved since the night before. The jet bridge was out of position by several feet; which I could not deduce from my position in the cockpit; as my main focus was the marshaller guiding the aircraft into the space. The whole jet bridge resides under the red striped non-movement area. None of the ramp personnel verified the position of the jet bridge prior to my taxi and park. The individual that guided the aircraft into gate never questioned how close we were to the jet bridge until it was too late. The wing walker on the left wing became a non-participant once out of my line of sight. Any warning he/she could have given would have been blocked from view by the aircraft or jet bridge. The gate agent standing near the jet bridge controls at the time of the incident did not give the marshaller any physical or aural warning at the time of impact. Ironically; the nose wheel was parked right on top of the parking T as evidenced by photos taken twenty minutes after the incident. Flight from had just landed and taxied to our assigned gate. We waited for a marshalling crew to arrive outside of the gate. Two ramp personnel marshaled us in both with wands; one on my left wing to clear ramp traffic the other individual to clear directly ahead into the gate. My First Officer was heads up and cleared to the right. With both engines operating I taxied into the gate at a walking pace and slowed as I approached the marshaller ahead. The jet bridge was turned away from the aircraft and my focus was on the marshaller ahead to verify distance remaining for the final brake application and eventual park. As the marshaller's hands were crossing the wands; the left propeller started striking the jet bridge; jet bridge guide wire; and some insulation on the jet bridge. The propellers were not yet in feather; and the power levers were ground idle. I visually confirmed that the propeller was indeed striking the bridge; and immediately loosened the friction lock and placed both condition levers to fuel off. Both feet were depressing the brakes. The gate agent who was in the jet bridge ran for safety and the marshaller who guided the aircraft into the jet bridge ran west away from the aircraft. The engines gauges did not show any abnormal reading during the shutdown. Once the engines were shutdown ramp; gate; and maintenance personnel arrived to assess the damage and de-plane passengers. No individuals were injured during the incident; except for the propeller no other damage was apparent to the aircraft; and the jet bridge suffered minor sheet metal damage. Be willing to question the situation when it does not appear safe to equipment or people. General situational awareness on the part of the ground personnel could have remedied the situation. The jet bridge non-movement area for gate is poorly marked; a single white line is all the separates two distinct parts of the non-movement area for reasons that I can only assume are for different types of the aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.