37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 850125 |
Time | |
Date | 200908 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | JFK.Airport |
State Reference | NY |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Light Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
After boarding in jfk it was observed by the flight crew that the ground personnel; again; did not have a headset connected for communications. I requested that a headset be used and the agent walked 8 ft to a bag on the ground; got a headset out and connected it; then informed me that 'he could hear me but I couldn't hear him.' I suspect that this might not be completely correct; as I made several comments that received no action outside the aircraft. I advised operations that this was unacceptable. With the failure to pre-coordinate hand signals; and the addition of rain any attempt at hand signals was greatly hampered. Although; they continued using hand signals for additional bags and whatever else they were trying to say while casually searching for an operable headset. After 30 minutes; 3 different headsets and multiple communications with operations; all the ground servicing personnel left the area. After this lengthy delay another ground service agent jumped into the tug that was connected to our aircraft; selected one of the 3 headsets that we had been assured did not operate properly; plugged it in; established two way communications and we proceeded to push back the aircraft. It appears that the entire operation in jfk is under the impression that it is acceptable to operate a pushback operation without any headset communications at all. There is never any advanced communication with the captain prior to the door being closed concerning pushback without a headset and they feel this is also acceptable. They somehow believe that if they inform us 'they can hear us; but we can't hear them' that this is acceptable for pushing back an aircraft into an active taxi area. I find it absolutely amazing that after the door closes I have to ask for the ground personnel to get a headset and this sparks a slow search. I am appalled by the lack of concern for safety while operating an aircraft in a hazardous environment. The ground personnel also believe that two way communications are not necessary even when the APU is deferred and additional considerations are necessary for engine start; higher power usage for initial taxi; and any instructions from ramp tower that need to be communicated to the tug driver. I have been forced into this song and dance for every pushback in jfk and find it extremely fatiguing. On this 4 day trip the crew experienced daily flights transiting jfk; and all suffered additional delays due to a wait for headset communications; causing additional unnecessary fatigue. This is an inherent problem with management and operations. The proper training on the use and need for two-way headset communications and the availability of operating headsets are a function of management. An operable headset should be attached to every tug that is used for pushback operations. Someone should correct the procedures in jfk and other stations that continuously disregard the operations policy for headset usage during pushback; including the stations who have informed me that a headset is 'required' for other airlines but not ours.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A commuter jet Captain appears to believe that ground crews at JFK fail to communicate effectively during aircraft dispatch.
Narrative: After boarding in JFK it was observed by the flight crew that the ground personnel; again; did not have a headset connected for communications. I requested that a headset be used and the agent walked 8 FT to a bag on the ground; got a headset out and connected it; then informed me that 'he could hear me but I couldn't hear him.' I suspect that this might not be completely correct; as I made several comments that received no action outside the aircraft. I advised Operations that this was unacceptable. With the failure to pre-coordinate hand signals; and the addition of rain any attempt at hand signals was greatly hampered. Although; they continued using hand signals for additional bags and whatever else they were trying to say while casually searching for an operable headset. After 30 minutes; 3 different headsets and multiple communications with Operations; all the ground servicing personnel left the area. After this lengthy delay another ground service agent jumped into the tug that was connected to our aircraft; selected one of the 3 headsets that we had been assured did not operate properly; plugged it in; established two way communications and we proceeded to push back the aircraft. It appears that the entire operation in JFK is under the impression that it is acceptable to operate a pushback operation without any headset communications at all. There is never any advanced communication with the Captain prior to the door being closed concerning pushback without a headset and they feel this is also acceptable. They somehow believe that if they inform us 'they can hear us; but we can't hear them' that this is acceptable for pushing back an aircraft into an active taxi area. I find it absolutely amazing that after the door closes I have to ask for the ground personnel to get a headset and this sparks a slow search. I am appalled by the lack of concern for safety while operating an aircraft in a hazardous environment. The ground personnel also believe that two way communications are not necessary even when the APU is deferred and additional considerations are necessary for engine start; higher power usage for initial taxi; and any instructions from ramp tower that need to be communicated to the tug driver. I have been forced into this song and dance for every pushback in JFK and find it extremely fatiguing. On this 4 day trip the crew experienced daily flights transiting JFK; and all suffered additional delays due to a wait for headset communications; causing additional unnecessary fatigue. This is an inherent problem with management and operations. The proper training on the use and need for two-way headset communications and the availability of operating headsets are a function of management. An operable headset should be attached to every tug that is used for pushback operations. Someone should correct the procedures in JFK and other stations that continuously disregard the operations policy for headset usage during pushback; including the stations who have informed me that a headset is 'required' for other airlines but not ours.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.