Narrative:

During the takeoff roll we received an aural and visual warning on ed 1 and the overhead panel of an apparent engine bleed leak and/or fire. It was somewhat confusing to me immediately as to what it meant operationally so with plenty of runway remaining and below V1; I decided the safest course of action was to abort the takeoff. A smooth abort procedure was executed and a normal taxi off runway 7 was performed. The first officer and I divided the duties of checklist; ATC calls and briefings to both the flight attendant and passengers. After those tasks were accomplished; I turned to both the first officer and jumpseat occupant to confirm what they saw with what I remembered prior to calling maintenance; and it was quickly apparent that even with 3 crewmembers present; we each saw different indications. There was some confusion over which engine/side it was on and whether it was the 10th or 14th stage bleed that was hot. I took a best guess since the warning went away as soon as I retarded the thrust levers and gave maintenance a call; then briefed the passengers of our intent to return to the gate for some inspections. Passengers were deplaned and with both engines shut down and only the APU running; suddenly another warning activated at the gate indicating a 14th stage bleed leak on the right engine. I had to assume that it was the original warning we aborted for; and adjusted my write-up in the maintenance log. Factors that led to my decision were; thunderstorms on and around the airport so an unplanned alternate was a strong possibility; the sun was straight into our eyes taking off runway 7 (I hadn't been wearing my sunglasses); I believe the tubes could have been on a higher setting since we terminated that same aircraft the night before; my seat was a little higher than normal with a jumpseater present (therefore I had to look under the glare shield to see the top of ed 1); and we as a crew had minimal rest the night before.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier Captain described noticing an engine bleed leak warning on the takeoff roll. He rejected the takeoff and returned to the ramp for maintenance assistance.

Narrative: During the takeoff roll we received an aural and visual warning on ED 1 and the overhead panel of an apparent engine bleed leak and/or fire. It was somewhat confusing to me immediately as to what it meant operationally so with plenty of runway remaining and below V1; I decided the safest course of action was to abort the takeoff. A smooth abort procedure was executed and a normal taxi off Runway 7 was performed. The First Officer and I divided the duties of checklist; ATC calls and briefings to both the Flight Attendant and passengers. After those tasks were accomplished; I turned to both the First Officer and jumpseat occupant to confirm what they saw with what I remembered prior to calling Maintenance; and it was quickly apparent that even with 3 crewmembers present; we each saw different indications. There was some confusion over which engine/side it was on and whether it was the 10th or 14th stage bleed that was hot. I took a best guess since the warning went away as soon as I retarded the thrust levers and gave maintenance a call; then briefed the passengers of our intent to return to the gate for some inspections. Passengers were deplaned and with both engines shut down and only the APU running; suddenly another warning activated at the gate indicating a 14th stage bleed leak on the right engine. I had to assume that it was the original warning we aborted for; and adjusted my write-up in the maintenance log. Factors that led to my decision were; thunderstorms on and around the airport so an unplanned alternate was a strong possibility; the sun was straight into our eyes taking off Runway 7 (I hadn't been wearing my sunglasses); I believe the tubes could have been on a higher setting since we terminated that same aircraft the night before; my seat was a little higher than normal with a jumpseater present (therefore I had to look under the glare shield to see the top of ED 1); and we as a crew had minimal rest the night before.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.