Narrative:

I was working with a hand off person on manr in the del rey area. All operation was normal; west traffic; equipment worked good; VFR weather; and no special activity. I had been on position for about 45-50 minutes and the traffic was light to moderate at the time. An A319 on the HOLTZ9 departure took off from lax on the south complex and I had instructed him to climb to 13;000 feet and maintain 250 knots. I turned flight abc toward pevee way point about 5 miles offshore to resume the HOLTZ9 departure. Flight abc was slowly climbing out of 4;800 feet as an LJ25 departed lax on the south complex routed through jli and did not tag up as he remained a primary target for about 3 miles offshore. Lax tower called my hand off to inform that the primary target was the lear. My hand off made me aware that the primary target was the lear. The lear checked in on my frequency at approximately 4-5 miles offshore as he was climbing through 4;700 feet. I had instructed the lear to climb to 13;000 feet and maintain 250 KTS. The lear was at 303 KTS ground speed and the A319 was 250-260 KTS. The A319 was still in the left turn toward pevee climbing through 5;000 feet as the lear was catching him in both speed and altitude. I issued traffic to the lear and he did not have visual contact on A319; so I immediately turned the lear to a 250 heading as an attempt to establish divergence. I had also instructed the lear to maintain 230 KTS for spacing. Once the A319 and the lear were no factor; I turned the lear to heading 160 and shipped the aircraft to newr. From the tape replay; it appeared that there was no lateral separation between the lear and the A319 to begin with when lax departed the lear. The lear was also short-cut-ted in the turn to heading 220 when he departed that caused his track to cut inside of the A319. When the lear finally checked in; there was 2.73 miles lateral and 400 feet vertical separation. Recommendation; this incident shows the importance of achieving communication in a timely manner. If the lear had checked in on my frequency sooner; there would have been more time and a higher chance to achieve separation. Also; the lear did not tag up for a few miles after departure which added more complexity to the situation. This is my second experience with late pilot check-in that have created a potential conflict. There also appeared to be a breakdown in safety for the release of the lear behind the A319 with minimal separation that rapidly diminished due to the great difference in speed and climb rate. I strongly feel that the lack of skill and experience resulted in the inability to foresee and resolve the conflict. I recommend the training program to be modified to allow more seasoning time prior to certification for a brand new controller with little or no experience. Greater emphasis should be put on how to handle complex situations and identifying potential conflicts before they develop. Additionally; I recommend controllers become more familiar with aircraft performance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SCT Controller described a loss of separation event involving an A319 followed by a Lear 60 off LAX with the tower recorded as responsible for the error; lack of aircraft performance knowledge was listed as a causal factor.

Narrative: I was working with a hand off person on MANR in the Del Rey area. All operation was normal; west traffic; equipment worked good; VFR weather; and no special activity. I had been on position for about 45-50 minutes and the traffic was light to moderate at the time. An A319 on the HOLTZ9 departure took off from LAX on the south complex and I had instructed him to climb to 13;000 feet and maintain 250 knots. I turned Flight ABC toward PEVEE way point about 5 miles offshore to resume the HOLTZ9 departure. Flight ABC was slowly climbing out of 4;800 feet as an LJ25 departed LAX on the south complex routed through JLI and did not tag up as he remained a primary target for about 3 miles offshore. LAX Tower called my hand off to inform that the primary target was the Lear. My hand off made me aware that the primary target was the Lear. The Lear checked in on my frequency at approximately 4-5 miles offshore as he was climbing through 4;700 feet. I had instructed the Lear to climb to 13;000 feet and maintain 250 KTS. The Lear was at 303 KTS ground speed and the A319 was 250-260 KTS. The A319 was still in the left turn toward PEVEE climbing through 5;000 feet as the Lear was catching him in both speed and altitude. I issued traffic to the Lear and he did not have visual contact on A319; so I immediately turned the Lear to a 250 heading as an attempt to establish divergence. I had also instructed the Lear to maintain 230 KTS for spacing. Once the A319 and the Lear were no factor; I turned the Lear to heading 160 and shipped the aircraft to NEWR. From the tape replay; it appeared that there was no lateral separation between the Lear and the A319 to begin with when LAX departed the Lear. The Lear was also short-cut-ted in the turn to heading 220 when he departed that caused his track to cut inside of the A319. When the Lear finally checked in; there was 2.73 miles lateral and 400 feet vertical separation. Recommendation; this incident shows the importance of achieving communication in a timely manner. If the Lear had checked in on my frequency sooner; there would have been more time and a higher chance to achieve separation. Also; the Lear did not tag up for a few miles after departure which added more complexity to the situation. This is my second experience with late pilot check-in that have created a potential conflict. There also appeared to be a breakdown in safety for the release of the Lear behind the A319 with minimal separation that rapidly diminished due to the great difference in speed and climb rate. I strongly feel that the lack of skill and experience resulted in the inability to foresee and resolve the conflict. I recommend the training program to be modified to allow more seasoning time prior to certification for a brand new controller with little or no experience. Greater emphasis should be put on how to handle complex situations and identifying potential conflicts before they develop. Additionally; I recommend controllers become more familiar with aircraft performance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.