37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 851203 |
Time | |
Date | 200909 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B777-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Relief Pilot |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200 Flight Crew Total 15000 Flight Crew Type 2500 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
As one of the relief pilots; I was on my break and got up to get a cup of coffee. Flight attendants expressed concern about our route of flight and arrival time. Flight attendants said 'passengers see it on the map and are asking questions'. They also stated that; when queried; the captain said we were deviating and he was too busy to explain the situation. Offering to be of assistance; I called the cockpit and asked to come up. First officer was pilot flying. Once in the cockpit; the captain explained that we had deviated for a dispatch message regarding seismic activity at a volcano near our route (severe weather advisory). Volcano was at sheveluch (5642N 16124E) with 'no airway impact at this time' and winds aloft forecast at 160/35. When I took my jumpseat position; we were proceeding to a point north of our route (n59e160) instead of our originally filed route to irkan on G583. Winds were from the south. Our new route was on the downwind side of the volcano approximately 100 or so miles north. We were daylight; VFR; with some clouds below us. No ash was observed. We were proceeding to a random latitude/longitude point (not a named point on an airway) to circumnavigate the possible volcanic ash plume; which was forecast to reach FL500 if eruption occurred. The captain explained he had had great difficulty obtaining clearance with language/radio clarity limitations. He stated that he had ultimately used dispatch via satcom; who used a russian translator; who spoke to the russian controller; and our clearance was relayed back to us in reverse through the dispatcher. I was on break when this clearance to deviate was received. The controller we were speaking to on the VHF radio when I arrived in the cockpit was not clear on our clearance as evidenced by multiple calls during our deviation asking for our present position and where we were proceeding. The captain stepped into the lavatory shortly after my arrival into the cockpit. The flying first officer was not comfortable with our clearance situation (I agreed with his assessment) and he continued to try to coordinate with the russian controller directly to ensure he understood where we were proceeding. When the captain returned; he expressed unhappiness with our continued efforts at making sure our clearance was understood by all parties involved. He stated 'the heck with them; we have our clearance and that is what we are flying'. He repeated this statement several times during the course of the deviation to me; the flying first officer; and the other relief pilot when she returned to the cockpit later. During our discussions; I expressed concern about possible midair with russian aircraft not under direct air traffic control (i.e. Military aircraft) and about poor air traffic control and coordination in russia generally. The kal airliner shootdown was also a consideration. I expressed my serious concern about our clearance situation and suggested we request to proceed to a nearby named intersection and proceed on an airway in the hopes that the russian controller could understand that clearance (versus a latitude/longitude) and would approve it. With another re-clearance; this is what we eventually did. We proceeded to okled then B240 to join our original flight plan at pakli. The other relief pilot was brought up at okled and we affected a crew changeover. I asked the captain to brief the other relief pilot regarding what had occurred; what our current clearance was; and how he wanted us to proceed going forward. While my fellow relief pilot and I were on duty (after the deviation); a russian controller asked us for the latitude/longitude of the volcano we had deviated around. When he received the coordinates; he stated that the volcano had not erupted. Also; during the deviation there were significant delays receiving updated flight plans from dispatch with our new route(s). The dispatcher said she had difficulty loading the flight plan with the random latitude/longitude waypoint. Despite having ten years experience on the 747 and 777 flying to the pacific/asia; I have flown only a handful of flights that were filed through russian airspace (a fact I shared with my fellow crew members prior to leaving ops). Because of my relative inexperience in russian operations; I had reviewed the fom on russian airspace procedures prior to going on break. On a page of the eurasia/artic polar briefing under the heading 'clearance readback' it states 'resolve without delay any question or doubt concerning an ATC clearance'. While the captain apparently harbored no doubt about our clearance; I did; the flying first officer did; and as evidenced by his repeated calls to us during the deviation; the russian controller did.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B777 on a polar route deviated for possible volcanic ash and experienced difficulty with Russian ATC understanding the amended clearance.
