Narrative:

We were at FL370 when the hydraulic G rsvr lo lvl ECAM annunciated. The sd showed the accompanying hydraulic system synoptic confirming that the green hydraulic reservoir quantity was zero. The first officer was pilot flying; so I told him to also talk to ATC while I accomplished the ECAM. I followed the checklist; turning off the ptu and 'green' engine-driven pump switches. After completing all items; I talked to dispatch and maintenance simultaneously to assess the severity of the problem and to see if continuing on to destination would be an issue. We (me; the first officer; dispatch and maintenance) agreed that continuing on would be ok since there were no other issues with the aircraft. We kept tabs on the weather at various airports as we continued on our way in case further problems occurred. We conferred with our purser and told her that while we had a problem with the one hydraulic system that the remaining systems were operating normally and that the only anomaly to expect would be the tow-in to the gate from the runway. I did not declare an emergency. I told the purser that on descent I would make an announcement regarding the system failure and to expect a normal landing and that the only difference would be the tow to the gate. About 25 nm from landing; I made a PA to the people stating just that. The first officer and I independently calculated the landing distance using the FM chart; and landing distance was not an issue. We ended up landing on the longest runway and avoided shutting down arrivals. We coordinated with the station ops personnel to meet us at the high-speed taxiway. I took over pilot flying duties from my first officer near top of descent; and we briefed the approach (visual backed up by the ILS). We discussed when we were going to configure (gravity extend the gear..flaps and slats were going to be slow); missed approach procedure (gear hanging)..and reviewed the partial gear landing (just in case) and the tow-in checklist. We were fully configured and on target speed 5 miles from the FAF. The landing was uneventful; and 'yellow' brakes operated normally (antiskid available). After reaching a slow taxi speed; I applied differential braking to turn and clear the runway and stopped the aircraft. We called ops to get the tug out to the aircraft. The maintenance personnel had us shut off the APU bleed since the head pressure to the residual fluid in the green reservoir was apparently being blown out of the top part of the #1 engine pylon. We opened our windows and opened the cockpit door to ventilate the cabin. We waited until the line maintenance crew could stop the hydraulic leak; and prevent further runway/taxiway contamination and then accomplished an uneventful tow-in to the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A320 flight crew experienced ECAM message HYD G RSVR LO LVL. They coordinated with Dispatch and Maintenance and continued to destination.

Narrative: We were at FL370 when the HYD G RSVR LO LVL ECAM annunciated. The SD showed the accompanying hydraulic system synoptic confirming that the green hydraulic reservoir quantity was zero. The First Officer was pilot flying; so I told him to also talk to ATC while I accomplished the ECAM. I followed the checklist; turning off the PTU and 'green' engine-driven pump switches. After completing all items; I talked to Dispatch and Maintenance simultaneously to assess the severity of the problem and to see if continuing on to destination would be an issue. We (me; the First Officer; Dispatch and Maintenance) agreed that continuing on would be ok since there were no other issues with the aircraft. We kept tabs on the weather at various airports as we continued on our way in case further problems occurred. We conferred with our Purser and told her that while we had a problem with the one hydraulic system that the remaining systems were operating normally and that the only anomaly to expect would be the tow-in to the gate from the runway. I did not declare an emergency. I told the purser that on descent I would make an announcement regarding the system failure and to expect a normal landing and that the only difference would be the tow to the gate. About 25 nm from landing; I made a PA to the people stating just that. The First Officer and I independently calculated the landing distance using the FM chart; and landing distance was not an issue. We ended up landing on the longest runway and avoided shutting down arrivals. We coordinated with the station ops personnel to meet us at the high-speed taxiway. I took over pilot flying duties from my First Officer near top of descent; and we briefed the approach (visual backed up by the ILS). We discussed when we were going to configure (gravity extend the gear..flaps and slats were going to be slow); missed approach procedure (gear hanging)..and reviewed the partial gear landing (just in case) and the tow-in checklist. We were fully configured and on target speed 5 miles from the FAF. The landing was uneventful; and 'yellow' brakes operated normally (antiskid available). After reaching a slow taxi speed; I applied differential braking to turn and clear the runway and stopped the aircraft. We called ops to get the tug out to the aircraft. The maintenance personnel had us shut off the APU bleed since the head pressure to the residual fluid in the green reservoir was apparently being blown out of the top part of the #1 Engine pylon. We opened our windows and opened the cockpit door to ventilate the cabin. We waited until the line maintenance crew could stop the hydraulic leak; and prevent further runway/taxiway contamination and then accomplished an uneventful tow-in to the gate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.