Narrative:

This was my initial trip as an A320 captain after completing my initial operating experience. The first leg of day 1 went well. Flight planning for this flight was normal; with our decision to add 900 pounds fuel because of my lack of experience. Enroute; we discussed and decided that we would accomplish an auto land in order to accomplish some of the 'new captain' requirements. I reviewed and briefed the first officer from the briefing guide in the A320 flight manual. We also briefed the approach based on the ATIS (VFR) and our arrival direction. On the arrival; descending to 11;000 MSL; we were given holding instructions to hold at as published. We entered holding and were given an efc for a planned 39 minute hold. The reason given was unexpected heavy rain shower 'crossing the field at this time.' the first officer sent an ACARS message to dispatch informing her of the situation and requested weather information for area airports. He also attempted to get a terminal area graphic of local area using the miscellaneous tg message; but the system was down. While the first officer did this; I flew the aircraft and made a PA to the cabin informing them of the holding situation. We entered the holding pattern with approximately 7;000 pounds. Of fuel. ACARS message was received from dispatch recommending ZZZ as our best option if a diversion was necessary. A quick bearing/distance check showed destination approximately 50 NM east; ZZZ approximately 110 NM south. The first officer and I discussed our options and agreed that ZZZ would be our diversion plan. We could see heavy rain shower on the radar between our hold and our destination; but a clear 'corridor' towards ZZZ if we had to divert. We agreed that we would use 5500# of fuel as our 'bingo' (max hold) to depart holding. At XA30z; with 6100# of fuel; I queried ATC about the efc estimate; asking if there was any chance that it would be shortened. They answered; 'no.' I told ATC that we did not have the endurance fuel and that we would like to show ZZZ as our new destination and requested to depart holding. ATC response: 'standby; they think they can get you in to your destination now. They have rain showers on final; but they say they can get you in.' after a quick question to my first officer ('are you O.K. With this?'); we were cleared to depart holding with vectors northeast out of holding. I made a PA to the cabin while the first officer sent a message to dispatch. Fuel was approx. 5900# departing the hold. We flew extended vectors to the northeast and descended per ATC instructions. All PA's were made; passengers seated; checklists accomplished; etc. Monitoring the radar; the first officer advocated a third airport as a better diversion airport based on our present position and the fact that the heaviest rain showers were now between our destination and ZZZ. I agreed. Approx 20NM northwest our destination; we were given clearance; 'descend to 4000; maintain 210 KIAS; fly heading 160 to intercept localizer.' with the AP1 engaged; I entered the heading in the FCU; confirmed the altitude on the FD; pulled the FCU altitude knob for open descent and slowed to 210 using speedbrakes and flaps 1. I told the first officer that I would use navigation initially to intercept the final because of the distance from the localizer transmitter. I pushed the heading/track knob and aurally verified that we had fmas of heading and navigation armed. I did not verify course offset value on the nd with navigation armed. ATC amended our heading assignment to 170 and I made the change and verified that navigation was still armed on the pfd. As we approached the course intercept point; ATC transmitted that they were breaking off the approach for another aircraft on final to xxl (parallel to our runway assignment) because of a windshear alert. The radio seemed very busy; and the windshear alert obviously got our attention. ATC followed that call with another transmission saying that the xxc final approach course had only heavy rain showers with no convective activity. I noticed and announced that the FMGC was not intercepting the extended course; and used the heading knob to spin the heading to approximately 210 to come back to final. I would estimate our overshoot at less than 1 NM. I armed localizer and quickly got localizer* as the first officer communicated with ATC. Because of the overshoot and delayed intercept of the localizer; ATC had not cleared us below 4000 ft and our airspeed assignment was still 210 KIAS. Once established; ATC cleared us to descend to 2000 ft. I do not remember ATC ever giving us instructions to slow. Knowing we were getting high; I immediately called; 'gear down; final descent checklist' and used full speedbrakes with open descent to descend. We entered a heavy rain shower and the radio was momentarily filled with heavy static. We received approach clearance; I armed app and engaged AP2. I never asked the first officer to set the FAF altitude; and now was most concerned with getting the aircraft slowed and configured. We were in IMC conditions because of low visibility with the heavy rain. With gear down; flaps 2; airspeed 180; and speedbrakes approximately; we crossed the FAF at 2000 MSL. Because we had not intercepted the glideslope and had not reset the FCU alt window; altitude* engaged. After a short delay; I asked the first officer to set a higher altitude in the window and called for vs 1200 down; managed speed. I disconnected the ap and manually flew the aircraft in a descent. I knew I was still high and correcting. The first officer later told me he momentarily saw vs >2000 FPM; and I would estimate our altitude approximately. 