Narrative:

Problem began at cruise, encountered severe engine vibration followed closely by fluctuating engine instruments and finally engine explosion with associated fire warning. Explosive decompression followed on the heels of the engine explosion and an emergency descent was initiated, ATC was advised during this period and crw was decided on as landing airport. After appropriate checklists were completed remainder of flight and landing were very anti-climatic. No evacuate/evacuation was necessary as there was no fire. The passengers were off loaded through forward stair door and put on buses to terminal. Human performance. This is something else entirely different. It probably took no more than 10 second to don oxygen masks and get airflow, however I felt very confused for the first 2 to 3 minutes (or at least it seemed that long). One part of my brain would tell me to be sure and get the checklist done and another part would say 'just fly the airplane.' it almost seemed like there was conflict going on inside my brain. It became apparent that all items (or most anyway) on the checklist got accomplished but I now find it hard to remember back to when we did these items. Both the copilot and I had already flown a 3 day trip together and were on the 3RD day of this trip. We worked well together and this was a plus in this situation. There is no way that training can prepare you for a situation like this but, we were both obviously well trained in emergency situations enough to perform well under the stress we experienced. Supplemental information from acn 85791. Already being in the descent we then did the fire shutdown procedure for that engine and blew the first fire bottle. We then announced the emergency descent and engine fire to ATC and squawked 7700 on the transponder. I got the emergency checklist out and we did the engine failure, fire and shutdown checklist. Since the captain was busy flying the aircraft and looking outside for the airport, I verified that the emergency descent checklist was done and then tuned the localizer frequency for our chosen runway for him. We were still getting a fire indication so we slowed the aircraft and fired the second bottle. Initially there was some minor confusion but we did everything we had to do and backed it up with the checklists. Simulator training helped us to a great extent, but in the simulator I had never had this type of compounded multiple emergency before. I think it would be a great help in the future to experience more of these multiple emergency situations in simulator training. Callback conversation with reporter revealed following. Engine failure put a hole in the aircraft big enough for a man to crawl through. Masks came out and all systems worked as designed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG EXPLOSIVE ENG FAILURE CAUSING EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION AT FL310. EMERGENCY DESCENT TO LNDG.

Narrative: PROB BEGAN AT CRUISE, ENCOUNTERED SEVERE ENG VIBRATION FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY FLUCTUATING ENG INSTRUMENTS AND FINALLY ENG EXPLOSION WITH ASSOCIATED FIRE WARNING. EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION FOLLOWED ON THE HEELS OF THE ENG EXPLOSION AND AN EMER DSCNT WAS INITIATED, ATC WAS ADVISED DURING THIS PERIOD AND CRW WAS DECIDED ON AS LNDG ARPT. AFTER APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED REMAINDER OF FLT AND LNDG WERE VERY ANTI-CLIMATIC. NO EVAC WAS NECESSARY AS THERE WAS NO FIRE. THE PAXS WERE OFF LOADED THROUGH FORWARD STAIR DOOR AND PUT ON BUSES TO TERMINAL. HUMAN PERFORMANCE. THIS IS SOMETHING ELSE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. IT PROBABLY TOOK NO MORE THAN 10 SEC TO DON OXYGEN MASKS AND GET AIRFLOW, HOWEVER I FELT VERY CONFUSED FOR THE FIRST 2 TO 3 MINUTES (OR AT LEAST IT SEEMED THAT LONG). ONE PART OF MY BRAIN WOULD TELL ME TO BE SURE AND GET THE CHKLIST DONE AND ANOTHER PART WOULD SAY 'JUST FLY THE AIRPLANE.' IT ALMOST SEEMED LIKE THERE WAS CONFLICT GOING ON INSIDE MY BRAIN. IT BECAME APPARENT THAT ALL ITEMS (OR MOST ANYWAY) ON THE CHKLIST GOT ACCOMPLISHED BUT I NOW FIND IT HARD TO REMEMBER BACK TO WHEN WE DID THESE ITEMS. BOTH THE COPLT AND I HAD ALREADY FLOWN A 3 DAY TRIP TOGETHER AND WERE ON THE 3RD DAY OF THIS TRIP. WE WORKED WELL TOGETHER AND THIS WAS A PLUS IN THIS SITUATION. THERE IS NO WAY THAT TRAINING CAN PREPARE YOU FOR A SITUATION LIKE THIS BUT, WE WERE BOTH OBVIOUSLY WELL TRAINED IN EMER SITUATIONS ENOUGH TO PERFORM WELL UNDER THE STRESS WE EXPERIENCED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 85791. ALREADY BEING IN THE DSCNT WE THEN DID THE FIRE SHUTDOWN PROC FOR THAT ENG AND BLEW THE FIRST FIRE BOTTLE. WE THEN ANNOUNCED THE EMER DSCNT AND ENG FIRE TO ATC AND SQUAWKED 7700 ON THE TRANSPONDER. I GOT THE EMER CHKLIST OUT AND WE DID THE ENG FAILURE, FIRE AND SHUTDOWN CHKLIST. SINCE THE CAPT WAS BUSY FLYING THE ACFT AND LOOKING OUTSIDE FOR THE ARPT, I VERIFIED THAT THE EMER DSCNT CHKLIST WAS DONE AND THEN TUNED THE LOC FREQ FOR OUR CHOSEN RWY FOR HIM. WE WERE STILL GETTING A FIRE INDICATION SO WE SLOWED THE ACFT AND FIRED THE SECOND BOTTLE. INITIALLY THERE WAS SOME MINOR CONFUSION BUT WE DID EVERYTHING WE HAD TO DO AND BACKED IT UP WITH THE CHKLISTS. SIMULATOR TRAINING HELPED US TO A GREAT EXTENT, BUT IN THE SIMULATOR I HAD NEVER HAD THIS TYPE OF COMPOUNDED MULTIPLE EMER BEFORE. I THINK IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP IN THE FUTURE TO EXPERIENCE MORE OF THESE MULTIPLE EMER SITUATIONS IN SIMULATOR TRAINING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED FOLLOWING. ENG FAILURE PUT A HOLE IN THE ACFT BIG ENOUGH FOR A MAN TO CRAWL THROUGH. MASKS CAME OUT AND ALL SYSTEMS WORKED AS DESIGNED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.