Narrative:

Flight from pit to atl. The first officer read the checklist, the second officer and I responded. We confirmed there was 29000 pounds of fuel showing by the three gauges. After takeoff climbing above 7000' the second officer advised me that we did not have enough fuel. To my shock he was right the fuel gauges read less than 14000 pounds. I saw on the ground when the checklists were read, all three gauges next to 10000 pounds which would give us 29000 pounds, when they must have been next to 5000 pounds. Returned to pit and loaded a total of 29000 pounds then proceeded to atl. Contributing factors: a passenger problem which started previous to departure, the jetway had the passenger door jammed, sun glare on the gauges, we were on a four day trip and were doing the sixth leg of the fourth day. Corrective action: have a totalizer on the forward panel so all three pilots could read the fuel load. Supplemental information from acn 85744. There was a contributing factor in the large transport because this aircraft doesn't have a fuel totalizer for the benefit of the whole crew. Supplemental information from acn 85505. There was no emergency declared nor was there any injuries or damage to the aircraft. There was a contributing factor in that the large transport does not have a fuel totalizer which is in view of the copilot. On the ground in pittsburg, other contributing factors were that we had been dealing with a group of irate executive traveler passengers in first class. The passenger refused to place his seat in the full upright position for taxi in toronto on the leg before and then demanded a first class seat for himself and his wife in pittsburg when there was none available. We had to call a company service rep to help resolve the situation and the passengers were deplaned in pittsburg. Another contributing factor was the jetway on gate which the jetway driver positioned too close to the aircraft door. The jetway pinched the aircraft door rubber seal, a water seal on the door. Another factor was fatigue. This was the last leg of a four day trip and this was the sixth leg of a 13 hour duty day, and we were all tired. I had read the checklist before starting engines and both the captain and the second officer responded - 30000 pounds of fuel on board and again responded 30000 pounds of fuel on the below the line items on the before starting engines checklist. It is impossible for me in the large transport copilot's seat to view the fuel gauges unless I bend backwards and turn my head around 180 degrees. I usually do this and add up individual fuel gauges to get the total fuel, but this time I was rushed to get into my seat and get strapped in after checking on the problem with the door seal and took the word of the second officer and captain. The second officer and captain are very professional pilots and had been performing in an outstanding manner during the other 3 days of the 4 day trip and there was no reason for me to doubt their word. However, due to their fatigue, they both looked at the evenly spaced gauges which were at 5000 pounds each and came up with a total of 30000 pounds of fuel which they both responded to my checklist queries twice. Another contributing factor was that the fueler that was assigned to our trip had not come to fuel our airplane due to management error of the operations agent or the gate agent. We did not catch the error until we were at FL260 when the second officer retotaled the fuel gauges. This was clearly a management error that the fuel truck was never dispatched to our aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT DEPARTED WITHOUT PROPER FUEL LOAD AND HAD TO RETURN FOR ADEQUATE FUEL.

