Narrative:

Upon meeting the cockpit crew who flew the inbound leg; the captain relayed the events from his flight. (He said): 1) after takeoff; both utility buses shed for no reason and would not reset (also shedding the #2 recirculation fan). 2) upon arrival at the gate; once the APU was up and running and after shutting down both engines; the APU would not accept the load and all electric was lost. The crew attempted several resets of the APU generator control switch with no effect. External power was plugged in and not accepted by the aircraft. The battery was drained for several minutes until the crew shut down all electric and maintenance was called. While maintenance was at work; the aircraft battery was powering all the buses on the hot battery bus for at least 20 minutes and volts dropped to at least 22. Upon review of the logbook; I noticed several interesting facts. First; external power had been rejected by the airplane at least twice previously; and then on the previous leg; for a total of three times. The aircraft also had just rejected the APU generator. An attempt to fix the external power problem was unsuccessful in june 2009; by replacing the bus power control unit (bpcu); external power was placarded inoperative. According to the write-up; a different problem arose and the maintenance crew suggested replacing a different unit. The external power placard was removed by simply 'relamping the switch's light bulb' the next day. Then the maintenance technician said that we needed yet another bpcu and the supervisors insisted that maintenance had not seated the unit properly and it had moved and therefore wasn't working correctly. So; we got another bpcu installed; (which didn't fix it the first time); and I was encouraged to believe that the reason the first change of the bpcu had been improper and that this installation had been correct and would most certainly fix the aircraft's electrical problems. On our leg; we were to run adjacent to a large area of thunderstorms with an exceptional amount of lightning. IFR conditions were present both enroute and on approach and it was a very dark night with no moon. A captain's biggest nightmare on a night IFR flight; where we will be beyond 30 minutes of an airport; on a non-extended range aircraft in a 757; is to lose all electrical power. The aircraft is virtually uncontrollable after 30 minutes (at best) in this condition unless it is met by a military (or other) intercept to fly formation all the way to landing. There would be no engine instruments; no attitude indications; no anti-ice or pitot to keep reliable back-up airspeed/altitude indications. No lighting whatsoever in cockpit or cabin. No fire detection or protection; no gear/flap indications. No navigation or communications capabilities at all and no inter-cockpit/cabin communications are available. Basically; we have nothing. Need I say more about that? The battery was also found dead upon arrival; and whether that is related in any way I don't know but the more I learned; the more uncomfortable I felt. I am glad I decided to submit this report because I have felt for a very long time that this was an unsafe practice; operating a non-er aircraft on routes beyond 30 minutes from an airport especially at night; which we routinely do. This airspace is an excellent example. We are beyond 30 minutes from any airfield on a large portion of those night flights to the northeast. There is literally; no way to keep the airplane upright after the battery dies. We need a back-up generator installed on the RAT; which would not cost much at all and would be a huge safety measure. I refused the aircraft for this particular flight on those grounds and I did strongly recommend a re-routing of the aircraft to a VFR; daytime flight to test out the system; which they did. I appreciate the maintenance department requesting a follow-up on this event and have the utmost confidence in them. In this particular instance; it was unwiseto accept a questionable fix since the part had already been replaced (once) and had not solved the problem. I was also concerned that the battery had been drained for 20 of its useful minutes. In a timely manner; I definitely relayed my apprehensions and intentions to dispatch; maintenance; and operations in advance so that we could initiate an airplane swap and minimize a delay.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Captain scheduled to fly a non-extended range B757-200 with a history of continuing electrical power rejection problems; on routes over water that were more than thirty minutes from any airport; explains why the aircraft was refused. The main DC battery used to provide standby power is rated for only thirty minutes of expected operational life.

Narrative: Upon meeting the cockpit crew who flew the inbound leg; the Captain relayed the events from his flight. (He said): 1) After takeoff; both utility buses shed for no reason and would not reset (also shedding the #2 recirculation fan). 2) Upon arrival at the gate; once the APU was up and running and after shutting down both engines; the APU would not accept the load and all electric was lost. The crew attempted several resets of the APU generator control switch with no effect. External power was plugged in and not accepted by the aircraft. The battery was drained for several minutes until the crew shut down all electric and Maintenance was called. While maintenance was at work; the aircraft battery was powering all the buses on the hot battery bus for at least 20 minutes and volts dropped to at least 22. Upon review of the logbook; I noticed several interesting facts. First; external power had been rejected by the airplane at least twice previously; and then on the previous leg; for a total of three times. The aircraft also had just rejected the APU generator. An attempt to fix the external power problem was unsuccessful in June 2009; by replacing the bus power control unit (BPCU); external power was placarded inoperative. According to the write-up; a different problem arose and the maintenance crew suggested replacing a different unit. The external power placard was removed by simply 'relamping the switch's light bulb' the next day. Then the Maintenance Technician said that we needed yet another BPCU and the Supervisors insisted that Maintenance had not seated the unit properly and it had moved and therefore wasn't working correctly. So; we got another BPCU installed; (which didn't fix it the first time); and I was encouraged to believe that the reason the first change of the BPCU had been improper and that this installation had been correct and would most certainly fix the aircraft's electrical problems. On our leg; we were to run adjacent to a large area of thunderstorms with an exceptional amount of lightning. IFR conditions were present both enroute and on approach and it was a very dark night with no moon. A Captain's biggest nightmare on a night IFR flight; where we will be beyond 30 minutes of an airport; on a non-extended range aircraft in a 757; is to lose all electrical power. The aircraft is virtually uncontrollable after 30 minutes (at best) in this condition unless it is met by a military (or other) intercept to fly formation all the way to landing. There would be no engine instruments; no attitude indications; no anti-ice or pitot to keep reliable back-up airspeed/altitude indications. No lighting whatsoever in cockpit or cabin. No fire detection or protection; no gear/flap indications. No navigation or communications capabilities at all and no inter-cockpit/cabin communications are available. Basically; we have nothing. Need I say more about that? The battery was also found dead upon arrival; and whether that is related in any way I don't know but the more I learned; the more uncomfortable I felt. I am glad I decided to submit this report because I have felt for a very long time that this was an unsafe practice; operating a non-ER aircraft on routes beyond 30 minutes from an airport especially at night; which we routinely do. This airspace is an excellent example. We are beyond 30 minutes from any airfield on a large portion of those night flights to the northeast. There is literally; no way to keep the airplane upright after the battery dies. We need a back-up generator installed on the RAT; which would not cost much at all and would be a huge safety measure. I refused the aircraft for this particular flight on those grounds and I did strongly recommend a re-routing of the aircraft to a VFR; daytime flight to test out the system; which they did. I appreciate the Maintenance Department requesting a follow-up on this event and have the utmost confidence in them. In this particular instance; it was unwiseto accept a questionable fix since the part had already been replaced (once) and had not solved the problem. I was also concerned that the battery had been drained for 20 of its useful minutes. In a timely manner; I definitely relayed my apprehensions and intentions to Dispatch; Maintenance; and Operations in advance so that we could initiate an airplane swap and minimize a delay.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.