Narrative:

We were the first flight out of lga with a very early push time because we were both based out west. This was a first time departure out of the airport for both pilots. Upon arrival at the gate; I received the release; which noted 2 mels. MEL 21-14 was for pressurization controller operating in altitude mode and MEL 30-1 concerned a right wing anti-ice valve wired in the open position. These are both lengthy mels and I read through them; looking for the potential impact on the flight. Nomenclature referred to in the MEL 30-1 as 'pneumatic manifolds' could not be found in either the QRH or the schematics. The only manifold I could find was the mix manifold. I noted the planned bleeds-on takeoff and the planned cruise of FL400. Neither the first officer nor I fully understood what the MEL was attempting to tell us and the subsequent impact of an anti-ice valve wired open on the flight procedures. My second mistake was assuming that the flight release was correct. The performance computer does not have an MEL tab for this situation. By this time we were getting a little rushed for an on-time departure. The departure procedures were new and detailed. On engine start for number 2; the max RPM achieved was only 21% N2 and I was very reluctant to put fuel to the engine. The MEL says nothing about being alert for a hot or delayed start due to pressure being siphoned off in the anti-ice valve. After the start of the number 2 engine; I should have turned off the number 2 bleed valve.we took off uneventfully with a bleeds-on takeoff as called for in the release. The configuration should have been bleeds off with the right bleed staying off until the tat dropped to less than 10C; somewhere around FL180-200. At around FL34.8 in the climb to FL400; the right bleed valve tripped off. We accomplished the QRH procedures and I elected to continue the flight at FL340. I pulled out the MEL at this point and began to deduce what the 'new' amended procedures needed to be to fully address the MEL. On the descent; I placed the right bleed valve back to off at 10C and landed uneventfully.rewrite the MEL 30-1. Neither the dispatcher; the maintenance representative; nor myself were fully sure what comprised the 'pneumatic manifold.' is it the bleed valve or the bleed valve and the associated pack? This is a teachable moment; as amended procedures have to be incorporated to fully deal with the MEL. Even the performance computer does not address this situation. Vmcg is referred to in the MEL but is not addressed anywhere else. Who or what determines that? A procedural note in the remarks section of the release could address this situation to adequately fly with this MEL.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 Captain accepted an aircraft with MEL 30-1 for right wing anti-ice valve wired in the open position but did not comprehend the requirements of this MEL. The right bleed valve was not closed after engine start and crew departed in this configuration.

Narrative: We were the first flight out of LGA with a very early push time because we were both based out west. This was a first time departure out of the airport for both pilots. Upon arrival at the gate; I received the release; which noted 2 MELs. MEL 21-14 was for pressurization controller operating in ALT mode and MEL 30-1 concerned a right wing anti-ice valve wired in the open position. These are both lengthy MELs and I read through them; looking for the potential impact on the flight. Nomenclature referred to in the MEL 30-1 as 'pneumatic manifolds' could not be found in either the QRH or the schematics. The only manifold I could find was the mix manifold. I noted the planned bleeds-on takeoff and the planned cruise of FL400. Neither the First Officer nor I fully understood what the MEL was attempting to tell us and the subsequent impact of an anti-ice valve wired open on the flight procedures. My second mistake was assuming that the flight release was correct. The performance computer does not have an MEL tab for this situation. By this time we were getting a little rushed for an on-time departure. The departure procedures were new and detailed. On engine start for number 2; the max RPM achieved was only 21% N2 and I was very reluctant to put fuel to the engine. The MEL says nothing about being alert for a hot or delayed start due to pressure being siphoned off in the anti-ice valve. After the start of the number 2 engine; I should have turned off the number 2 bleed valve.We took off uneventfully with a bleeds-on takeoff as called for in the release. The configuration should have been bleeds off with the right bleed staying off until the TAT dropped to less than 10C; somewhere around FL180-200. At around FL34.8 in the climb to FL400; the right bleed valve tripped off. We accomplished the QRH procedures and I elected to continue the flight at FL340. I pulled out the MEL at this point and began to deduce what the 'new' amended procedures needed to be to fully address the MEL. On the descent; I placed the right bleed valve back to off at 10C and landed uneventfully.Rewrite the MEL 30-1. Neither the Dispatcher; the Maintenance Representative; nor myself were fully sure what comprised the 'pneumatic manifold.' Is it the bleed valve or the bleed valve and the associated pack? This is a teachable moment; as amended procedures have to be incorporated to fully deal with the MEL. Even the performance computer does not address this situation. VMCG is referred to in the MEL but is not addressed anywhere else. Who or what determines that? A procedural note in the remarks section of the release could address this situation to adequately fly with this MEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.