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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 84686 |
Time | |
Date | 198803 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : den |
State Reference | CO |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 400 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 2000 |
ASRS Report | 84686 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 210 flight time total : 15000 flight time type : 5000 |
ASRS Report | 84864 |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Our airline operates 106 air carrier type aircraft, about 64 of them are standardized, the others vastly vary in avionic equipment, flight directors and cockpit set ups. We were in a cockpit in which we were relatively unfamiliar. This required us to look around for equipment switches and diverted our attention which would have otherwise been a relaxed and perceptive environment. We had very little exposure to the different cockpit. These differences have forced the company to increase our landing minimums when flying with this particular type of flight director. The WX was blowing snow with rapidly lowering visibility. As we taxied to hold short of runway 35L, the tower queried us in a manner in which he wanted an immediate response. He said that another carrier which was waiting to takeoff, his minimums were 1400 RVR, 'what is yours?' this generated some confusion because I had never heard of takeoff minimums of 1400 and I was sure we had identical minimums. But the captain said 1600 RVR, so that is what I relayed to the tower. The captain and I discussed that we were not restr for takeoff minimums due to different flight director. That only applied to landing minimums. We thought that since we were not restr we could takeoff with minimums of 600 RVR. We made a cursory assumption that the 2 parallel runways had identical takeoff minimums. We were so rushed that I did not differentiate the minimums in the takeoff section of the approach charts since the tower was reporting 1200 RVR we thought there was no problem. The captain said, 'tell him our minimums are 600 RVR.' when I did the tower said, 'fly heading 010 degrees, cleared for takeoff.' this clearance only reinforced our error. I know he is not required to advise us, but doesn't he have a moral obligation? My thinking is that everyone concerned should exercise checks and balances with each other when in the aviation environment. I am not blaming the controller, I am just pointing out the deficiencies in the status quo. He (ATC) should have known the published lowest minimums for runway 35L was 1600 RVR. If he could have pointed it out instead of asking us with the implication that we could takeoff while another carrier had to wait, we would not have fallen into that pitfall. I must stress that the time factor here was very short. The inflection of the controller's voice demanded an immediate response. This forced us to make a decision on the moment. When I looked at the minimums on the approach charts, I looked so fast that I thought it applied to both runway 35 parallels. I will never let this happen again. I have very much pride in knowing procedures and operating as safely as humanly possible. The problem is we should never forget we are human and are capable of mistakes. From now on I will never be rushed and will not hesitate to say 'stand by please.' supplemental information from acn 84864: the problem was discovered after departure when I got the book out because I had some doubts.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: TKOF BELOW RVR MINIMUMS.
Narrative: OUR AIRLINE OPERATES 106 ACR TYPE ACFT, ABOUT 64 OF THEM ARE STANDARDIZED, THE OTHERS VASTLY VARY IN AVIONIC EQUIP, FLT DIRECTORS AND COCKPIT SET UPS. WE WERE IN A COCKPIT IN WHICH WE WERE RELATIVELY UNFAMILIAR. THIS REQUIRED US TO LOOK AROUND FOR EQUIP SWITCHES AND DIVERTED OUR ATTN WHICH WOULD HAVE OTHERWISE BEEN A RELAXED AND PERCEPTIVE ENVIRONMENT. WE HAD VERY LITTLE EXPOSURE TO THE DIFFERENT COCKPIT. THESE DIFFERENCES HAVE FORCED THE COMPANY TO INCREASE OUR LNDG MINIMUMS WHEN FLYING WITH THIS PARTICULAR TYPE OF FLT DIRECTOR. THE WX WAS BLOWING SNOW WITH RAPIDLY LOWERING VIS. AS WE TAXIED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 35L, THE TWR QUERIED US IN A MANNER IN WHICH HE WANTED AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE. HE SAID THAT ANOTHER CARRIER WHICH WAS WAITING TO TKOF, HIS MINIMUMS WERE 1400 RVR, 'WHAT IS YOURS?' THIS GENERATED SOME CONFUSION BECAUSE I HAD NEVER HEARD OF TKOF MINIMUMS OF 1400 AND I WAS SURE WE HAD IDENTICAL MINIMUMS. BUT THE CAPT SAID 1600 RVR, SO THAT IS WHAT I RELAYED TO THE TWR. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THAT WE WERE NOT RESTR FOR TKOF MINIMUMS DUE TO DIFFERENT FLT DIRECTOR. THAT ONLY APPLIED TO LNDG MINIMUMS. WE THOUGHT THAT SINCE WE WERE NOT RESTR WE COULD TKOF WITH MINIMUMS OF 600 RVR. WE MADE A CURSORY ASSUMPTION THAT THE 2 PARALLEL RWYS HAD IDENTICAL TKOF MINIMUMS. WE WERE SO RUSHED THAT I DID NOT DIFFERENTIATE THE MINIMUMS IN THE TKOF SECTION OF THE APCH CHARTS SINCE THE TWR WAS RPTING 1200 RVR WE THOUGHT THERE WAS NO PROB. THE CAPT SAID, 'TELL HIM OUR MINIMUMS ARE 600 RVR.' WHEN I DID THE TWR SAID, 'FLY HDG 010 DEGS, CLRED FOR TKOF.' THIS CLRNC ONLY REINFORCED OUR ERROR. I KNOW HE IS NOT REQUIRED TO ADVISE US, BUT DOESN'T HE HAVE A MORAL OBLIGATION? MY THINKING IS THAT EVERYONE CONCERNED SHOULD EXERCISE CHKS AND BALANCES WITH EACH OTHER WHEN IN THE AVIATION ENVIRONMENT. I AM NOT BLAMING THE CTLR, I AM JUST POINTING OUT THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE STATUS QUO. HE (ATC) SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THE PUBLISHED LOWEST MINIMUMS FOR RWY 35L WAS 1600 RVR. IF HE COULD HAVE POINTED IT OUT INSTEAD OF ASKING US WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT WE COULD TKOF WHILE ANOTHER CARRIER HAD TO WAIT, WE WOULD NOT HAVE FALLEN INTO THAT PITFALL. I MUST STRESS THAT THE TIME FACTOR HERE WAS VERY SHORT. THE INFLECTION OF THE CTLR'S VOICE DEMANDED AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE. THIS FORCED US TO MAKE A DECISION ON THE MOMENT. WHEN I LOOKED AT THE MINIMUMS ON THE APCH CHARTS, I LOOKED SO FAST THAT I THOUGHT IT APPLIED TO BOTH RWY 35 PARALLELS. I WILL NEVER LET THIS HAPPEN AGAIN. I HAVE VERY MUCH PRIDE IN KNOWING PROCS AND OPERATING AS SAFELY AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE. THE PROB IS WE SHOULD NEVER FORGET WE ARE HUMAN AND ARE CAPABLE OF MISTAKES. FROM NOW ON I WILL NEVER BE RUSHED AND WILL NOT HESITATE TO SAY 'STAND BY PLEASE.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 84864: THE PROB WAS DISCOVERED AFTER DEP WHEN I GOT THE BOOK OUT BECAUSE I HAD SOME DOUBTS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.