Narrative:

An embraer 145LR aircraft had a fault of air data computer #2; and was troubleshot from first shift. I had gotten the turnover verbally from first shift. I went out to the aircraft and removed and installed the air data computer (air data computer). I had asked my lead three times to bring somebody in with rii; and experience with using the barometer tester. I was met with very unclear; unintelligible responses. I had then gone out to set up the test equipment. After I had set up the test; I had called my lead; to please send someone out with the qualifications. The lead had sent out another mechanic; who had never used the equipment. It had taken some time; but I was able to perform the operational checks; and leak checks in accordance with the amm I had gotten the job done; and had signed off the logbook. The plane had left before anyone had caught the fact that I had missed the rii. And I was informed last night; by my supervisor; that the equipment and computer were reduced vertical separation minimums (rvsm) sensitive; as well. It was caught that the rii was indeed missed; by our quality control persons; later in the evening. I am very unclear on how it missed the rvsm sensitive as well. I was not informed of this until late last night.time; teamwork and a huge misunderstanding of the task at hand. My first mistake was not checking out the rii list. I was working under the assumption of a dated information bulletin; stating that (if); only one air data computer computer's lines were broken it was not rii. The bulletin was read; as well as informed by my lead. I was not even aware that the computer was rvsm sensitive as well. Yes; I had asked my lead for someone with rii; and was met with resistance; and ignorance; and angry mumblings. I was told that the plane was hard timed; when I had made my 4th request for help. The help I had received was from another mechanic; no fault of his own; but had never had even been exposed to the testing equipment. That day; we had no one qualified for avionics; nor rvsm. The job card from the amm; and instructions from the baro tester were clear; and I was able to perform the task. I had gone ahead and signed the logbook; seeing as the computer had passed the tests.as far as I know what has transpired; is the plane had come back the next morning; and the air data computer #2 was removed and replaced; with all the qualifications met.the information; is and was very easily attainable; and one thing I do know that is my fault was not reading the rii list; and working off a dated bulletin. Yes; I had asked for help; and even someone with rii. But I was focused at the job at hand; and did not make the push for the rii. Manpower is a consideration here as well. There was no one qualified to run the equipment; or has the training; for the task that night. I do not know if someone had even an inspector's qualifications that night as well. My lead was under pressure to get the plane flying; and had a very unclear idea of the work being done; and I had received that pressure from my lead; to get the plane off the gate. Training would also help in this case. We only do have 2 people with the qualifications working on second shift. They work opposite schedules; so if one cannot make it to work; then everyone else without training on these sensitive areas have to figure it out.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Mechanic reports about the events surrounding his efforts at accomplishing the removal and installation of an ADC #2 on an Embraer 145LR; that had been released for service without proper inspections to satisfy reduced vertical separation minimums (RVSM) operational requirements.

Narrative: An Embraer 145LR aircraft had a fault of ADC #2; and was troubleshot from first shift. I had gotten the turnover verbally from first shift. I went out to the aircraft and removed and installed the air data computer (ADC). I had asked my Lead three times to bring somebody in with RII; and experience with using the barometer tester. I was met with very unclear; unintelligible responses. I had then gone out to set up the test equipment. After I had set up the test; I had called my Lead; to please send someone out with the qualifications. The Lead had sent out another Mechanic; who had never used the equipment. It had taken some time; but I was able to perform the operational checks; and leak checks in accordance with the AMM I had gotten the job done; and had signed off the logbook. The plane had left before anyone had caught the fact that I had missed the RII. And I was informed last night; by my Supervisor; that the equipment and computer were reduced vertical separation minimums (RVSM) sensitive; as well. It was caught that the RII was indeed missed; by our quality control persons; later in the evening. I am very unclear on how it missed the RVSM sensitive as well. I was not informed of this until late last night.Time; teamwork and a huge misunderstanding of the task at hand. My first mistake was not checking out the RII list. I was working under the assumption of a dated information bulletin; stating that (if); only one ADC computer's lines were broken it was not RII. The bulletin was read; as well as informed by my Lead. I was not even aware that the computer was RVSM sensitive as well. Yes; I had asked my Lead for someone with RII; and was met with resistance; and ignorance; and angry mumblings. I was told that the plane was hard timed; when I had made my 4th request for help. The help I had received was from another Mechanic; no fault of his own; but had never had even been exposed to the testing equipment. That day; we had no one qualified for avionics; nor RVSM. The job card from the AMM; and instructions from the baro tester were clear; and I was able to perform the task. I had gone ahead and signed the logbook; seeing as the computer had passed the tests.As far as I know what has transpired; is the plane had come back the next morning; and the ADC #2 was removed and replaced; with all the qualifications met.The information; is and was very easily attainable; And one thing I do know that is my fault was not reading the RII list; and working off a dated bulletin. Yes; I had asked for help; and even someone with RII. But I was focused at the job at hand; and did not make the push for the RII. Manpower is a consideration here as well. There was no one qualified to run the equipment; or has the training; for the task that night. I do not know if someone had even an inspector's qualifications that night as well. My Lead was under pressure to get the plane flying; and had a very unclear idea of the work being done; and I had received that pressure from my Lead; to get the plane off the gate. Training would also help in this case. We only do have 2 people with the qualifications working on second shift. They work opposite schedules; so if one cannot make it to work; then everyone else without training on these sensitive areas have to figure it out.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.