Narrative:

Flight departed expecting to land with 14;100 pounds of fuel. However; throughout flight; fuel consumption was higher than planned; despite many efforts by crew; enroute; to change cost index; fly at max altitudes available; reduce cabin air flow to low flow; change alternate airport; communicate the problem to the company and invite feedback; as well as other steps outlined in manuals. In addition; an ACARS message was sent to our dispatcher asking for our ATC desk to contact the TRACON supervisor to advise that our flight could be declaring 'minimum fuel' when checking in with approach control. Unfortunately; center required us to descend from FL400 to FL280. This resulted in our estimated fuel on board at landing to be reduced to 11;200 pounds of fuel which was calculated to be 49-55 minutes of fuel projected at landing. Minimum fuel was declared at that time with center rather than waiting to reach TRACON. This declaration benefited us because we were allowed to fly at FL340 for an extended period of time and allowed us direct routing with three centers. After changing to approach control; an idle thrust profile descent was provided from 6000 ft to 1500 ft; resulting in minimum fuel burn. We landed with 13;100 pounds of fuel and reached the gate with approximately 12;400 pounds. Since departing with full knowledge that we were dispatching with no holding fuel; no tanker fuel; and just 1000 pounds of extra fuel; the crew kept exceptional fuel records not only over the atlantic ocean as required; but at fixes en route for the entire flight. Both the master and second flight releases were completed by different pilots so that results and conclusions could be contrasted and compared even prior to leaving the european continent. We knew less than half way across the ocean that a problem was developing and began communications with the company at that time by requesting the change of alternate airports and requesting that we all focus added attention to the re-release fuel requirements (since it was projected to be acceptable by just 300 pounds which is less than 90 seconds for the A-330 aircraft). We were legal to continue and were re-released at seaer intersection. We also consulted the fom and ph to review policy and procedural barriers. The team worked together extremely well and we were able to reach unanimous agreements with adjustments necessary to reduce fuel burn throughout the flight. We also reviewed at each crew break interval how the problem was developing and what steps were warranted as the flight progressed. Although dispatch had conducted excellent fuel planning in advance of our flight; winds were not as favorable as planned; resulting in a need to change plans and use all available resources. All parties reached unanimous agreement to dispatch with this fuel load even though it is lower than we normally receive. This was in accordance with the company's desire to reduce fuel burn en route by operating with minimum dispatched fuel loads. Weather was excellent en route and at the destination and alternates. Therefore; we believed we could complete this flight safely from the preflight until landing and possibly delete alternate airports altogether if it became necessary. Unfortunately; the winds were not as forecast and the flight planning considerations proved not to be totally correct. I have no suggestions since I believe we did the best job we could under the circumstances; and so did the dispatchers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Dispatched across the Atlantic Ocean with planned minimum fuel reserves at their destination; an A330 flight crew struggled to adapt to higher fuel burn and less favorable winds than forecast.

Narrative: Flight departed expecting to land with 14;100 LBS of fuel. However; throughout flight; fuel consumption was higher than planned; despite many efforts by crew; enroute; to change cost index; fly at max altitudes available; reduce cabin air flow to low flow; change alternate airport; communicate the problem to the company and invite feedback; as well as other steps outlined in manuals. In addition; an ACARS message was sent to our Dispatcher asking for our ATC Desk to contact the TRACON Supervisor to advise that our flight could be declaring 'Minimum Fuel' when checking in with Approach Control. Unfortunately; Center required us to descend from FL400 to FL280. This resulted in our estimated fuel on board at landing to be reduced to 11;200 LBS of fuel which was calculated to be 49-55 minutes of fuel projected at landing. Minimum fuel was declared at that time with Center rather than waiting to reach TRACON. This declaration benefited us because we were allowed to fly at FL340 for an extended period of time and allowed us direct routing with three Centers. After changing to Approach Control; an idle thrust profile descent was provided from 6000 FT to 1500 FT; resulting in minimum fuel burn. We landed with 13;100 LBS of fuel and reached the gate with approximately 12;400 LBS. Since departing with full knowledge that we were dispatching with no holding fuel; no tanker fuel; and just 1000 LBS of extra fuel; the crew kept exceptional fuel records not only over the Atlantic Ocean as required; but at fixes en route for the entire flight. Both the Master and second Flight Releases were completed by different pilots so that results and conclusions could be contrasted and compared even prior to leaving the European Continent. We knew less than half way across the ocean that a problem was developing and began communications with the company at that time by requesting the change of alternate airports and requesting that we all focus added attention to the re-release fuel requirements (since it was projected to be acceptable by just 300 LBS which is less than 90 seconds for the A-330 aircraft). We were legal to continue and were re-released at SEAER Intersection. We also consulted the FOM and PH to review policy and procedural barriers. The team worked together extremely well and we were able to reach unanimous agreements with adjustments necessary to reduce fuel burn throughout the flight. We also reviewed at each crew break interval how the problem was developing and what steps were warranted as the flight progressed. Although dispatch had conducted excellent fuel planning in advance of our flight; winds were not as favorable as planned; resulting in a need to change plans and use all available resources. All parties reached unanimous agreement to dispatch with this fuel load even though it is lower than we normally receive. This was in accordance with the company's desire to reduce fuel burn en route by operating with minimum dispatched fuel loads. Weather was excellent en route and at the destination and alternates. Therefore; we believed we could complete this flight safely from the preflight until landing and possibly delete alternate airports altogether if it became necessary. Unfortunately; the winds were not as forecast and the flight planning considerations proved not to be totally correct. I have no suggestions since I believe we did the best job we could under the circumstances; and so did the Dispatchers.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.