Narrative:

Here is one that looks good or at least ok on paper, but I feel is a set up for pilot error and fatal consequences. Everyone is just too tired to perform. The reason I am writing this is because prior to departure lax I commented that, 'while the first leg was an unavoidable necessity, tacking on the second leg by crew schedule is a tired--accident waiting to happen, and foolish economics by the company.' the first officer stated that he had been flying this pairing for some time and he had no problem with it, 'it's just a matter of getting used to it.' on the second leg, I kept a list of the first officer performance as I became aware of it and read it back to him before we left the cockpit in phl. The flight had been VMC most all of the way from lax-jfk-phl, and virtually problem free. The first officer mixed altitude and heading numbers from departure on readback. First officer missed 4 ATC calls en route. First officer selected (never used) 18 degree flaps instead of standard 22 degree flaps. F/east caught the error and verified 22 degree flaps were called for. First officer had to be told twice to lower gear. First officer did not initially respond to before landing final checklist read by F/east. After landing during taxi in, the first officer performed and answered the after landing checklist, but the radar was left on normal and the transponder was left on until after the secure cockpit checklist was completed and responded to. I caught them on my final review before leaving my seat. I am certain I missed some things too, as well as some of those by the first officer. We all were tired--too tired to fly safely! I do not believe we violated anything, but we sure could have. I feel the situation would have been worse, had other fatiguing factors, such as weather, holding, equipment and cabin considerations been present as well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB PIC DOCUMENTS EVIDENCE THAT IF A FLT CREW IS UP ALL NIGHT THEY GET TIRED AND THAT THIS FATIGUE CAUSES THEM TO COMMIT MINOR PROCEDURAL ERRORS.

Narrative: HERE IS ONE THAT LOOKS GOOD OR AT LEAST OK ON PAPER, BUT I FEEL IS A SET UP FOR PLT ERROR AND FATAL CONSEQUENCES. EVERYONE IS JUST TOO TIRED TO PERFORM. THE REASON I AM WRITING THIS IS BECAUSE PRIOR TO DEP LAX I COMMENTED THAT, 'WHILE THE FIRST LEG WAS AN UNAVOIDABLE NECESSITY, TACKING ON THE SECOND LEG BY CREW SCHEDULE IS A TIRED--ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN, AND FOOLISH ECONOMICS BY THE COMPANY.' THE FO STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN FLYING THIS PAIRING FOR SOME TIME AND HE HAD NO PROB WITH IT, 'IT'S JUST A MATTER OF GETTING USED TO IT.' ON THE SECOND LEG, I KEPT A LIST OF THE FO PERFORMANCE AS I BECAME AWARE OF IT AND READ IT BACK TO HIM BEFORE WE LEFT THE COCKPIT IN PHL. THE FLT HAD BEEN VMC MOST ALL OF THE WAY FROM LAX-JFK-PHL, AND VIRTUALLY PROB FREE. THE FO MIXED ALT AND HDG NUMBERS FROM DEP ON READBACK. FO MISSED 4 ATC CALLS ENRTE. FO SELECTED (NEVER USED) 18 DEG FLAPS INSTEAD OF STANDARD 22 DEG FLAPS. F/E CAUGHT THE ERROR AND VERIFIED 22 DEG FLAPS WERE CALLED FOR. FO HAD TO BE TOLD TWICE TO LOWER GEAR. FO DID NOT INITIALLY RESPOND TO BEFORE LNDG FINAL CHKLIST READ BY F/E. AFTER LNDG DURING TAXI IN, THE FO PERFORMED AND ANSWERED THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST, BUT THE RADAR WAS LEFT ON NORMAL AND THE TRANSPONDER WAS LEFT ON UNTIL AFTER THE SECURE COCKPIT CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED AND RESPONDED TO. I CAUGHT THEM ON MY FINAL REVIEW BEFORE LEAVING MY SEAT. I AM CERTAIN I MISSED SOME THINGS TOO, AS WELL AS SOME OF THOSE BY THE FO. WE ALL WERE TIRED--TOO TIRED TO FLY SAFELY! I DO NOT BELIEVE WE VIOLATED ANYTHING, BUT WE SURE COULD HAVE. I FEEL THE SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN WORSE, HAD OTHER FATIGUING FACTORS, SUCH AS WEATHER, HOLDING, EQUIPMENT AND CABIN CONSIDERATIONS BEEN PRESENT AS WELL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.