Narrative:

Upon visual approach; selected gear down. Did not perceive landing gear system to audibly actuate or through tactile sensations extend. Cockpit indications were three red in transit lights; and a yellow handle in transit light. No other lights illuminated. Executed a go around. After we were established in the climb; notified tower that we had a landing gear problem. Emergency not declared. In my perception it was to be handled as an abnormal; unless the gear failed to extend manually. Nor could I recall any regulatory requirement to declare an emergency with this type of malfunction initially - that is; electrical extension of the gear. Tower asked if we wished to immediately return for approach. We advised tower that we wished to consult with company. We were handed off to approach. Asked approach for a higher altitude; offered 3 or 5 thousand; and we selected 5;000 ft. I instructed the first officer to contact company utilizing the SELCAL system; and to provide them with the indications that we saw exactly; and; assuming they had no objections; that we desired to perform an alternate gear extension. Even though we were no further than 15 miles from the repeater; and at sufficient altitude; the first officer reported to me that communication was very difficult. He stated that the transmissions from dispatch were extremely weak; and barely readable. He was handed off from our dispatcher to maintenance; and was in the middle of a conversation with a maintenance controller when the system disconnected. We then attempted a relay through operations; which proved more difficult. I instructed the first officer to relay through operations that we wished to perform an alternate gear extension; unless the company had any objections. The operations agent; from what I was told from the first officer; had trouble comprehending the situation; and there was some confusion until the message was properly relayed. Word came back from dispatch to go ahead with the manual extension. After some vectoring; we returned for landing. First officer performed the manual extension procedure while I flew. It was fortunate that he just experienced the drill recently in the simulator; and had no problem performing the procedure. Landed uneventfully and taxied to gate. Pinned all three gear upon shutdown - per checklist. The selcal system has proved unreliable in many instances over my career here. In this particular instance; it transmitted very weak communications and disconnected. We had to then resort to an operations frequency relay; which in many cases can cause confused/ mixed up message relays or instructions. We communicated with company for this malfunction because that is what we are trained to do in the simulator; and it is what the procedure requires. From the outset; however; it was patently obvious that the only correct and safe course of action was a manual extension of the gear. As it turned out later; I was informed that the mechanic initially diagnosing the problem read out a solenoid sequence valve fault code. Cycling the gear handle could have created a more serious problem. Not that we even considered that; which we did not. But it demonstrates that red in transit light(s) dictates a manual gear extension. I feel that perhaps the D-8 program manager; or the training department; should authorize flight crews to automatically perform an alternate gear extension under certain very specific circumstances. That is; any time there is a loss of hydraulic fluid; or illumination of a gear inop caution light; or any time a red in transit light is illuminated following gear extension. This would eliminate the need for a lengthy attempt at communicating with dispatch; and perhaps burning off fuel that might become vital to divert to an airport with better crash fire rescue equipment facilities or a longer runway. Flight crews are already authorized to cycle the gear in the event of a single amber door light remaining illuminated without contacting dispatch. Authorization for a specific course of action for this malfunction would follow along this vein of thought.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DHC-8 flight crew experienced landing gear failure to extend. They coordinated with Maintenance Control and Dispatch and extended the gear manually.

Narrative: Upon visual approach; selected gear down. Did not perceive landing gear system to audibly actuate or through tactile sensations extend. Cockpit indications were three red in transit lights; and a yellow handle in transit light. No other lights illuminated. Executed a go around. After we were established in the climb; notified tower that we had a landing gear problem. Emergency not declared. In my perception it was to be handled as an abnormal; UNLESS the gear failed to extend manually. Nor could I recall any regulatory requirement to declare an emergency with this type of malfunction initially - that is; electrical extension of the gear. Tower asked if we wished to immediately return for approach. We advised tower that we wished to consult with company. We were handed off to Approach. Asked Approach for a higher altitude; offered 3 or 5 thousand; and we selected 5;000 FT. I instructed the First Officer to contact company utilizing the SELCAL system; and to provide them with the indications that we saw exactly; and; assuming they had no objections; that we desired to perform an alternate gear extension. Even though we were no further than 15 miles from the repeater; and at sufficient altitude; the First Officer reported to me that communication was very difficult. He stated that the transmissions from Dispatch were extremely weak; and barely readable. He was handed off from our Dispatcher to Maintenance; and was in the middle of a conversation with a Maintenance Controller when the system disconnected. We then attempted a relay through operations; which proved more difficult. I instructed the First Officer to relay through operations that we wished to perform an alternate gear extension; unless the company had any objections. The operations agent; from what I was told from the First Officer; had trouble comprehending the situation; and there was some confusion until the message was properly relayed. Word came back from Dispatch to go ahead with the manual extension. After some vectoring; we returned for landing. First Officer performed the manual extension procedure while I flew. It was fortunate that he just experienced the drill recently in the simulator; and had no problem performing the procedure. Landed uneventfully and taxied to gate. Pinned all three gear upon shutdown - per checklist. The SelCal system has proved unreliable in many instances over my career here. In this particular instance; it transmitted very weak communications and disconnected. We had to then resort to an operations frequency relay; which in many cases can cause confused/ mixed up message relays or instructions. We communicated with company for this malfunction because that is what we are trained to do in the simulator; and it is what the procedure requires. From the outset; however; it was patently obvious that the only correct and safe course of action was a manual extension of the gear. As it turned out later; I was informed that the Mechanic initially diagnosing the problem read out a solenoid sequence valve fault code. Cycling the gear handle could have created a more serious problem. Not that we even considered that; which we did not. But it demonstrates that red in transit light(s) dictates a manual gear extension. I feel that perhaps the D-8 program manager; or the training department; should authorize flight crews to automatically perform an alternate gear extension under certain very specific circumstances. That is; any time there is a loss of hydraulic fluid; or illumination of a Gear Inop caution light; or any time a red in transit light is illuminated following gear extension. This would eliminate the need for a lengthy attempt at communicating with dispatch; and perhaps burning off fuel that might become vital to divert to an airport with better CFR facilities or a longer runway. Flight crews are already authorized to cycle the gear in the event of a single amber door light remaining illuminated without contacting dispatch. Authorization for a specific course of action for this malfunction would follow along this vein of thought.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.