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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 858103 |
Time | |
Date | 200911 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | AGS.Airport |
State Reference | GA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Approach Coordinator |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
An IFR aircraft was enroute dnl field from the north and was going IFR into dnl which is about 6 NM nnw of ags. Ags tower had the point out and was coordinating departures with runway 35 in use. At the time ags was reporting 1200 sct and the ILS 35 in use and dnl ASOS was reporting 008 few or 800 sct and 2100 broken. The IFR aircraft's radar was terminated and currently on the advisory frequency when the tower asked for a release off runway 35 for an IFR aircraft. The radar controller said he was going to release the aircraft. I was a coordinator and said you cannot because we are protecting the airspace around dnl and it conflicts. The radar controller said he was going to do it and I said he could not. The radar controller paged the supervisory controller and he/she came to the radar room and said release the aircraft. Before the supervisor came into the room I attempted to reach the IFR aircraft via the dnl unicom frequency to get the cancellation and have him transmit that on 126.8 and got no answer. The supervisor said release the aircraft. The aircraft then called the radar controller to cancel IFR into dnl. Neither the supervisor nor radar controller wanted to hear that we were protecting for that IFR aircraft and while we observed his data tag we were working that aircraft with non radar separation into an uncontrolled field with no control tower. With my years of experience I have not seen inexperienced controllers make such a willful error in judgment. Both controllers felt there is no protected airspace to protect; radar separation applies all the way into an uncontrolled airport; that the aircraft will not go around or execute a missed approach; and that no loss off any separation will or has occurred. At best both controllers were betting that it would work and definitely not ensuring separation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AGS Controller voiced concern regarding the procedures utilized when another Controller released an IFR aircraft from a non-towered airport; not applying required non RADAR standards.
Narrative: An IFR aircraft was enroute DNL field from the north and was going IFR into DNL which is about 6 NM NNW of AGS. AGS Tower had the point out and was coordinating departures with Runway 35 in use. At the time AGS was reporting 1200 SCT and the ILS 35 in use and DNL ASOS was reporting 008 FEW or 800 SCT and 2100 BKN. The IFR aircraft's radar was terminated and currently on the advisory frequency when the tower asked for a release off Runway 35 for an IFR aircraft. The RADAR Controller said he was going to release the aircraft. I was a Coordinator and said you cannot because we are protecting the airspace around DNL and it conflicts. The RADAR Controller said he was going to do it and I said he could not. The RADAR Controller paged the Supervisory Controller and he/she came to the RADAR room and said release the aircraft. Before the Supervisor came into the room I attempted to reach the IFR aircraft via the DNL UNICOM frequency to get the cancellation and have him transmit that on 126.8 and got no answer. The Supervisor said release the aircraft. The aircraft then called the RADAR Controller to cancel IFR into DNL. Neither the Supervisor nor RADAR Controller wanted to hear that we were protecting for that IFR aircraft and while we observed his data tag we were working that aircraft with non radar separation into an uncontrolled field with no Control Tower. With my years of experience I have not seen inexperienced controllers make such a willful error in judgment. Both controllers felt there is no protected airspace to protect; radar separation applies all the way into an uncontrolled airport; that the aircraft will not go around or execute a missed approach; and that no loss off any separation will or has occurred. At best both controllers were betting that it would work and definitely not ensuring separation.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.