Narrative: As one of the relief pilots; I was on my break and got up to get a cup of coffee. Flight attendants expressed concern about our route of flight and arrival time. Flight attendants said 'passengers see it on the map and are asking questions'. They also stated that; when queried; the Captain said we were deviating and he was too busy to explain the situation. Offering to be of assistance; I called the cockpit and asked to come up. First Officer was pilot flying. Once in the cockpit; the Captain explained that we had deviated for a dispatch message regarding seismic activity at a volcano near our route (Severe Weather Advisory). Volcano was at Sheveluch (5642N 16124E) with 'no airway impact at this time' and winds aloft forecast at 160/35. When I took my jumpseat position; we were proceeding to a point North of our route (N59E160) instead of our originally filed route to IRKAN on G583. Winds were from the south. Our new route was on the downwind side of the volcano approximately 100 or so miles North. We were daylight; VFR; with some clouds below us. No ash was observed. We were proceeding to a random latitude/longitude point (not a named point on an airway) to circumnavigate the possible volcanic ash plume; which was forecast to reach FL500 if eruption occurred. The Captain explained he had had great difficulty obtaining clearance with language/radio clarity limitations. He stated that he had ultimately used Dispatch via SATCOM; who used a Russian Translator; who spoke to the Russian Controller; and our clearance was relayed back to us in reverse through the Dispatcher. I was on break when this clearance to deviate was received. The Controller we were speaking to on the VHF radio when I arrived in the cockpit was not clear on our clearance as evidenced by multiple calls during our deviation asking for our present position and where we were proceeding. The Captain stepped into the lavatory shortly after my arrival into the cockpit. The flying First Officer was not comfortable with our clearance situation (I agreed with his assessment) and he continued to try to coordinate with the Russian Controller directly to ensure he understood where we were proceeding. When the Captain returned; he expressed unhappiness with our continued efforts at making sure our clearance was understood by all parties involved. He stated 'The heck with them; we have our clearance and that is what we are flying'. He repeated this statement several times during the course of the deviation to me; the flying First Officer; and the other Relief Pilot when she returned to the cockpit later. During our discussions; I expressed concern about possible midair with Russian aircraft not under direct Air Traffic Control (i.e. military aircraft) and about poor air traffic control and coordination in Russia generally. The KAL airliner shootdown was also a consideration. I expressed my serious concern about our clearance situation and suggested we request to proceed to a nearby named intersection and proceed on an airway in the hopes that the Russian Controller could understand that clearance (versus a latitude/longitude) and would approve it. With another re-clearance; this is what we eventually did. We proceeded to OKLED then B240 to join our original flight plan at PAKLI. The other Relief Pilot was brought up at OKLED and we affected a crew changeover. I asked the Captain to brief the other Relief Pilot regarding what had occurred; what our current clearance was; and how he wanted us to proceed going forward. While my fellow Relief Pilot and I were on duty (after the deviation); a Russian Controller asked us for the latitude/longitude of the Volcano we had deviated around. When he received the coordinates; he stated that the volcano had not erupted. Also; during the deviation there were significant delays receiving updated flight plans from Dispatch with our new route(s). The Dispatcher said she had difficulty loading the flight plan with the random latitude/longitude waypoint. Despite having ten years experience on the 747 and 777 flying to the Pacific/Asia; I have flown only a handful of flights that were filed through Russian airspace (a fact I shared with my fellow crew members prior to leaving ops). Because of my relative inexperience in Russian operations; I had reviewed the FOM on Russian airspace procedures prior to going on break. On a page of the Eurasia/Artic Polar briefing under the heading 'Clearance Readback' it states 'Resolve without delay any question or doubt concerning an ATC clearance'. While the Captain apparently harbored no doubt about our clearance; I did; the flying First Officer did; and as evidenced by his repeated calls to us during the deviation; the Russian Controller did.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.