Narrative: FLT FROM PIT TO ATL. THE F/O READ THE CHKLIST, THE S/O AND I RESPONDED. WE CONFIRMED THERE WAS 29000 LBS OF FUEL SHOWING BY THE THREE GAUGES. AFTER TKOF CLBING ABOVE 7000' THE S/O ADVISED ME THAT WE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL. TO MY SHOCK HE WAS RIGHT THE FUEL GAUGES READ LESS THAN 14000 LBS. I SAW ON THE GND WHEN THE CHKLISTS WERE READ, ALL THREE GAUGES NEXT TO 10000 LBS WHICH WOULD GIVE US 29000 LBS, WHEN THEY MUST HAVE BEEN NEXT TO 5000 LBS. RETURNED TO PIT AND LOADED A TOTAL OF 29000 LBS THEN PROCEEDED TO ATL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: A PAX PROB WHICH STARTED PREVIOUS TO DEP, THE JETWAY HAD THE PAX DOOR JAMMED, SUN GLARE ON THE GAUGES, WE WERE ON A FOUR DAY TRIP AND WERE DOING THE SIXTH LEG OF THE FOURTH DAY. CORRECTIVE ACTION: HAVE A TOTALIZER ON THE FORWARD PANEL SO ALL THREE PLTS COULD READ THE FUEL LOAD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 85744. THERE WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THE LGT BECAUSE THIS ACFT DOESN'T HAVE A FUEL TOTALIZER FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE WHOLE CREW. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 85505. THERE WAS NO EMER DECLARED NOR WAS THERE ANY INJURIES OR DAMAGE TO THE ACFT. THERE WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THAT THE LGT DOES NOT HAVE A FUEL TOTALIZER WHICH IS IN VIEW OF THE COPLT. ON THE GND IN PITTSBURG, OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE THAT WE HAD BEEN DEALING WITH A GROUP OF IRATE EXECUTIVE TRAVELER PAXS IN FIRST CLASS. THE PAX REFUSED TO PLACE HIS SEAT IN THE FULL UPRIGHT POS FOR TAXI IN TORONTO ON THE LEG BEFORE AND THEN DEMANDED A FIRST CLASS SEAT FOR HIMSELF AND HIS WIFE IN PITTSBURG WHEN THERE WAS NONE AVAILABLE. WE HAD TO CALL A COMPANY SVC REP TO HELP RESOLVE THE SITUATION AND THE PAXS WERE DEPLANED IN PITTSBURG. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE JETWAY ON GATE WHICH THE JETWAY DRIVER POSITIONED TOO CLOSE TO THE ACFT DOOR. THE JETWAY PINCHED THE ACFT DOOR RUBBER SEAL, A WATER SEAL ON THE DOOR. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS FATIGUE. THIS WAS THE LAST LEG OF A FOUR DAY TRIP AND THIS WAS THE SIXTH LEG OF A 13 HOUR DUTY DAY, AND WE WERE ALL TIRED. I HAD READ THE CHKLIST BEFORE STARTING ENGS AND BOTH THE CAPT AND THE S/O RESPONDED - 30000 LBS OF FUEL ON BOARD AND AGAIN RESPONDED 30000 LBS OF FUEL ON THE BELOW THE LINE ITEMS ON THE BEFORE STARTING ENGS CHKLIST. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME IN THE LGT COPLT'S SEAT TO VIEW THE FUEL GAUGES UNLESS I BEND BACKWARDS AND TURN MY HEAD AROUND 180 DEGS. I USUALLY DO THIS AND ADD UP INDIVIDUAL FUEL GAUGES TO GET THE TOTAL FUEL, BUT THIS TIME I WAS RUSHED TO GET INTO MY SEAT AND GET STRAPPED IN AFTER CHKING ON THE PROB WITH THE DOOR SEAL AND TOOK THE WORD OF THE S/O AND CAPT. THE S/O AND CAPT ARE VERY PROFESSIONAL PLTS AND HAD BEEN PERFORMING IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER DURING THE OTHER 3 DAYS OF THE 4 DAY TRIP AND THERE WAS NO REASON FOR ME TO DOUBT THEIR WORD. HOWEVER, DUE TO THEIR FATIGUE, THEY BOTH LOOKED AT THE EVENLY SPACED GAUGES WHICH WERE AT 5000 LBS EACH AND CAME UP WITH A TOTAL OF 30000 LBS OF FUEL WHICH THEY BOTH RESPONDED TO MY CHKLIST QUERIES TWICE. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THAT THE FUELER THAT WAS ASSIGNED TO OUR TRIP HAD NOT COME TO FUEL OUR AIRPLANE DUE TO MGMNT ERROR OF THE OPS AGENT OR THE GATE AGENT. WE DID NOT CATCH THE ERROR UNTIL WE WERE AT FL260 WHEN THE S/O RETOTALED THE FUEL GAUGES. THIS WAS CLEARLY A MGMNT ERROR THAT THE FUEL TRUCK WAS NEVER DISPATCHED TO OUR ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.