Narrative:

Crew desk awakens me early in the morning to tell me the flight is delayed about 1 hour. In flight operations; no paperwork for trip; desk clerk has none from dispatch. 50 minutes before departure call dispatch to see what is wrong. She forgot to do our paperwork. Sends paperwork. Asked for volcano sigmets and other warnings. She did not want to include volcano data I had collected on my private weather service maps; saying that it did not apply. Requested that volcano data be included in our weather documentation. Plotted volcano data on polar plotting map. Ash prohibits use of some enroute suitable landing airports. Crew agrees that this needs to be monitored enroute. Enroute no updated volcano or SIGMET data provided by dispatch. Prior to going on break and entering unreliable communication airspace I check all metar and taf weather for all suitable landing airports and destination/possible alternates; sigmets and volcano reports via ACARS. Volcano ash now has greatly enlarged and covers our course in russia to FL350 on satellite; which does not always include the end of volcanic hazard to flight. Contact dispatch regarding sigmets and volcano reports and ask why we received no severe weather updates or reroute around ash cloud. Dispatcher indicates that ash is not relevant as it stops at FL350 on and beyond our course upwind. The ash is spreading upwind well over our course. Dispatcher indicated that we are planned to climb to FL380 in that area of russia and no course deviation is required around ash. Crew soundly disagrees. We demanded flight around the ash cloud growing upwind well across our route. The dispatcher's opinion that whatever the satellite picture says is the total risk of growing volcano ash was not agreeable to me. Volcano risk extends beyond the nighttime ash picture from a satellite. At this point I cannot take my break. Still talking to anchorage; the first reroute from dispatch arrives. We were told by dispatch that this reroute was accepted by ATC; it is a new clearance. But we need ATC to issue a new clearance. Anchorage knows nothing about it and refuses to get involved in a reroute. Call magadan satcom and they know nothing about a reroute request and when we read them the route desired they refuse to change routing. Wait 20 minutes to see if route request gets to ATC. Nothing arrives after calling anchorage and magadan again. 9. Multiple satcom calls for over an hour to dispatch; magadan and anchorage trying to get this solved results in no new ATC clearance. Dispatch says we have a clearance; but we do not have ATC authority to fly a new course. 10. Prepare for diversion to fairbanks or anchorage; as we are getting zero cooperation to fly a safe route around volcanic ash. We do not wish to be NORDO in russia; attempting to obtain a reroute through several control centers or trying to arrange a diversion to the USA. 11. Dispatch issues another route (second reroute) and says we have a new clearance. Now in magadan airspace. More satcom calls yield that magadan still knows nothing of this; we are given no new ATC clearance despite what dispatch says is a new clearance. More satcom calls. Ask for new flight plan for fuel study if we do get a clearance with more flying miles. More satcom calls as the flight plan does not come through for evaluation; then some other copies come through stopping over 600 miles from destination. Load new possible route as route 2 in FMS. Dispatch says the new route is only a minor deviation; but in fact it is about 30 extra minutes flight time. Fuel is now an issue for study given rjaa and rjtt weather remaining below the taf; and nightfall coming. Finally receive a full printed copy of the new flight plan. Most all text is unreadable; prints off the side of the page or stops well short of destination. Satcom magadan again. Finally get a new ATC clearance before leaving magadan ATC into the russian continent where the new route immediately starts. Weather at destination rjaa and alternate rjtt is well below taf for hours. Study taf and NOTAMS for several airports. Rjtt alternate is operating well below taf for hours; near cat 1 ceiling for visual continuation to land. No taf changes issued. More satcom calls to dispatch for alternate search rjgg and rjtt. Need fuel required and discussion with dispatch on the matter. Dispatch says no alternate change possible. Ask for fuel to rjgg and rjtt. None received. More satcom. Ask for burn rjtt to rjgg and proposed routing for loading FMS. We are told the route is direct and the burn 15.1. Study maps for possible flight rjaa to rjgg or diversion rjgg. New 'ship set' chart situation adds unsatisfactory workload as captain has no alternate charts; first officer has no enroute maps. Root around in back seat relief pilot bag for navigation materials. Route planning goes badly until we find airways between rjtt and rjgg on the osaka area chart. Enroute chart is poor; without published airways; for a flight rjaa-rjgg. Self acquire rjgg weather and NOTAMS and continue to monitor rjaa and rjtt. NOTAMS for rjgg