Narrative:

On jul/tue/96 at about XX00 local, the control tower sighted several tornadoes in the vicinity of the international airport. At least one touched down on the airport property. The supervisor in the control tower had made the necessary preliminary steps in case the control tower had to be evacuate/evacuationed. There were more than 30 cars damaged in the south employee parking lot. This parking lot is adjacent to runway 35L. The tower called the TRACON advising them of this tornado near runway 35L and requested no more arrs to that runway. The traffic management coordinator in the TRACON refused to get off that runway. Subsequently, at least 6 more arrs landed on runway 35L. Current tower orders require the tower to coordinate all runway changes with the TRACON. The practical application of this is that the TRACON usually overrides the tower supervisor or traffic management coordinator in the assignment of runways. This violates FAA order 7210, which states the tower supervisor shall determine the runways in use. The tower supervisor is able to look out the window and actually physically see the tornado. Once they make this call to the TRACON, there should be no question about what steps need to be taken. Tower controllers have often complained to facility management about the practice of the TRACON determining what runways we shall use. Nothing has been done about our concerns. The incident of jul/tue/96 placed aircraft in an unsafe position and should not have happened. The tornado was approximately 1/2 mi west of the threshold of runway 35L. This practice needs to be investigated by an outside source immediately.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR STATED THAT AFTER A TORNADO WAS SIGHTED ON THE ARPT NEAR THE APCH RWY, THE TWR SUPVR ATTEMPTED A RWY CHANGE WITH THE TFC MGMNT COORDINATOR (TMC). RPTR CLAIMS THE TMC REFUSED TO MAKE THE RWY CHANGE WHICH PLACED ACFT IN AN UNSAFE POS. RPTR ALLEGES FAA HANDBOOK 7210 WAS VIOLATED.

Narrative: ON JUL/TUE/96 AT ABOUT XX00 LCL, THE CTL TWR SIGHTED SEVERAL TORNADOES IN THE VICINITY OF THE INTL ARPT. AT LEAST ONE TOUCHED DOWN ON THE ARPT PROPERTY. THE SUPVR IN THE CTL TWR HAD MADE THE NECESSARY PRELIMINARY STEPS IN CASE THE CTL TWR HAD TO BE EVACED. THERE WERE MORE THAN 30 CARS DAMAGED IN THE S EMPLOYEE PARKING LOT. THIS PARKING LOT IS ADJACENT TO RWY 35L. THE TWR CALLED THE TRACON ADVISING THEM OF THIS TORNADO NEAR RWY 35L AND REQUESTED NO MORE ARRS TO THAT RWY. THE TFC MGMNT COORDINATOR IN THE TRACON REFUSED TO GET OFF THAT RWY. SUBSEQUENTLY, AT LEAST 6 MORE ARRS LANDED ON RWY 35L. CURRENT TWR ORDERS REQUIRE THE TWR TO COORDINATE ALL RWY CHANGES WITH THE TRACON. THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THIS IS THAT THE TRACON USUALLY OVERRIDES THE TWR SUPVR OR TFC MGMNT COORDINATOR IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF RWYS. THIS VIOLATES FAA ORDER 7210, WHICH STATES THE TWR SUPVR SHALL DETERMINE THE RWYS IN USE. THE TWR SUPVR IS ABLE TO LOOK OUT THE WINDOW AND ACTUALLY PHYSICALLY SEE THE TORNADO. ONCE THEY MAKE THIS CALL TO THE TRACON, THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION ABOUT WHAT STEPS NEED TO BE TAKEN. TWR CTLRS HAVE OFTEN COMPLAINED TO FACILITY MGMNT ABOUT THE PRACTICE OF THE TRACON DETERMINING WHAT RWYS WE SHALL USE. NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE ABOUT OUR CONCERNS. THE INCIDENT OF JUL/TUE/96 PLACED ACFT IN AN UNSAFE POS AND SHOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. THE TORNADO WAS APPROX 1/2 MI W OF THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 35L. THIS PRACTICE NEEDS TO BE INVESTIGATED BY AN OUTSIDE SOURCE IMMEDIATELY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.