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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 857401 |
Time | |
Date | 200910 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | PHL.Airport |
State Reference | PA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb Takeoff |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Coordinator |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Military 3 Air Traffic Control Radar 13 Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types |
Miss Distance | Horizontal 1400 Vertical 0 |
Narrative:
While working tower sequencer; an air carrier taxied out to runway 8 for departure for lga which was 20 miles in trail; requiring a apreq with the phl TRACON tmc. The tower front line manager (flm); called to get a release and told the tmc that the air carrier was #2 for departure when in fact the subject aircraft for lga was #8 for departure off the airport. The tmc gave a release based on the fact they thought the aircraft was #2 and not #8. When the traffic didn't depart right away; a lga overflight came into the area now requiring the local controller to go in trail of the overflight in stead of in front. As the tower sequencer I advised local of the change in sequence. The flm was angry that the air carrier did not depart first. The flm then ordered the local controller to depart the air carrier for lga right away. Despite protest from the sequencer and the local controller; the flm insisted; this caused confusion and angst. The flm even proceeded to call the departure controller to inform them that the air carrier would be departing in front of the overflight and told they departure controller to slow his overflight aircraft. The local controller had to take an aircraft that was on the runway for departure back off the runway to get the aircraft for lga going. In the mean time; the local controller cleared another same company aircraft; with a similar call sign; off of runway 9L on a 096 heading; then cleared the subject air carrier for lga off runway 8 on a 096 heading; when he meant to clear them on a 081 heading. The local controller tried to re-issue the proper heading but kept jumbling up the call signs. The aircraft had visual separation; but it was not a good situation. There were 3 things that made this situation bad. 1) an order from a manager for a controller to do something when they don't have the whole picture of what is going on and is not safety related. Especially in this case it was just to make a point that he was given a release without traffic even though it was obvious that there was traffic in the area. 2) similar sounding call signs. This has been a common problem in phl. 3) the mitigated headings that are used for departures. The single digit headings (ie. 081; 096; 268) are so different than the standard 5 degree increments that controllers are used to using.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PHL Coordinator described confused IFR release event; alleging a Supervisor ordered sequence change confused the the Local Controller requiring the use of visual separation to maintain required standards.
Narrative: While working Tower Sequencer; an air carrier taxied out to Runway 8 for departure for LGA which was 20 miles in trail; requiring a APREQ with the PHL TRACON TMC. The Tower Front Line Manager (FLM); called to get a release and told the TMC that the air carrier was #2 for departure when in fact the subject aircraft for LGA was #8 for departure off the airport. The TMC gave a release based on the fact they thought the aircraft was #2 and not #8. When the traffic didn't depart right away; a LGA overflight came into the area now requiring the Local Controller to go in trail of the overflight in stead of in front. As the Tower Sequencer I advised Local of the change in sequence. The FLM was angry that the air carrier did not depart first. The FLM then ordered the Local Controller to depart the air carrier for LGA right away. Despite protest from the Sequencer and the Local Controller; the FLM insisted; this caused confusion and angst. The FLM even proceeded to call the Departure Controller to inform them that the air carrier would be departing in front of the overflight and told they departure controller to slow his overflight aircraft. The Local Controller had to take an aircraft that was on the runway for departure back off the runway to get the aircraft for LGA going. In the mean time; the Local Controller cleared another same company aircraft; with a similar call sign; off of runway 9L on a 096 heading; then cleared the subject air carrier for LGA off runway 8 on a 096 heading; when he meant to clear them on a 081 heading. The Local Controller tried to re-issue the proper heading but kept jumbling up the call signs. The aircraft had visual separation; but it was not a good situation. There were 3 things that made this situation bad. 1) An ORDER from a manager for a controller to do something when they don't have the whole picture of what is going on and is not safety related. Especially in this case it was just to make a point that he was given a release without traffic even though it was obvious that there was traffic in the area. 2) Similar sounding call signs. This has been a common problem in PHL. 3) The mitigated headings that are used for departures. The single digit headings (ie. 081; 096; 268) are so different than the standard 5 degree increments that controllers are used to using.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.