Narrative:

I was flying VFR. I was flying VFR at 5;500 ft with flight following. At some point close to the north state border; ATC advised that neither it nor the next control facility would be able to track me at 5;500 ft. I then climbed to 7;500 ft and continued toward my destination until I looked down and noticed that the cloud cover was getting tighter and I descended VFR through broken cloud cover back to 5;500 ft. At some point center handed me off to approach and I continued heading toward my destination. Approach handed me off to my destination approach facility and at about 25-30 miles west of my destination; I realized that the ceiling was getting lower. I did not think that the lower ceiling was significant; as I was on a slow descent from 5;500 ft for landing and I was well below the clouds. All of a sudden; I realized that the ceiling was approximately 3;300 ft; and the safe altitude on the sectional indicated 2;700 ft. As I progressed toward my destination; I realized that the ceiling continued to descend and it was all of a sudden at approximately 2;800 or 2;900 ft. I continued to attempt to receive transmissions from AWOS; to no avail. Approach said I was probably too low. Though the sectional stated that 2;700 ft. Was the safe altitude; approach alerted me to two (2) towers/antennas 9 miles north at 12 o'clock. At that point I was in the clouds and became disoriented; and advised approach that I would like some assistance. Approach made certain inquiries as to my skill-set; vectored me onto 2 or 3 different headings; and passed me off to approach. Approach directed me to descend into VFR conditions at which point I was guided to the airport and landed without incident. The problem was that I flew into IMC and I am not instrument rated. I became disoriented. The problem arose as above-stated. Contributing factors were my inability to reach AWOS; and the weather; which was significantly different than what was forecast at the time of pre-flight. Additionally; though I had moving radar on the plane; at the time that I was in the clouds it was too late to check for the satellite images showing cloud cover; as everything happened so quickly. My corrective actions were to seek assistance from approach. Human performance considerations could have changed the outcome. As soon as I saw that the ceiling was getting lower; perhaps I should have turned a 180 and headed back to clear skies. I think that the inaction on my part in that regard resulted from the fact that the lowering of the ceiling from approximately 3;300 ft. To 2;700 or 2;800 ft. Happened so quickly; that I did not recognize what was happening. A better understanding of the possible weather changes in general; and particularly those in summer conditions; would have altered my course of action. Even though I had done everything by the book in terms of weather forecasts prior to the approximately 2.25 hour flight; and watched the weather in flight on the moving radar; circumnavigating various storms on the flight; I did not realize that the conditions at my destination could change so rapidly and be so different than what was forecast. Additionally; I had not realized that the nexrad moving radar would not show cloud cover; and all looked clear; until it was too late.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: VFR general aviation aircraft in contact with ATC for flight advisories entered IMC conditions during an attempted descent into MLE; ATC assisted in securing VFR conditions and landing at another airport.

Narrative: I was flying VFR. I was flying VFR at 5;500 FT with flight following. At some point close to the north state border; ATC advised that neither it nor the next control facility would be able to track me at 5;500 FT. I then climbed to 7;500 FT and continued toward my destination until I looked down and noticed that the cloud cover was getting tighter and I descended VFR through broken cloud cover back to 5;500 FT. At some point Center handed me off to Approach and I continued heading toward my destination. Approach handed me off to my destination approach facility and at about 25-30 miles west of my destination; I realized that the ceiling was getting lower. I did not think that the lower ceiling was significant; as I was on a slow descent from 5;500 FT for landing and I was well below the clouds. All of a sudden; I realized that the ceiling was approximately 3;300 FT; and the safe altitude on the sectional indicated 2;700 FT. As I progressed toward my destination; I realized that the ceiling continued to descend and it was all of a sudden at approximately 2;800 or 2;900 FT. I continued to attempt to receive transmissions from AWOS; to no avail. Approach said I was probably too low. Though the sectional stated that 2;700 FT. was the safe altitude; Approach alerted me to two (2) towers/antennas 9 miles north at 12 o'clock. At that point I was in the clouds and became disoriented; and advised approach that I would like some assistance. Approach made certain inquiries as to my skill-set; vectored me onto 2 or 3 different headings; and passed me off to Approach. Approach directed me to descend into VFR conditions at which point I was guided to the airport and landed without incident. The problem was that I flew into IMC and I am not instrument rated. I became disoriented. The problem arose as above-stated. Contributing factors were my inability to reach AWOS; and the weather; which was significantly different than what was forecast at the time of pre-flight. Additionally; though I had moving radar on the plane; at the time that I was in the clouds it was too late to check for the satellite images showing cloud cover; as everything happened so quickly. My corrective actions were to seek assistance from approach. Human performance considerations could have changed the outcome. As soon as I saw that the ceiling was getting lower; perhaps I should have turned a 180 and headed back to clear skies. I think that the inaction on my part in that regard resulted from the fact that the lowering of the ceiling from approximately 3;300 FT. to 2;700 or 2;800 FT. happened so quickly; that I did not recognize what was happening. A better understanding of the possible weather changes in general; and particularly those in summer conditions; would have altered my course of action. Even though I had done everything by the book in terms of weather forecasts prior to the approximately 2.25 hour flight; and watched the weather in flight on the moving radar; circumnavigating various storms on the flight; I did not realize that the conditions at my destination could change so rapidly and be so different than what was forecast. Additionally; I had not realized that the Nexrad moving radar would not show cloud cover; and all looked clear; until it was too late.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.