refer to a flight operations bulletin for ILS X Y and Z approaches. I read this bulletin in flight ops but now I need a review. Ask dispatch on satcom several times to get us a copy of the bulletin referred to in the NOTAM. None supplied. Finally we receive a message that a manager kindly advised that the NOTAM is not valid. We are not comfortable with rjtt alternate weather; especially as visibility and ceilings are less than taf as night approaches. If a revised taf is issued for rjtt we will need to be prepared for a new alternate. We like rjgg as an alternate but dispatch disagrees in adding it. We have no complete flight plan for continuing to rjaa. We at least plan for a possible diversion if the flight plan finally is received and rjtt does not remain a legal alternate. Call dispatch again. Finally get a plan for new route to rjaa for fuel planning. Advise dispatch and ATC of 'minimum fuel' entering japan; as we want fuel to rjaa and rjgg as alternate. FMS estimates fuel remaining will be 38.0 at rjaa. However rjaa ATC requires fuel well in excess of flight plan fuel for last 200 or so miles; often requiring up to 7800 in extra descent fuel without holding in my experience and that of others. We cannot accept typical ATC delay. We continue to rjaa; but plan to exit if any delays are issued. Declaring min fuel got us placed #16 for landing; fuel on board was 30.3 at landing vs. FMS planned 38.0. This allowed a planned 15.2 fob at alternate rjgg. This entire day; including 13:21 hours enroute; was done with no sleep due to the workload placed upon me to stay with the ship as captain. I do not understand the dispatch volcano separation standards; please advise. My first officer and I worked all night to keep the plane out of harms way and we were exhausted upon arrival rjaa. Far too many communications were required; and the new flight bag navigation material setup is ridiculous. Maps were marked in colored pens to progressively plot ash far across our course. Having my own maps that could be marked for routes and reroutes would have reduced the navigation workload and fatigue significantly this night. I disagree with the elimination of the captain's flight planning aids for use in the hotel; at home prior to a trip or in flight operations wherever we are located. Absence of navigation materials compromises the captains that do care to do the job thoroughly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Captain of a long range Pacific Ocean crossing takes exception to the Dispatcher's unwillingness to provide information and flight planning data to facilitate circumnavigating volcanic ash.

Narrative: Crew desk awakens me early in the morning to tell me the flight is delayed about 1 hour. In flight operations; no paperwork for trip; desk clerk has none from dispatch. 50 minutes before departure call dispatch to see what is wrong. She forgot to do our paperwork. Sends paperwork. Asked for volcano SIGMETS and other warnings. She did not want to include volcano data I had collected on my private weather service maps; saying that it did not apply. Requested that volcano data be included in our weather documentation. Plotted volcano data on polar plotting map. Ash prohibits use of some enroute suitable landing airports. Crew agrees that this needs to be monitored enroute. Enroute no updated volcano or SIGMET data provided by dispatch. Prior to going on break and entering unreliable communication airspace I check all METAR and TAF weather for all suitable landing airports and destination/possible alternates; SIGMETS and volcano reports via ACARS. Volcano ash now has greatly enlarged and covers our course in Russia to FL350 on satellite; which does not always include the end of volcanic hazard to flight. Contact dispatch regarding SIGMETS and volcano reports and ask why we received no severe weather updates or reroute around ash cloud. Dispatcher indicates that ash is not relevant as it stops at FL350 on and beyond our course upwind. The ash is spreading upwind well over our course. Dispatcher indicated that we are planned to climb to FL380 in that area of Russia and no course deviation is required around ash. Crew soundly disagrees. We demanded flight around the ash cloud growing upwind well across our route. The Dispatcher's opinion that whatever the satellite picture says is the total risk of growing volcano ash was not agreeable to me. Volcano risk extends beyond the nighttime ash picture from a satellite. At this point I cannot take my break. Still talking to Anchorage; the first reroute from dispatch arrives. We were told by dispatch that this reroute was accepted by ATC; it is a new clearance. But we need ATC to issue a new clearance. Anchorage knows nothing about it and refuses to get involved in a reroute. Call Magadan SATCOM and they know nothing about a reroute request and when we read them the route desired they refuse to change routing. Wait 20 minutes to see if route request gets to ATC. Nothing arrives after calling Anchorage and Magadan again. 