Narrative:

Assessment of vibration gauge issue. Following take-off we began climbing to fl 280. The #2 engine's vibration gauge started to slowly increase into the abnormal range (yellow arc.). The vibration gauge increased to 2.0 at fl 320. We ran the QRH; and were only able control the engine vibration in the normal range at approximately 70% power setting. Because the thrust setting needed to maintain the vibration reading in the normal range was too low to maintain cruise flight at fl 320; we determined it was necessary to divert; and the flight continued with no other problems. We established contact with dispatch and maintenance to discuss the vibration problem. After telling dispatch where we were and that we needed an airport for diversion; a new destination airport was selected and ATC was advised. During the discussions; maintenance control advised us to follow the QRH and shut down the #2 engine. We asked multiple questions; but the only answer given was to follow the QRH. We asked to speak with a chief pilot or a program manager; but maintenance control told us that no one was available. During this conversation; we learned that the #2 engine had experienced this same problem the week before; and that the wrong engine had been fixed. Rationale for decision to forgo engine shut-down was that after descending to the mid-teens; we were able to control the vibration all the way to landing thus not needing an engine shut-down. Our decision to fore go shutting down the #2 engine was also predicated on the fact that there were no other severe engine abnormalities; indications or abnormal vibration throughout the airframe. However; on the ground; the flight attendant said that there was a louder than normal sound coming from the engine. We decided not to fly the aircraft out due to multiple findings and the very poor inspection done by contract maintenance. Even other ground crew personnel told us that they should not be trusted. It is our belief that the contract maintenance person never inspected the #2 engine. The only time we were able to communicate with this person was when he finally came up to the cockpit for the run-up. After the run-up; he concluded that the engine was fine; and that we were good to go. Back at the gate; he took the maintenance book to sign off the engine; but had to come back and find out which engine we experienced trouble with. A decision to not use these contract maintenance personnel should be highly considered. This is a reoccurring problem with these engines. With that said; this incident may have not happened if maintenance would have fixed the correct engine the week before.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An CRJ-900's #2 engine developed a high vibration on its gauge. This aircraft had a similar previous discrepancy which may not have been addressed correctly. The flight diverted to an enroute station for inspection by a Contract Mechanic whom the flight crew did not trust and therefore would not continue flying based on that person's maintenance release.

Narrative: Assessment of Vibration Gauge Issue. Following take-off we began climbing to FL 280. The #2 engine's Vibration Gauge started to slowly increase into the abnormal range (yellow arc.). The Vibration Gauge increased to 2.0 at FL 320. We ran the QRH; and were only able control the engine vibration in the normal range at approximately 70% power setting. Because the thrust setting needed to maintain the vibration reading in the normal range was too low to maintain cruise flight at FL 320; we determined it was necessary to divert; and the flight continued with no other problems. We established contact with Dispatch and Maintenance to discuss the vibration problem. After telling Dispatch where we were and that we needed an airport for diversion; a new destination airport was selected and ATC was advised. During the discussions; Maintenance Control advised us to follow the QRH and shut down the #2 engine. We asked multiple questions; but the only answer given was to follow the QRH. We asked to speak with a Chief Pilot or a Program Manager; but Maintenance Control told us that no one was available. During this conversation; we learned that the #2 engine had experienced this same problem the week before; and that the wrong engine had been fixed. Rationale for Decision to forgo Engine Shut-Down was that after descending to the mid-teens; we were able to control the vibration all the way to landing thus not needing an engine shut-down. Our decision to fore go shutting down the #2 engine was also predicated on the fact that there were no other severe engine abnormalities; indications or abnormal vibration throughout the airframe. However; on the ground; the Flight Attendant said that there was a louder than normal sound coming from the engine. We decided not to fly the aircraft out due to multiple findings and the very poor inspection done by contract maintenance. Even other ground crew personnel told us that they should not be trusted. It is our belief that the Contract Maintenance person never inspected the #2 engine. The only time we were able to communicate with this person was when he finally came up to the cockpit for the run-up. After the run-up; he concluded that the engine was fine; and that we were good to go. Back at the gate; he took the maintenance book to sign off the engine; but had to come back and find out which engine we experienced trouble with. A decision to not use these contract maintenance personnel should be highly considered. This is a reoccurring problem with these engines. With that said; this incident may have not happened if maintenance would have fixed the correct engine the week before.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.