Narrative:

Please review the tailwind limitation for aug; along with the company bulletin and the new commercial chart. Because of the limitation and current winds; we did the VOR approach to runway 35; which resulted in a missed approach. While holding; the duty flight manager told operations that we should land runway 17 because the memo and the operations bulletin had been rescinded. He then quoted the bulletin to sound more official. I can't stress how unsafe this practice is. I flew to augusta the day that a light transport overran the runway and saw the mess myself. Our situation was set up the same way. I could see the accident chain forming; so I made the call to continue to boston; where I was met with more flack. We had held for more than one hour; and fuel was a major concern. The weather in boston was also near minimums and the ILS to runway 4R; the favored runway; was out of service. On the way to boston we held over scupp; and any more holding would have been unsafe. I'm filing this report in lieu of contacting the FAA; but the event needs to be addressed; as pilots are accountable for every action whereas it seems most other departments are not.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Captain of a light transport responds to management criticism of his decision to divert to an alternate in lieu of flying an ILS approach to a short runway with what he considered to be excessive tailwinds.

Narrative: Please review the tailwind limitation for AUG; along with the company bulletin and the new commercial chart. Because of the limitation and current winds; we did the VOR approach to Runway 35; which resulted in a missed approach. While holding; the duty flight manager told operations that we should land Runway 17 because the memo and the operations bulletin had been rescinded. He then quoted the bulletin to sound more official. I can't stress how unsafe this practice is. I flew to Augusta the day that a light transport overran the runway and saw the mess myself. Our situation was set up the same way. I could see the accident chain forming; so I made the call to continue to Boston; where I was met with more flack. We had held for more than one hour; and fuel was a major concern. The weather in Boston was also near minimums and the ILS to Runway 4R; the favored runway; was out of service. On the way to Boston we held over SCUPP; and any more holding would have been unsafe. I'm filing this report in lieu of contacting the FAA; but the event needs to be addressed; as pilots are accountable for every action whereas it seems most other departments are not.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.