Narrative:

Departed in the evening. During climb out with 3 passengers on board; 'rh windshield heat inop' amber cas message illuminated when passing through 4000-6000 ft. Complete checklist (avoid icing). Continued flight. Passing 18;000-20;000 ft low oil quantity indication and 'rh oil low' amber cas message illuminated. All other engine indications were normal (oil pressure; oil temperature; tit; no vibrations) and we elected to return to our departure airport. Commenced descent with rh engine in idle. During final stages of return and approach; all oil temperatures; engine power were normal and no unusual vibrations were evident. However; rh oil pressure began to decrease and the red 'oil pressure low' cas warning illuminated. We determined that it was imperative to get the plane safely on the ground as quickly as possible before the situation degraded further. We elected not to shut down the engine as we were heavy; in the terminal area; and in a safe and stabilized position to land (but additional thrust would be available for other contingencies by keeping the right engine operating if needed). We used minimal thrust settings on the right engine during the visual approach and landing to runway 25 which is the longest runway. Conditions were clear; night time; winds 10-15 KTS from 220 degrees; runway was dry. FMS indicated stopping distance at 3200-3400 ft. Landing was very smooth in the touchdown zone and minimal braking was required for a full rollout to the end of the runway. Brakes were inspected by ground fire fighters immediately after clearing the runway. No indications of hot brakes. Rh engine was shut down for taxi back to FBO. No emergency was declared. All passenger were briefed on the situation during the flight. All passengers and crewmembers were safe and unharmed. Post flight inspection indicated loss of engine oil from rh engine. The determination to land and airplane as quickly as possible in an overweight condition with both engines operating (the right engine in a minimal thrust regime) was based on the fact that had we elected to shut down the right engine which was indicating low oil quantity; we would have required at least another 1 to 1.5 hours of flight time orbiting the field to burn off enough fuel to facilitate a single engine landing at maximum landing weight. I did not feel this was a prudent decision as the worst case scenario: a major failure of the left engine after securing the right engine; would mean an overweight landing with only one significant impaired or no-operating engines. This condition would be possible for the entire 1 to 1.5 hours we orbited the field. Given the fact that the aircraft had already demonstrated significantly impaired reliability issued during this short flight; we elected to land quickly while we still had available thrust from the right engine. In the event the right engine failed during our visual approach; we could then secure that engine; and proceed to orbit the field until enough fuel had been burned off and a single engine landing could then be attempted.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C750's CAS illuminated 'R/H OIL LOW' during climbout with all other indications normal. During the return flight to the departure airport; the 'OIL PRESS LOW' CAS annunciated. An emergency was not declared.

Narrative: Departed in the evening. During climb out with 3 passengers on board; 'RH windshield heat inop' amber CAS message illuminated when passing through 4000-6000 FT. Complete checklist (avoid icing). Continued flight. Passing 18;000-20;000 FT low oil quantity indication and 'RH OIL LOW' amber CAS message illuminated. All other engine indications were normal (oil pressure; oil temperature; TIT; no vibrations) and we elected to return to our departure airport. Commenced descent with RH engine in idle. During final stages of return and approach; all oil temperatures; engine power were normal and no unusual vibrations were evident. However; RH oil pressure began to decrease and the red 'OIL PRESSURE LOW' CAS warning illuminated. We determined that it was imperative to get the plane safely on the ground as quickly as possible before the situation degraded further. We elected not to shut down the engine as we were heavy; in the terminal area; and in a safe and stabilized position to land (but additional thrust would be available for other contingencies by keeping the right engine operating if needed). We used minimal thrust settings on the right engine during the visual approach and landing to Runway 25 which is the longest runway. Conditions were clear; night time; winds 10-15 KTS from 220 degrees; runway was dry. FMS indicated stopping distance at 3200-3400 FT. Landing was very smooth in the touchdown zone and minimal braking was required for a full rollout to the end of the runway. Brakes were inspected by ground fire fighters immediately after clearing the runway. No indications of hot brakes. RH engine was shut down for taxi back to FBO. No emergency was declared. All passenger were briefed on the situation during the flight. All passengers and crewmembers were safe and unharmed. Post flight inspection indicated loss of engine oil from RH engine. The determination to land and airplane as quickly as possible in an overweight condition with both engines operating (the right engine in a minimal thrust regime) was based on the fact that had we elected to shut down the right engine which was indicating low oil quantity; we would have required at least another 1 to 1.5 hours of flight time orbiting the field to burn off enough fuel to facilitate a single engine landing at maximum landing weight. I did not feel this was a prudent decision as the worst case scenario: a major failure of the left engine after securing the right engine; would mean an overweight landing with only one significant impaired or no-operating engines. This condition would be possible for the entire 1 to 1.5 hours we orbited the field. Given the fact that the aircraft had already demonstrated significantly impaired reliability issued during this short flight; we elected to land quickly while we still had available thrust from the right engine. In the event the right engine failed during our visual approach; we could then secure that engine; and proceed to orbit the field until enough fuel had been burned off and a single engine landing could then be attempted.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.