Narrative:

When we arrived at the gate mr.X from the FAA was already on the aircraft waiting for us. He informed me that he was here to give me a random line check. Our aircraft; just went through a service inspection over night. We pushed off the gate and I asked the first officer to start both engines before taxing since the plane sat for more then two hours on the ground; so we needed the 5 minute warm up and we had a short taxi. Taxied for about 2 minutes when we got a 'brake hot' ECAM message. Number three wheel brake showed 315 degrees and within a few seconds the indication went up to about 900; then changed to two amber X's. I stopped the aircraft; asked for the ECAM procedure and informed ground we have to work on a problem. I tried to raise maintenance on the radio; but we encountered communication problems with them. Operations was trying to relay between us. Meanwhile ground told us to move over to taxiway K. I complied and called maintenance control on the phone. First they directed us to pull circuit breaker M37 and reset it. This did not clear the fault. Maintenance told me to stand by. At the same time I was concerned of our fuel burn; since we did not have a whole lot of fuel to begin with and I didn't know how long it would it take to rectify our maintenance issue. I asked the first officer to shut number two engine down to conserve fuel. The first officer then replied; 'what do you want to do that for? This is pilot deferrable. We just defer it and go.' I told him; 'I don't know how long this will take and we are burning too much fuel here running two engines.' meanwhile I got maintenance control back on line and talked to a different person than the first time. He directed us to reset several circuit breaker's. This procedure successfully cleared the fault. The wheel page showed green and number three brakes indicated 175 degrees. The other brakes were showing 30 degrees. I told maintenance control that the fault has been cleared but we have a large difference between the temperatures of number three and the rest of the wheels. He told me; it was acceptable; since the temperature was below maximum limit. Maintenance control told me to put an information only write up in the log; so I did. Once I hung up the phone with maintenance; the first officer told me he wasn't comfortable going and showed me the following operational procedure on the laptop: brake temperature monitoring unit C/B hydraulic/brk/temperature/det/unit/(121VU M37) -- pull. After chocks are in place; the parking brake will be released. One ship's clock will be activated at parking brake release and the aircraft shall not be moved for a period of one hour. Even though this procedure did not apply to our situation since we did not defer the brake temperature monitoring unit; I was still concerned about the difference in temperature readings between number three and the rest of our brakes and the first officer's expressed uneasiness about the situation. I decided to call maintenance control again. I told them about our concerns and they reassured me that we were good to go. They also told me; that the erroneous reading was most likely caused by the number four wheel change maintenance had performed over night. I communicated this information to the first officer and he replied 'no they changed number three; it has a brand new tire'. Maintenance insisted they worked on number four. I checked in the log and it stated they worked on number four. After considering the facts; the inconsistencies; the first officer's statements and my own judgment; I decided to go back to the gate and let maintenance sort this out and fix the problem. The first officer asked me if I wanted to get towed to the gate. I said since the reading is 175 degrees and the gate is only a few hundred feet away; I'd like to taxi and keep a close eye on the temperature. If it starts to rise we will stop and ask for maintenance to come to the aircraft. We taxied to the gate. The temperature remained at 175 degrees. After shut down mr. X told me that my CRM was unacceptable to him. He stated; to me; 'you completely shut the first officer out and just did your own thing'. When the first officer expressed his regret to me; mr. X told the first officer that he did exactly what he needed to do and that he did a great job. While I was removing my belongings from the cockpit; the mechanic came up and told me; the problem was caused by a loose cannon plug.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 Captain reports on the circumstances of his FAA line check. . Problems arose after a faulty brake temperature sensor caused a return to the gate.

Narrative: When we arrived at the gate Mr.X from the FAA was already on the aircraft waiting for us. He informed me that he was here to give me a Random Line Check. Our aircraft; just went through a service inspection over night. We pushed off the gate and I asked the First Officer to start both engines before taxing since the plane sat for more then two hours on the ground; so we needed the 5 minute warm up and we had a short taxi. Taxied for about 2 minutes when we got a 'Brake HOT' ECAM message. Number three wheel brake showed 315 degrees and within a few seconds the indication went up to about 900; then changed to two amber X's. I stopped the aircraft; asked for the ECAM procedure and informed ground we have to work on a problem. I tried to raise Maintenance on the radio; but we encountered communication problems with them. OPS was trying to relay between us. Meanwhile ground told us to move over to Taxiway K. I complied and called Maintenance Control on the phone. First they directed us to pull CB M37 and reset it. This did not clear the fault. Maintenance told me to stand by. At the same time I was concerned of our fuel burn; since we did not have a whole lot of fuel to begin with and I didn't know how long it would it take to rectify our maintenance issue. I asked the First Officer to shut number Two Engine down to conserve fuel. The First Officer then replied; 'What do you want to do that for? This is pilot deferrable. We just defer it and go.' I told him; 'I don't know how long this will take and we are burning too much fuel here running two engines.' Meanwhile I got Maintenance Control back on line and talked to a different person than the first time. He directed us to reset several CB's. This procedure successfully cleared the fault. The wheel page showed green and number three brakes indicated 175 degrees. The other brakes were showing 30 degrees. I told Maintenance Control that the fault has been cleared but we have a large difference between the temperatures of number three and the rest of the wheels. He told me; it was acceptable; since the temperature was below maximum limit. Maintenance Control told me to put an INFO ONLY write up in the log; so I did. Once I hung up the phone with Maintenance; the First Officer told me he wasn't comfortable going and showed me the following operational procedure on the Laptop: Brake Temperature Monitoring Unit C/B HYDRAULIC/BRK/TEMP/DET/UNIT/(121VU M37) -- PULL. After chocks are in place; the parking brake will be released. One ship's clock will be activated at parking brake release and the aircraft shall not be moved for a period of one hour. Even though this procedure did not apply to our situation since we did not defer the Brake Temperature Monitoring Unit; I was still concerned about the difference in temperature readings between number three and the rest of our brakes and the First Officer's expressed uneasiness about the situation. I decided to call Maintenance Control again. I told them about our concerns and they reassured me that we were good to go. They also told me; that the erroneous reading was most likely caused by the number four wheel change maintenance had performed over night. I communicated this information to the First Officer and he replied 'No they changed number three; it has a brand new tire'. Maintenance insisted they worked on number four. I checked in the log and it stated they worked on number four. After considering the facts; the inconsistencies; the First Officer's statements and my own judgment; I decided to go back to the gate and let Maintenance sort this out and fix the problem. The First Officer asked me if I wanted to get towed to the gate. I said since the reading is 175 degrees and the gate is only a few hundred feet away; I'd like to taxi and keep a close eye on the temperature. If it starts to rise we will stop and ask for Maintenance to come to the aircraft. We taxied to the gate. The temperature remained at 175 degrees. After shut down Mr. X told me that my CRM was unacceptable to him. He stated; to me; 'you completely shut the First Officer out and just did your own thing'. When the First Officer expressed his regret to me; Mr. X told the First Officer that he did exactly what he needed to do and that he did a great job. While I was removing my belongings from the cockpit; the Mechanic came up and told me; the problem was caused by a loose cannon plug.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.