9. Multiple SATCOM calls for over an hour to dispatch; Magadan and Anchorage trying to get this solved results in no new ATC CLEARANCE. Dispatch says we have a clearance; but we do not have ATC authority to fly a new course. 10. Prepare for diversion to Fairbanks or Anchorage; as we are getting zero cooperation to fly a safe route around volcanic ash. We do not wish to be NORDO in Russia; attempting to obtain a reroute through several control centers or trying to arrange a diversion to the USA. 11. Dispatch issues another route (second reroute) and says we have a new clearance. Now in Magadan airspace. More SATCOM calls yield that Magadan still knows nothing of this; we are given NO NEW ATC CLEARANCE despite what dispatch says is a new clearance. More SATCOM calls. Ask for new flight plan for fuel study if we do get a clearance with more flying miles. More SATCOM calls as the flight plan does not come through for evaluation; then some other copies come through stopping over 600 miles from destination. Load new possible route as route 2 in FMS. Dispatch says the new route is only a minor deviation; but in fact it is about 30 extra minutes flight time. Fuel is now an issue for study given RJAA and RJTT weather remaining below the TAF; and nightfall coming. Finally receive a full printed copy of the new flight plan. Most all text is unreadable; prints off the side of the page or stops well short of destination. SATCOM Magadan again. Finally get a new ATC Clearance before leaving Magadan ATC into the Russian continent where the new route immediately starts. Weather at destination RJAA and alternate RJTT is well below TAF for hours. Study TAF and NOTAMS for several airports. RJTT alternate is operating well below TAF for hours; near Cat 1 ceiling for visual continuation to land. No TAF changes issued. More SATCOM calls to Dispatch for alternate search RJGG and RJTT. Need fuel required and discussion with dispatch on the matter. Dispatch says no alternate change possible. Ask for fuel to RJGG and RJTT. None received. More SATCOM. Ask for burn RJTT to RJGG and proposed routing for loading FMS. We are told the route is direct and the burn 15.1. Study maps for possible flight RJAA to RJGG or diversion RJGG. New 'ship set' chart situation adds unsatisfactory workload as Captain has no alternate charts; First Officer has no enroute maps. Root around in back seat relief pilot bag for navigation materials. Route planning goes badly until we find airways between RJTT and RJGG on the Osaka Area Chart. Enroute chart is poor; without published airways; for a flight RJAA-RJGG. Self acquire RJGG weather and NOTAMS and continue to monitor RJAA and RJTT. NOTAMS for RJGG refer to a flight operations bulletin for ILS X Y and Z approaches. I read this bulletin in flight ops but now I need a review. Ask dispatch on SATCOM several times to get us a copy of the bulletin referred to in the NOTAM. None supplied. Finally we receive a message that a manager kindly advised that the NOTAM is not valid. We are not comfortable with RJTT alternate weather; especially as visibility and ceilings are less than TAF as night approaches. If a revised TAF is issued for RJTT we will need to be prepared for a new alternate. We like RJGG as an alternate but dispatch disagrees in adding it. We have no complete flight plan for continuing to RJAA. We at least plan for a possible diversion if the flight plan finally is received and RJTT does not remain a legal alternate. Call dispatch again. Finally get a plan for new route to RJAA for fuel planning. Advise Dispatch and ATC of 'minimum fuel' entering Japan; as we want fuel to RJAA and RJGG as alternate. FMS estimates fuel remaining will be 38.0 at RJAA. However RJAA ATC requires fuel well in excess of flight plan fuel for last 200 or so miles; often requiring up to 7800 in extra descent fuel without holding in my experience and that of others. We cannot accept typical ATC delay. We continue to RJAA; but plan to exit if any delays are issued. Declaring min fuel got us placed #16 for landing; fuel on board was 30.3 at landing vs. FMS planned 38.0. This allowed a planned 15.2 FOB at alternate RJGG. This entire day; including 13:21 hours enroute; was done with no sleep due to the workload placed upon me to stay with the ship as Captain. I do not understand the dispatch volcano separation standards; please advise. My First Officer and I worked all night to keep the plane out of harms way and we were exhausted upon arrival RJAA. Far too many communications were required; and the new flight bag navigation material setup is ridiculous. Maps were marked in colored pens to progressively plot ash far across our course. Having my own maps that could be marked for routes and reroutes would have reduced the navigation workload and fatigue significantly this night. I disagree with the elimination of the Captain's flight planning aids for use in the hotel; at home prior to a trip or in flight operations wherever we are located. Absence of navigation materials compromises the Captains that do care to do the job thoroughly.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.