Narrative:

First officer was the pilot flying. Approaching 95 KTS on takeoff roll there was a wind noise around first officer's side window. At about 100 KTS his window began to open and he reached to stop it. I called 'I've got the airplane;' and took control. About 110 KTS; 30 KTS below V1; I decided to abort. I called the abort and retarded the throttles. The autobrakes started operation. I reverted to manual braking. The aircraft decelerated normally using light braking. We exited the runway and I called for the QRH abort procedure. We contacted ground control; notified company; dispatch and requested arff. While waiting I did not set the parking brake. Arff arrived and reported no visual abnormalities. Arff used a thermal scan on the brakes and tire area and reported normal temperatures with no hot spots. Maintenance arrived at the aircraft. We informed him of what had occurred. He instructed us to set the brakes. After inspection of the tires and the brakes maintenance reported no abnormalities and cleared us for taxi to the gate. We informed ground; company and arff. After following us to the gate the fire equipment departed. We did not move the window after the abort. The window was open; handle in the lock position and 'closed' in full view. We informed maintenance of the details when they boarded. One mechanic initially thought structural damage may have caused it to open. Maintenance inspected the window and locking mechanism operation. Forces on the open/close handle were not normal. They determined the locking pins were not working properly. The window would not lock properly in the closed position. The aircraft was taken out of service to repair and re-rig the locking mechanism. My decision to abort above 80 KTS for an open window was based on: 1) we had just changed control of the aircraft as the first officer tried to control the window. 2) the noise level was already high and communication was already difficult. 3) most importantly; I was at 110 KTS; 30 KTS below V1 with 10;000 ft of runway remaining. I felt aborting was the safest decision in this situation. After review with first officer I don't believe we actually declared an emergency when advising tower of the abort or when requesting the arff. I should have checked with ground to ensure we had in fact declared it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 Captain reports First Officer's window opening at about 100 KTS during the takeoff roll. First Officer was pilot flying and Captain assumed control and rejected the takeoff.

Narrative: First Officer was the pilot flying. Approaching 95 KTS on takeoff roll there was a wind noise around First Officer's side window. At about 100 KTS his window began to open and he reached to stop it. I called 'I've got the airplane;' and took control. About 110 KTS; 30 KTS below V1; I decided to abort. I called the abort and retarded the throttles. The autobrakes started operation. I reverted to manual braking. The aircraft decelerated normally using light braking. We exited the runway and I called for the QRH Abort procedure. We contacted Ground Control; notified company; Dispatch and requested ARFF. While waiting I did not set the parking brake. ARFF arrived and reported no visual abnormalities. ARFF used a thermal scan on the brakes and tire area and reported normal temperatures with no hot spots. Maintenance arrived at the aircraft. We informed him of what had occurred. He instructed us to set the brakes. After inspection of the tires and the brakes maintenance reported no abnormalities and cleared us for taxi to the gate. We informed Ground; Company and ARFF. After following us to the gate the fire equipment departed. We did not move the window after the abort. The window was open; handle in the lock position and 'CLOSED' in full view. We informed Maintenance of the details when they boarded. One Mechanic initially thought structural damage may have caused it to open. Maintenance inspected the window and locking mechanism operation. Forces on the open/close handle were not normal. They determined the locking pins were not working properly. The window would not lock properly in the closed position. The aircraft was taken out of service to repair and re-rig the locking mechanism. My decision to abort above 80 KTS for an open window was based on: 1) We had just changed control of the aircraft as the First Officer tried to control the window. 2) The noise level was already high and communication was already difficult. 3) Most importantly; I was at 110 KTS; 30 KTS below V1 with 10;000 FT of runway remaining. I felt aborting was the safest decision in this situation. After review with First Officer I don't believe we actually declared an emergency when advising Tower of the abort or when requesting the ARFF. I should have checked with Ground to ensure we had in fact declared it.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.