Narrative:

An inadvertent runway incursion occurred at aberdeen regional airport (abr). I have accumulated approximately 150 hours of flight time in this aircraft. The flight was normal with increasing turbulence as the day warmed. Visibility was generally good with some haze present. However; nagging weather problems during my trip to the west coast and return; caused me to elect an unscheduled landing in aberdeen for a weather check. As I approached the aberdeen area; I tuned my communications radio to the aberdeen regional airport (abr) ASOS and CTAF frequencies (ASOS 125.875 and CTAF 122.95 MHZ) indicated on my section aeronautical chart dated 15 jan 2009 - 2 july 2009. At approximately XD00 hours mdt; shortly before beginning my approach to aberdeen. I heard a VHF communications broadcast by an aircraft on 122.95 MHZ to abr requesting a landing advisory. The aircraft made several calls; but received no answer. No further communications of any description were heard on that frequency (122.95 MHZ) until after my landing at abr. At ten miles distance from abr; I made an advisory transmission to aberdeen traffic on VHF frequency 122.95 MHZ of my approach and intended landing at aberdeen on runway 31; the runway best suited for winds identified by the abr ASOS broadcast. There was no response of any kind. After identifying the runways and seeing no other traffic; I announced and executed a pattern entry to the abr runway on 122.95 MHZ had followed a normal 'left traffic' pattern in moderate turbulence. I then executed a turn to 'left base' and a subsequent turn to 'final approach' announcing each turn on 122.95 MHZ as each maneuver was initiated. I received no communication during this time. Upon reaching a point abeam the end of runway 31 during 'left downwind.' turbulence increased with each flap extension and as I slowed; descended and maneuvered the aircraft for touch down my attention was fully engaged in maintaining airspeed runway alignment and proper wing attitude. Deeply into 'final approach;' I observed a maintenance vehicle drive onto the runway and race down the strip (away from my approach) at high speed. A quick check of airspeed indicated that my aircraft was slowing through sixty-two knots with power greatly reduced; the end of the runway nearly underfoot and mere feet of altitude remained. Considering the necessity for an abrupt power and aircraft attitudinal change and the resulting requirements for a straight; low level period of flight to gain enough airspeed and altitude to safely maneuver; I elected to land for the following reasons: a) a 'go-around' would have necessitated over-flying the single engine aircraft at low level and low airspeed with flaps at 'full' or 'stage one' settings. B) low level turbulence was complicating aircraft attitude control. C) my aircraft was in an ideal position for a 'near runway approach end' landing at low airspeed. D) short field landing characteristics of the aircraft are excellent and I had little doubt that I could land and stop the aircraft well short of danger; but felt certain that an alternative 'go-around' would subject the single engine aircraft and vehicles to a low; slow down pass in troublesome atmospheric conditions. Upon landing; I was questioned by a person who did not identify himself. He asked if my aircraft had a radio and if I had heard any transmissions. I answered 'yes' to having radios and 'no' to hearing transmissions. He then asked what frequency I used for my approach and I responded with a '122.95 mhx' answer. He then informed me that a recent change to 122.70 MHZ had been initiated by the FAA for abr. A quick check of my chart indicated that the correct frequency to abr is 122.95 MHZ; the frequency that I was using during my approach. The date on my chart indicated that is was and still is the correct aeronautical chart. There were signs prominently posted in the FBO/pilot areas announcing the frequency change cited (from 122.95 to 122.70 MHZ); but theywere of little use to a transient pilot with no knowledge of abr local revisions. The signs indicated that 122.95 MHZ would continue to be monitored; but no responses would be transmitted. I think it likely that a NOTAM announcing the aberdeen frequency change was issued; but the fact that abr was not a planned landing site caused me to ignore those details during pre-flight briefing. That is not an easily repaired oversight given the plethora of overwhelming details confronting a pilot. One suggestion that might 'fix' such a problem is to have facilities experiencing a 'mid-chart issuance' frequency change continue to monitor obsolete frequency's and issue correction warning to airmen until the change is reflected in current aeronautical charts. Doing so would have easily rectified this situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A pilot landed at ABR with traffic on the runway because the CTAF frequency listed on the current sectional aeronautical chart had recently been changed and the pilot had not received the alert. Since ABR was a diversionary airport the pilot had not checked ABR's NOTAMS.

