Narrative:

On initial descent in to burbank; the captain notified me that he would like to do the four stacks visual approach; and accordingly briefed the approach; including briefing that the descent angle was 3.25 degrees for the approach; and that there was a VASI on the left. After the handoff to approach; we were given a heading of 090 for the visual; and told to call runway 15 in sight for the visual. We passed oat mountain at 5000 feet; and then were cleared lower; to 3000 feet. Approaching the san gabriels; I became uneasy with the captains choice of flight path; horizontally and vertically. The captain chose to fly over the mountains; instead of along the side of them as the flight path indicates on the chart. Upon crossing the first mountains in the san gabriels; we received a master caution light on the glareshield; followed by the aural alert; 'terrain; terrain.' this continued for several seconds with the captain 'cursing' the stupidity of the lights and noise. The captain took no corrective action. Several seconds later; we received the master warning light on the glareshield; followed by the aural 'pull up; pull up;' and as well immediately received the 'too low gear' aural cavalry charge. Again no corrective action was taken. I immediately told the captain that he had no choice when he received the master warning; but he told me I was wrong; and tried to cancel the master warning on the glareshield. I continued to press the matter with him; saying that he had to execute a egpws memory procedure as outlined in our flight standards manual. He made no corrective action and proceeded to land. On the ground I pulled out the flight standards manual; and read in the maneuvers section to him in regards to egpws procedures. He should reread the 'emergency abnormal procedures' section as well.I feel that the captain compromised the safety of everyone on that flight by his; 1. Unpreparedness to deal with a terrain closure situation. 2. Macho attitude. 3. Lack of effective CRM in dealing with a potentially devastating situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew on a visual approach to BUR received multiple GPWS aural alerts; that were dismissed by the flying pilot while the non-flying pilot unsuccesfully advocated a go-around.

Narrative: On initial descent in to Burbank; the Captain notified me that he would like to do the Four Stacks Visual Approach; and accordingly briefed the approach; including briefing that the descent angle was 3.25 degrees for the approach; and that there was a VASI on the left. After the handoff to approach; we were given a heading of 090 for the visual; and told to call Runway 15 in sight for the visual. We passed Oat Mountain at 5000 feet; and then were cleared lower; to 3000 feet. Approaching the San Gabriels; I became uneasy with the Captains choice of flight path; horizontally and vertically. The Captain chose to fly OVER the mountains; instead of along the side of them as the flight path indicates on the chart. Upon crossing the first mountains in the San Gabriels; we received a Master Caution light on the glareshield; followed by the aural alert; 'Terrain; Terrain.' This continued for several seconds with the Captain 'cursing' the stupidity of the lights and noise. The Captain took NO corrective action. Several seconds later; we received the Master Warning light on the glareshield; followed by the aural 'Pull UP; Pull UP;' and as well immediately received the 'Too Low Gear' aural cavalry charge. Again NO corrective action was taken. I immediately told the Captain that he had NO CHOICE when he received the Master Warning; but he told me I was wrong; and tried to cancel the Master Warning on the glareshield. I continued to press the matter with him; saying that he had to execute a EGPWS memory procedure as outlined in our Flight Standards Manual. He made no corrective action and proceeded to land. On the ground I pulled out the Flight Standards Manual; and read in the Maneuvers Section to him in regards to EGPWS procedures. He should reread the 'Emergency Abnormal Procedures' section as well.I feel that the Captain compromised the safety of everyone on that flight by his; 1. Unpreparedness to deal with a terrain closure situation. 2. Macho attitude. 3. Lack of effective CRM in dealing with a potentially devastating situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.