Narrative:

We departed from runway 26L; atlanta; GA (atl) via the JACKTS5 RNAV departure. However; the FMS had been programmed for a departure from runway 27R. This caused the aircraft to track toward an initial departure fix which was further south than the initial fix would have been for runway 26L. Once the deviation was noticed by departure ATC; the controller issued vectors to the flight to adjust the flights course to pick up the remainder of the departure procedure. Factors associated: the standard operating procedures for our company has the FMS programming being done at the gate. In atlanta; the departure runway is programmed based on a best guess; since the pdcs from ATC received at the gate do not include a runway assignment. If the runway assumption is in error there is no item in the follow on checklists to verify it; or correct the programming error. The follow on checklists are directed to assuring aircraft configuration; flaps; speeds; not FMS route programming. Once departed from the gate the flight had a convoluted taxi both within the gate alley and enroute to the runway. This increased the crew's workload with added radio calls during the numerous taxiway changes; hold shorts and checklist. All checklists were completed. While still located on the taxiway the flight was given a takeoff clearance. Final checklist was completed and the takeoff roll commenced. The company policy of having both FMS screens displaying non-route information helped prevent the runway error from being detected. Once the takeoff roll was underway a loud whistling sound began. This loud noise added distraction to the CRM and made communications very difficult. The sound was later determined to have been caused by the ground crew leaving the access door for the headset connection open. The initial RNAV fix is 6 miles from the end of the runway. Once airborne changing the RNAV departure procedure is more involved than while still on the ground. With climbout airspeeds accelerating to 250 KTS the chances of reprogramming the FMS to correct a runway input error is unlikely without assistance from ATC to vector the flight while re-programming takes place. Flight continued to destination. The RNAV departures from the ground are a new procedure in atlanta. As such the companies checklist and standard operating procedures are lagging behind the operation. So far training for implementation of RNAV departure procedures have been memo driven. There needs to be a challenge and response checklist item on the before takeoff checklist; which verifies the: runway; departure and first fix. Further it would be useful to include the departure runway in the pre departure clearance. Presently ramp; metering; ground and tower know the expected departure runway; however; the crew is assuming a runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL-65 flight crew deviated from the cleared SID because they had preselected the wrong runway and did not change it when they got their clearance.

Narrative: We departed from Runway 26L; Atlanta; GA (ATL) via the JACKTS5 RNAV departure. However; the FMS had been programmed for a departure from Runway 27R. This caused the aircraft to track toward an initial departure fix which was further south than the initial fix would have been for Runway 26L. Once the deviation was noticed by Departure ATC; the Controller issued vectors to the flight to adjust the flights course to pick up the remainder of the departure procedure. Factors associated: The standard operating procedures for our company has the FMS programming being done at the gate. In Atlanta; the departure runway is programmed based on a best guess; since the PDCs from ATC received at the gate do not include a runway assignment. If the runway assumption is in error there is no item in the follow on checklists to verify it; or correct the programming error. The follow on checklists are directed to assuring aircraft configuration; flaps; speeds; not FMS route programming. Once departed from the gate the flight had a convoluted taxi both within the gate alley and enroute to the runway. This increased the crew's workload with added radio calls during the numerous taxiway changes; hold shorts and checklist. All checklists were completed. While still located on the taxiway the flight was given a takeoff clearance. Final checklist was completed and the takeoff roll commenced. The company policy of having both FMS screens displaying non-route information helped prevent the runway error from being detected. Once the takeoff roll was underway a loud whistling sound began. This loud noise added distraction to the CRM and made communications very difficult. The sound was later determined to have been caused by the ground crew leaving the access door for the headset connection open. The initial RNAV fix is 6 miles from the end of the runway. Once airborne changing the RNAV departure procedure is more involved than while still on the ground. With climbout airspeeds accelerating to 250 KTS the chances of reprogramming the FMS to correct a runway input error is unlikely without assistance from ATC to vector the flight while re-programming takes place. Flight continued to destination. The RNAV departures from the ground are a new procedure in Atlanta. As such the companies checklist and standard operating procedures are lagging behind the operation. So far training for implementation of RNAV departure procedures have been memo driven. There needs to be a challenge and response checklist item on the Before Takeoff Checklist; which verifies the: Runway; Departure and First Fix. Further it would be useful to include the departure runway in the PDC. Presently ramp; metering; ground and tower know the expected departure runway; however; the crew is assuming a runway.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.