1200 AGL. (1500 MSL) and 3 NM from the runway threshold. I believe that we descended through the GS at approx 1000 AGL (approximately 1300 MSL); still in IMC. The cockpit was very busy; the GPWS? Glideslope? Warning activating as we passed through 1000 ft AGL. I began to apply backpressure to stop the descent rate. The first officer later stated that he thought he heard the mode 1 'sink rate' also; but I can't recall this. The first officer noticed I had not retracted the speedbrakes; and he retracted them. Just seconds after getting the GPWS warnings; we broke out of the rain shower and had visual with the runway. I momentarily saw VASI indications of being on glideslope (red over white) but our vector momentarily took us to indications of being below glideslope. I quickly corrected; then over-corrected and got slightly high; before finally stabilizing the approach approximately 500 ft AGL. Realizing that I still had flaps 3; I called for flaps full and verified that the final descent checklist was complete. After stabilizing at approximately 500 ft AGL; the remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful. Landing fuel was approximately 4500#; shutdown at the gate 4300#. Obviously; this is not the experience anyone wants on day 1 of being a new captain; and I've thought a lot about what happened on this flight. My first officer and I were able to openly discuss all of the events and replay what had happened so that we could try to learn from this. Some thoughts I've had: 1) if I had known how the situation was going to develop; and with the experience level of my first officer and the rapidly changing situation; I probably should have considered asking if he would be comfortable flying the approach. We could have decided this early (in the holding pattern) as a backup plan if we did go to our destination. However; we couldn't predict how everything would develop; and the requirement exists for me to fly the first 10 legs after IOE; so this would have been an exercise of captain's authority for safety. Also; had we known there would be a windshear alert to any runway at ZZZ1; we would have diverted. 2) you can only use the information you're given. It was frustrating that ATC cleared us to our destination only after we informed them that we were ready to divert to ZZZ. Maybe ATC accepted my call to divert as a minfuel call and that gave us traffic priority? 3) I now understand clearly that even though the FMGC may not have the correct from-to waypoints on the fplan (ppos at 1L); it is still possible to be in heading with navigation armed. I know I verified that FMA twice. My previous flying experience on the B777 would not let you do this; displaying a message; 'not on an intcpt heading.' I will now always try to verify the lateral distance deviation on the nd with navigation armed; also. 4) the snowball-effect of the navigation error intercepting the localizer late; getting high; and hearing the windshear alert to the other runway all contributed to my task saturation. With our fuel state getting low and being a new captain; my thought was that I had to get this aircraft on the ground and that if I could get the aircraft stabilized by short final; this was the safest call.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A new A320 Captain and an experienced First Officer described an approach into an airport with heavy weather and numerous delays. The Captain's report described a new Captain's task saturated experience and thought processes in a complex high workload aircraft.

Narrative: This was my initial trip as an A320 Captain after completing my Initial Operating Experience. The first leg of day 1 went well. Flight planning for this flight was normal; with our decision to add 900 LBS fuel because of my lack of experience. Enroute; we discussed and decided that we would accomplish an auto land in order to accomplish some of the 'new captain' requirements. I reviewed and briefed the First Officer from the briefing guide in the A320 Flight Manual. We also briefed the approach based on the ATIS (VFR) and our arrival direction. On the arrival; descending to 11;000 MSL; we were given holding instructions to hold at as published. We entered holding and were given an EFC for a planned 39 minute hold. The reason given was unexpected heavy rain shower 'crossing the field at this time.' The First Officer sent an ACARS message to Dispatch informing her of the situation and requested weather information for area airports. He also attempted to get a terminal area graphic of local area using the MISC TG message; but the system was down. While the First Officer did this; I flew the aircraft and made a PA to the cabin informing them of the holding situation. We entered the holding pattern with approximately 7;000 LBS. of fuel. ACARS message was received from Dispatch recommending ZZZ as our best option if a diversion was necessary. A quick bearing/distance check showed destination approximately 50 NM east; ZZZ approximately 110 NM south. The First Officer and I discussed our options and agreed that ZZZ would be our diversion plan. We could see heavy rain shower on the radar between our hold and our destination; but a clear 'corridor' towards ZZZ if we had to divert. We agreed that we would use 5500# of fuel as our 'Bingo' (max hold) to depart holding. At XA30z; with 6100# of fuel; I queried ATC about the EFC estimate; asking if there was any chance that it would be shortened. They answered; 'No.' I told ATC that we did not have the endurance fuel and that we would like to show ZZZ as our new destination and requested to depart holding. ATC response: 'Standby; they think they can get you in to your destination now. They have rain showers on final; but they say they can get you in.' After a quick question to my First Officer ('Are you O.K. with this?'); we were cleared to depart holding with vectors northeast out of holding. I made a PA to the cabin while the First Officer sent a message to dispatch. Fuel was approx. 