Narrative: An inadvertent runway incursion occurred at Aberdeen Regional Airport (ABR). I have accumulated approximately 150 hours of flight time in this aircraft. The flight was normal with increasing turbulence as the day warmed. Visibility was generally good with some haze present. However; nagging weather problems during my trip to the west coast and return; caused me to elect an unscheduled landing in Aberdeen for a weather check. As I approached the Aberdeen area; I tuned my communications radio to the Aberdeen Regional Airport (ABR) ASOS and CTAF frequencies (ASOS 125.875 and CTAF 122.95 MHZ) indicated on my section aeronautical chart dated 15 Jan 2009 - 2 July 2009. At approximately XD00 hours MDT; shortly before beginning my approach to Aberdeen. I heard a VHF communications broadcast by an aircraft on 122.95 MHZ to ABR requesting a landing advisory. The aircraft made several calls; but received no answer. No further communications of any description were heard on that frequency (122.95 MHZ) until after my landing at ABR. At ten miles distance from ABR; I made an advisory transmission to Aberdeen traffic on VHF frequency 122.95 MHZ of my approach and intended landing at Aberdeen on Runway 31; the runway best suited for winds identified by the ABR ASOS broadcast. There was no response of any kind. After identifying the runways and seeing no other traffic; I announced and executed a pattern entry to the ABR runway on 122.95 MHZ had followed a normal 'left traffic' pattern in moderate turbulence. I then executed a turn to 'left base' and a subsequent turn to 'final approach' announcing each turn on 122.95 MHZ as each maneuver was initiated. I received no communication during this time. Upon reaching a point abeam the end of Runway 31 during 'left downwind.' Turbulence increased with each flap extension and as I slowed; descended and maneuvered the aircraft for touch down my attention was fully engaged in maintaining airspeed runway alignment and proper wing attitude. Deeply into 'final approach;' I observed a maintenance vehicle drive onto the runway and race down the strip (away from my approach) at high speed. A quick check of airspeed indicated that my aircraft was slowing through sixty-two knots with power greatly reduced; the end of the runway nearly underfoot and mere feet of altitude remained. Considering the necessity for an abrupt power and aircraft attitudinal change and the resulting requirements for a straight; low level period of flight to gain enough airspeed and altitude to safely maneuver; I elected to land for the following reasons: A) A 'go-around' would have necessitated over-flying the single engine aircraft at low level and low airspeed with flaps at 'full' or 'stage one' settings. B) Low level turbulence was complicating aircraft attitude control. C) My aircraft was in an ideal position for a 'near runway approach end' landing at low airspeed. D) Short field landing characteristics of the Aircraft are excellent and I had little doubt that I could land and stop the aircraft well short of danger; but felt certain that an alternative 'go-around' would subject the single engine aircraft and vehicles to a low; slow down pass in troublesome atmospheric conditions. Upon landing; I was questioned by a person who did not identify himself. He asked if my aircraft had a radio and if I had heard any transmissions. I answered 'Yes' to having radios and 'No' to hearing transmissions. He then asked what frequency I used for my approach and I responded with a '122.95 MHX' answer. He then informed me that a recent change to 122.70 MHZ had been initiated by the FAA for ABR. A quick check of my chart indicated that the correct frequency to ABR is 122.95 MHZ; the frequency that I was using during my approach. The date on my chart indicated that is was and still is the correct aeronautical chart. There were signs prominently posted in the FBO/pilot areas announcing the frequency change cited (from 122.95 to 122.70 MHZ); but theywere of little use to a transient pilot with no knowledge of ABR local revisions. The signs indicated that 122.95 MHZ would continue to be monitored; but no responses would be transmitted. I think it likely that a NOTAM announcing the Aberdeen frequency change was issued; but the fact that ABR was not a planned landing site caused me to ignore those details during pre-flight briefing. That is not an easily repaired oversight given the plethora of overwhelming details confronting a pilot. One suggestion that might 'fix' such a problem is to have facilities experiencing a 'mid-chart issuance' frequency change continue to monitor obsolete frequency's and issue correction warning to airmen until the change is reflected in current aeronautical charts. Doing so would have easily rectified this situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.