Narrative:

I was flying as a first officer/lca doing a line check with the FAA in the jumpseat. It was the first flight of the day for this aircraft. Maintenance had brought the aircraft over from the hanger earlier. They; unfortunately for me; left the pressurization switch in the manual position. As I was doing my acceptance check I performed the usual test on the pressurization system. You do this by momentarily moving the pressurization switch to the manual then back to auto position. It tested fine. I did not notice that the switch started in the manual position so after I did the test it remained in the manual position. I acknowledge that this was my fault (even thought maintenance should not leave it in that position). After the captain started the engines the aircraft slowly started to pressurize. We did notice this after a moment and both looked at the pressurization panel to determine what was happening. After a short time the FAA inspector started telling us what to do. He told the captain to open the side ground hatch and then quickly told us to open the top escape hatch. This was very distracting. I then decided to open the emergency dump switch to alleviate the pressure so that we could slow down and solve the problem. The pressure immediately started to return to normal. The captain and I then looked again at the pressurization panel. We both realized at the same time that the switch was in the wrong position. Before even having a chance to move the switch back the FAA inspector reached over and moved it himself. He wanted something to be done now! This did not set a good tone for the rest of the flight. I fully admit that I made a mistake and did not notice that maintenance left the switch in the wrong position. I rarely fly in the right seat and have not done first officer first flight of the day checks for quite some time. While I was performing some of my cockpit checks the FAA inspector had me call crew scheduling twice to check on a captain that was running late. This also was disrupting and distracting. Trying to do a line check; flying as a first officer; getting the flight out on time; and having the FAA watch you is all quite stressful. I suggest that the company not allow line checks to be done from the right seat. I will also try to be more vigilant in the future in checking this switch. The FAA also needs to allow crews to slow down and solve the problem. If the FAA inspector had known exactly what the problem was right away and it was an emergency; why didn't he move the switch immediately? We may have solved the issue sooner if he hadn't started telling us how to operate the aircraft. I don't mean this in an insulting way; it was simply very distracting. I will not be flying in the right seat as an lca again though. My lca authorization was revoked after returning from this flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The Check Airman acting as First Officer of an SF340 prior to engine start did not remedy pressurization switch left in manual by maintenance. Resolution of the subsequent rapid pressurization of the aircraft while still at the gate is compromised by the interference of an FAA Inspector on the jump seat.

Narrative: I was flying as a First Officer/LCA doing a line check with the FAA in the jumpseat. It was the first flight of the day for this aircraft. Maintenance had brought the aircraft over from the hanger earlier. They; unfortunately for me; left the pressurization switch in the manual position. As I was doing my acceptance check I performed the usual test on the pressurization system. You do this by momentarily moving the pressurization switch to the manual then back to auto position. It tested fine. I did not notice that the switch started in the manual position so after I did the test it remained in the manual position. I acknowledge that this was my fault (even thought Maintenance should not leave it in that position). After the Captain started the engines the aircraft slowly started to pressurize. We did notice this after a moment and both looked at the pressurization panel to determine what was happening. After a short time the FAA Inspector started telling us what to do. He told the Captain to open the side ground hatch and then quickly told us to open the top escape hatch. This was very distracting. I then decided to open the emergency dump switch to alleviate the pressure so that we could slow down and solve the problem. The pressure immediately started to return to normal. The Captain and I then looked again at the pressurization panel. We both realized at the same time that the switch was in the wrong position. Before even having a chance to move the switch back the FAA Inspector reached over and moved it himself. He wanted something to be done now! This did not set a good tone for the rest of the flight. I fully admit that I made a mistake and did not notice that Maintenance left the switch in the wrong position. I rarely fly in the right seat and have not done First Officer first flight of the day checks for quite some time. While I was performing some of my cockpit checks the FAA Inspector had me call crew scheduling twice to check on a Captain that was running late. This also was disrupting and distracting. Trying to do a line check; flying as a First Officer; getting the flight out on time; and having the FAA watch you is all quite stressful. I suggest that the company not allow line checks to be done from the right seat. I will also try to be more vigilant in the future in checking this switch. The FAA also needs to allow crews to slow down and solve the problem. If the FAA Inspector had known exactly what the problem was right away and it was an emergency; why didn't he move the switch immediately? We may have solved the issue sooner if he hadn't started telling us how to operate the aircraft. I don't mean this in an insulting way; it was simply very distracting. I will not be flying in the right seat as an LCA again though. My LCA authorization was revoked after returning from this flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.