Narrative:

At local XA30 local my helicopter with a crew of four proceeded offshore to the southeast of the airport on a training mission to an oil rig located 125 miles southeast. The purpose of the trip was to conduct night landing training on the oil rig. As the aircraft proceeded offshore (about 30 miles southeast of our departure airport); we experienced a caution segment light '#2 engine not fly' which indicates that the aircraft systems does not recognize the throttle position as being fully forward in the fly position. The light flickered once and the pilots referred immediately to the aircraft emergency checklist. The caution light was not listed in the checklist and the ensuing discussion between the pilots distracted us to the point of forgetting to switch the transponder code to the company discreet code as required by our certificate of waiver to far 99.11 from center. As we continued enroute to the oil rig; in the next 30 minutes; the light flickered several times and then came on steady for about 10 seconds. During this time the pilots referred to the flight manual where again there was no reference to the caution light either in the emergency section or the engine section of the manual. Unable to find reference to the caution indication and unclear of its repercussions; it was decided to abort the training flight and return to the airport for maintenance action. The aircraft turned around toward our departure airport at approximately XB15 (25 miles short of the oil rig). Realizing our oversight on the squawk code; we immediately selected 121.5 on #1 radio and approach on the #2 radio. We contacted approach and they were aware of the situation. We confirmed with approach that we were cleared to land and terminated the flight. The next morning we reported the incident to our company director of operations and chief pilot. Since this incident; we have incorporated 'ransponder code' as a checklist item in our aircraft cruise checklist. We also conducted an extensive de-briefing with the crew and other pilots. We have de-briefed our flight following and dispatch agency as a back-up. Having discovered on landing that our dispatcher had neglected to file DVFR flight plan for us; we have also taken training and operations actions to insure a flight plan is filed for all offshore flights. I believe these actions will prevent a recurrence of this incident. I believe that we have taken corrective actions to insure this will never happen again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A helicopter enroute to an oil rig for night landing practice experienced a throttle control anomaly so the crew decided to return to the home base of maintenance; creating an ADIZ violation because a DVFR flight plan was not filed and the correct transponder code was not squawked.

Narrative: At local XA30 local my helicopter with a crew of four proceeded offshore to the southeast of the airport on a training mission to an oil rig located 125 miles southeast. The purpose of the trip was to conduct night landing training on the oil rig. As the aircraft proceeded offshore (about 30 miles southeast of our departure airport); we experienced a caution segment light '#2 ENG NOT FLY' which indicates that the aircraft systems does not recognize the throttle position as being fully forward in the fly position. The light flickered once and the pilots referred immediately to the aircraft Emergency Checklist. The caution light was not listed in the checklist and the ensuing discussion between the pilots distracted us to the point of forgetting to switch the transponder code to the company discreet code as required by our Certificate of Waiver to FAR 99.11 from Center. As we continued enroute to the oil rig; in the next 30 minutes; the light flickered several times and then came on steady for about 10 seconds. During this time the pilots referred to the flight manual where again there was no reference to the caution light either in the emergency section or the engine section of the manual. Unable to find reference to the caution indication and unclear of its repercussions; it was decided to abort the training flight and return to the airport for maintenance action. The aircraft turned around toward our departure airport at approximately XB15 (25 miles short of the oil rig). Realizing our oversight on the squawk code; we immediately selected 121.5 on #1 radio and Approach on the #2 radio. We contacted Approach and they were aware of the situation. We confirmed with Approach that we were cleared to land and terminated the flight. The next morning we reported the incident to our company Director of Operations and Chief Pilot. Since this incident; we have incorporated 'ransponder Code' as a checklist item in our aircraft Cruise Checklist. We also conducted an extensive de-briefing with the crew and other pilots. We have de-briefed our flight following and Dispatch agency as a back-up. Having discovered on landing that our Dispatcher had neglected to file DVFR flight plan for us; we have also taken training and operations actions to insure a flight plan is filed for all offshore flights. I believe these actions will prevent a recurrence of this incident. I believe that we have taken corrective actions to insure this will never happen again.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.