5900# departing the hold. We flew extended vectors to the northeast and descended per ATC instructions. All PA's were made; passengers seated; checklists accomplished; etc. Monitoring the radar; the First Officer advocated a third airport as a better diversion airport based on our present position and the fact that the heaviest rain showers were now between our destination and ZZZ. I agreed. Approx 20NM northwest our destination; we were given clearance; 'Descend to 4000; maintain 210 KIAS; fly heading 160 to intercept localizer.' With the AP1 engaged; I entered the heading in the FCU; confirmed the altitude on the FD; pulled the FCU altitude knob for open descent and slowed to 210 using speedbrakes and Flaps 1. I told the First Officer that I would use NAV initially to intercept the final because of the distance from the LOC transmitter. I pushed the HEADING/TRACK knob and aurally verified that we had FMAs of HDG and NAV armed. I did not verify course offset value on the ND with NAV armed. ATC amended our heading assignment to 170 and I made the change and verified that NAV was still armed on the PFD. As we approached the course intercept point; ATC transmitted that they were breaking off the approach for another aircraft on final to XXL (parallel to our runway assignment) because of a windshear alert. The radio seemed very busy; and the windshear alert obviously got our attention. ATC followed that call with another transmission saying that the XXC final approach course had only heavy rain showers with no convective activity. I noticed and announced that the FMGC was not intercepting the extended course; and used the heading knob to spin the heading to approximately 210 to come back to final. I would estimate our overshoot at less than 1 NM. I armed LOC and quickly got LOC* as the First Officer communicated with ATC. Because of the overshoot and delayed intercept of the LOC; ATC had not cleared us below 4000 FT and our airspeed assignment was still 210 KIAS. Once established; ATC cleared us to descend to 2000 FT. I do not remember ATC ever giving us instructions to slow. Knowing we were getting high; I immediately called; 'Gear down; Final Descent Checklist' and used full speedbrakes with open descent to descend. We entered a heavy rain shower and the radio was momentarily filled with heavy static. We received approach clearance; I armed APP and engaged AP2. I never asked the First Officer to set the FAF altitude; and now was most concerned with getting the aircraft slowed and configured. We were in IMC conditions because of low visibility with the heavy rain. With GEAR DOWN; Flaps 2; Airspeed 180; and speedbrakes approximately; we crossed the FAF at 2000 MSL. Because we had not intercepted the glideslope and had not reset the FCU alt window; ALT* engaged. After a short delay; I asked the First Officer to set a higher altitude in the window and called for VS 1200 down; managed speed. I disconnected the AP and manually flew the aircraft in a descent. I knew I was still high and correcting. The First Officer later told me he momentarily saw VS >2000 FPM; and I would estimate our altitude approximately. 1200 AGL. (1500 MSL) and 3 NM from the runway threshold. I believe that we descended through the GS at approx 1000 AGL (approximately 1300 MSL); still in IMC. The cockpit was very busy; the GPWS? GLIDESLOPE? Warning activating as we passed through 1000 FT AGL. I began to apply backpressure to stop the descent rate. The First Officer later stated that he thought he heard the Mode 1 'SINK RATE' also; but I can't recall this. The First Officer noticed I had not retracted the speedbrakes; and he retracted them. Just seconds after getting the GPWS warnings; we broke out of the rain shower and had visual with the runway. I momentarily saw VASI indications of being on glideslope (Red over White) but our vector momentarily took us to indications of being below glideslope. I quickly corrected; then over-corrected and got slightly high; before finally stabilizing the approach approximately 500 FT AGL. Realizing that I still had Flaps 3; I called for Flaps full and verified that the FINAL DESCENT checklist was complete. After stabilizing at approximately 500 FT AGL; the remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful. Landing fuel was approximately 4500#; shutdown at the gate 4300#. Obviously; this is not the experience anyone wants on Day 1 of being a new Captain; and I've thought a lot about what happened on this flight. My First Officer and I were able to openly discuss all of the events and replay what had happened so that we could try to learn from this. Some thoughts I've had: 1) If I had known how the situation was going to develop; and with the experience level of my First Officer and the rapidly changing situation; I probably should have considered asking if he would be comfortable flying the approach. We could have decided this early (in the holding pattern) as a backup plan if we did go to our destination. However; we couldn't predict how everything would develop; and the requirement exists for me to fly the first 10 legs after IOE; so this would have been an exercise of Captain's Authority for safety. Also; had we known there would be a windshear alert to any runway at ZZZ1; we would have diverted. 2) You can only use the information you're given. It was frustrating that ATC cleared us to our destination only after we informed them that we were ready to divert to ZZZ. Maybe ATC accepted my call to divert as a MINFUEL call and that gave us traffic priority? 3) I now understand clearly that even though the FMGC may not have the correct FROM-TO waypoints on the FPLAN (PPOS at 1L); it is still possible to be in HDG with NAV armed. I know I verified that FMA twice. My previous flying experience on the B777 would not let you do this; displaying a message; 'NOT ON AN INTCPT HDG.' I will now always try to verify the lateral distance deviation on the ND with NAV armed; also. 4) The snowball-effect of the navigation error intercepting the localizer late; getting high; and hearing the windshear alert to the other runway all contributed to my task saturation. With our fuel state getting low and being a new Captain; my thought was that I had to get this aircraft on the ground and that if I could get the aircraft stabilized by short final; this was the safest call.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.