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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 859739 |
Time | |
Date | 200911 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | DTW.Airport |
State Reference | MI |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
The before start checklist above and below the line was completed. I placed my headset on and was about to call for pushback from ramp control. At that time; the aircraft began the push. I told the captain that we were not cleared for pushback. The ramp tower told me; 'after the aircraft clears behind you; cleared to push.' the captain started flashing the taxi/landing light to stop the tug operator with the push. This was the first time I realized that the tug driver had no headset. I immediately told ramp that we had lost communication with our tug driver and the other aircraft did not begin their taxi. While that communication was going on the captain was yelling out the window to get the tug operator's attention. As he was doing this I continued flashing the nose taxi/landing light for the captain. I looked at the tug driver and he paid no attention to the light that was lighting up his whole tug. Finally the push was stopped with the captain's verbal commands out of the window. I advised the ramp control again that we were having trouble communicating with the ground crew. It was my thought that we would stay still until communications were established. Shortly after that we began to push again with no direction from the flight deck. I advised ramp control and they said it was clear. When we did come to a stop; I opened the window and told the ground crew that the captain requested they talk to him. At that time with the brake set we completed the before start checklist items and began to start the left engine while the captain was talking to the ground crew. We were cleared to taxi and the flight was continued with no further events. This event occurred for a few reasons: 1. Because of the undue pressure placed on the ground crew for on time departure. This contradicts safety at its core! 2. The ground crew not advising the captain of no headset available until after the jetway was pulled away. 3. The ground crew not realizing that there was a problem when the aircraft lights were flashing on and off. The beginning of this event happened simultaneously. Proper training of the entire ground crew involved. No pushback unless we have a headset. My biggest concern is that no one on that push crew was aware that when we began flashing the lights that there may be a problem. The flashing; whether discussed or not; is not a normal event during pushback; yet they paid no attention to them. We must provide the ground crew with working headsets.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A First Officer described a DTW Ground Crew pushing his aircraft back at their discretion with no head set communications; with no clearance from the Flight Crew and conflicting traffic behind them.
Narrative: The Before Start checklist above and below the line was completed. I placed my headset on and was about to call for pushback from Ramp Control. At that time; the aircraft began the push. I told the Captain that we were not cleared for pushback. The Ramp Tower told me; 'after the aircraft clears behind you; cleared to push.' The Captain started flashing the taxi/landing light to stop the Tug Operator with the push. This was the first time I realized that the Tug Driver had no headset. I immediately told Ramp that we had lost communication with our Tug Driver and the other aircraft did not begin their taxi. While that communication was going on the Captain was yelling out the window to get the Tug Operator's attention. As he was doing this I continued flashing the nose taxi/landing light for the Captain. I looked at the Tug Driver and he paid no attention to the light that was lighting up his whole tug. Finally the push was stopped with the Captain's verbal commands out of the window. I advised the Ramp Control again that we were having trouble communicating with the Ground Crew. It was my thought that we would stay still until communications were established. Shortly after that we began to push again with no direction from the flight deck. I advised Ramp Control and they said it was clear. When we did come to a stop; I opened the window and told the Ground Crew that the Captain requested they talk to him. At that time with the brake set we completed the Before Start checklist items and began to start the left engine while the Captain was talking to the Ground Crew. We were cleared to taxi and the flight was continued with no further events. This event occurred for a few reasons: 1. Because of the undue pressure placed on the Ground Crew for on time departure. This contradicts safety at its core! 2. The Ground Crew not advising the Captain of no headset available until after the jetway was pulled away. 3. The Ground Crew not realizing that there was a problem when the aircraft lights were flashing on and off. The beginning of this event happened simultaneously. Proper training of the entire Ground Crew involved. No pushback unless we have a headset. My biggest concern is that no one on that Push Crew was aware that when we began flashing the lights that there may be a problem. The flashing; whether discussed or not; is not a normal event during pushback; yet they paid no attention to them. We must provide the Ground Crew with working headsets.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.