Narrative:

Two events combined in this report. Weather had been between MVFR and IFR throughout the day. Ladd army airfield (fbk/pafa) ATCT was closed all day. Aircraft X had departed eielson AFB (eil/paei) on a local IFR clearance for some practice approaches. After executing an approach to eil; aircraft X was requesting the NDB-a approach to fbk and was informed that no landing or weather information was available and issued the fairbanks (fai/pafa) wind and altimeter. While holding over chena NDB (cun) had requested that I file an IFR clearance to anchorage (anc/panc) via the fdio. All this was accomplished without incident. Event #1: upon completion of some holding at cun; aircraft X requested and was cleared for the NDB-a approach to fbk. At an appropriate point the aircraft was given climb out instructions (fly heading 170; climb and maintain 3000') and changed to the advisory frequency. When aircraft X was approximately 5-6nm from the runway inbound; fbk ATCT called over the shoutline. I was on the phone at the moment; so the developmental in picked up the call and informed me that fbk ATCT was advising us that there was snow removal equipment on the runway. I immediately called fbk ATCT over the shoutline and informed them I was not talking to aircraft X at this point and that I would attempt to contact the aircraft on guard. I then broadcast in the blind on guard to aircraft X that there were personnel and equipment on the runway at fbk and received no response. Event #2: following the previous event; as I monitored aircraft X approach I noticed that upon reaching the runway threshold the aircraft began turning to the north of the runway. At first I thought perhaps the aircraft had visually acquired the snow removal equipment on the runway and in an attempt to not overfly the surface had deviated slightly to the right before executing their climb out procedure. This thought was quickly dispelled when the aircraft appeared to continue to remain north of the runway; so I initiated another blind transmission on guard and instructed the aircraft to fly heading 170; climb and maintain 3000; and contact me on 125.35. In my haste; I had given the west radar frequency; so I advised the developmental on west radar that aircraft X should be coming up on their frequency; but that he was radar contact and to put him on my frequency again. Aircraft X checked on with west radar and was radar identified and given instruction to switch to my frequency. When aircraft X checked on my frequency I redundantly re-identified him and asked what had transpired at the end of his approach. The pilot informed me he was circling for runway 7. I informed the pilot that circling is not authorized north of the runway on the NDB-a approach and after a moment the pilot indicated that he now noticed that restriction on the chart. At this point aircraft X was given his IFR clearance to anc and departed my airspace without further incident. Recommendation; reference event #1: at the time of this event there were no known notams issued regarding personnel and/or equipment on the runway at fbk. A printout of the notams for fbk at the time of the incident should be attached to this report. Appropriate dissemination of this information would have prevented this occurrence; as well as future occurrences. Reference event #2: the ATC system performed its function to monitor the approach and took immediate action to correct an observed abnormality. Had I been more inquisitive as to the nature of the approach request; I might have determined that aircraft X intended to circle to land. With that information I would have issued a more detailed approach clearance; which would have included a restriction to circle south of the runway. While this would have prevented the occurrence; the traffic situation at the time did not warrant that level of detail as there was nothing to preclude the aircraft from executing the procedure as published. The publishedprocedure clearly includes a statement that restricts the circling maneuver to south of the runway. Therefore; I believe the problem was that the pilot's briefing of the approach was either incorrect or not detailed enough to include the circling restriction.procedure clearly includes a statement that restricts the circling maneuver to south of the runway. Therefore; I believe the problem was that the pilot's briefing of the approach was either incorrect or not detailed enough to include the circling restriction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAI controller described multiple errors when runway closure information was not disseminated properly; a flight crew did not correctly interpret charting information and a wrong frequency was issued; all leading to a potential closed runway landing event.

Narrative: Two events combined in this report. Weather had been between MVFR and IFR throughout the day. Ladd Army Airfield (FBK/PAFA) ATCT was closed all day. Aircraft X had departed Eielson AFB (EIL/PAEI) on a local IFR clearance for some practice approaches. After executing an approach to EIL; Aircraft X was requesting the NDB-A approach to FBK and was informed that no landing or weather information was available and issued the Fairbanks (FAI/PAFA) wind and altimeter. While holding over Chena NDB (CUN) had requested that I file an IFR clearance to Anchorage (ANC/PANC) via the FDIO. All this was accomplished without incident. Event #1: Upon completion of some holding at CUN; Aircraft X requested and was cleared for the NDB-A approach to FBK. At an appropriate point the aircraft was given climb out instructions (fly heading 170; climb and maintain 3000') and changed to the advisory frequency. When Aircraft X was approximately 5-6NM from the runway inbound; FBK ATCT called over the shoutline. I was on the phone at the moment; so the developmental in picked up the call and informed me that FBK ATCT was advising us that there was snow removal equipment on the runway. I immediately called FBK ATCT over the shoutline and informed them I was not talking to Aircraft X at this point and that I would attempt to contact the aircraft on guard. I then broadcast in the blind on guard to Aircraft X that there were personnel and equipment on the runway at FBK and received no response. Event #2: Following the previous event; as I monitored Aircraft X approach I noticed that upon reaching the runway threshold the aircraft began turning to the North of the runway. At first I thought perhaps the aircraft had visually acquired the snow removal equipment on the runway and in an attempt to not overfly the surface had deviated slightly to the right before executing their climb out procedure. This thought was quickly dispelled when the aircraft appeared to continue to remain North of the runway; so I initiated another blind transmission on guard and instructed the aircraft to fly heading 170; climb and maintain 3000; and contact me on 125.35. In my haste; I had given the West RADAR frequency; so I advised the developmental on West RADAR that Aircraft X should be coming up on their frequency; but that he was RADAR contact and to put him on my frequency again. Aircraft X checked on with West RADAR and was RADAR identified and given instruction to switch to my frequency. When Aircraft X checked on my frequency I redundantly re-identified him and asked what had transpired at the end of his approach. The pilot informed me he was circling for Runway 7. I informed the pilot that circling is not authorized North of the runway on the NDB-A approach and after a moment the pilot indicated that he now noticed that restriction on the chart. At this point Aircraft X was given his IFR clearance to ANC and departed my airspace without further incident. Recommendation; Reference Event #1: At the time of this event there were no known NOTAMs issued regarding personnel and/or equipment on the runway at FBK. A printout of the NOTAMs for FBK at the time of the incident should be attached to this report. Appropriate dissemination of this information would have prevented this occurrence; as well as future occurrences. Reference Event #2: The ATC system performed its function to monitor the approach and took immediate action to correct an observed abnormality. Had I been more inquisitive as to the nature of the approach request; I might have determined that Aircraft X intended to circle to land. With that information I would have issued a more detailed approach clearance; which would have included a restriction to circle South of the runway. While this would have prevented the occurrence; the traffic situation at the time did not warrant that level of detail as there was nothing to preclude the aircraft from executing the procedure as published. The publishedprocedure clearly includes a statement that restricts the circling maneuver to South of the runway. Therefore; I believe the problem was that the pilot's briefing of the approach was either incorrect or not detailed enough to include the circling restriction.procedure clearly includes a statement that restricts the circling maneuver to South of the runway. Therefore; I believe the problem was that the pilot's briefing of the approach was either incorrect or not detailed enough to include the circling restriction.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.