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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 860810 |
Time | |
Date | 200911 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-400 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach Landing Initial Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Flap/Slat Indication |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach |
Narrative:
We were configured at flaps 5 and 180 KTS on downwind; being vectored for an ILS to south runway. Turned base and called for flaps 10 and gear down. I was pilot flying and noticed a slight rolling of the aircraft. About then; as I was looking at the flap gauge; the first officer pointed out we had one flap at 5 degrees and one at 10. The flaps were split. We were about 1500 ft and I elected to do a go-around and called gear up.we left the flaps where they were and were cleared on runway; heading to 2000 ft; then eventually 5000 ft. The first officer did a fabulous job of communicating our situation to tower and approach. We did the after takeoff checklist except for the flaps and then ran the quick reference handbook (QRH) for trailing edge flap asymmetry which directed us to move the flap lever to the nearest; smallest position which was 5 degrees. Neither flap moved. We then continued with the checklist which set us up for a flap 5 landing; using flaps 40 +40 for reference. Once the checklist was complete; the first officer attempted to call operations; which never did answer us throughout the flight; and dispatch who computed our landing distance for our configuration and stated we were within the available distance for 16L. As he was doing that I informed ATC of our situation and declared an emergency and requested the equipment to standby. I was primarily concerned with a possible brake fire or blown tire. I believe our reference speed was 169 KTS. Once he was done with that; he took over ATC and I called the flight attendants and had them plan for a normal landing and they had no questions. I then made a PA explaining our condition to the passengers. We completed the descent and approach checks on the QRH checklist and continued for the approach. We completed an ILS to 16L and landed on the thousand foot markers on speed with minimal flare; I selected and used autobrakes-2 and briefed the first officer I would not use manual braking unless required; so as to limit our brake heat build up. We stopped fine and cleared the runway and stopped. We requested the fire department to inspect our wheels and brakes to which no smoke or fire was noted. We taxied to gate under our own power with a fire truck following us. Deplaned normally and de-briefed flight attendants's and maintenance. No flight attendants indicated any type of concern and we were complimented by them and several passengers on our informative PA and handling of the situation. Several also commented they didn't even know we went around. Two jump seating pilots also said there appeared to be no apprehension in the cabin. I called the dispatch and chief pilot's office immediately after deplaning. My first officer did an outstanding job.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-400 turning base; when the First Officer pointed out the flap gauge was showing one flap at 5 degrees and one at 10 degrees. The crew accomplished a go-around; declared an emergency and landed uneventfully.
Narrative: We were configured at Flaps 5 and 180 KTS on downwind; being vectored for an ILS to south runway. Turned base and called for Flaps 10 and gear down. I was pilot flying and noticed a slight rolling of the aircraft. About then; as I was looking at the flap gauge; the First Officer pointed out we had one flap at 5 degrees and one at 10. The flaps were split. We were about 1500 FT and I elected to do a go-around and called gear up.We left the flaps where they were and were cleared on runway; heading to 2000 FT; then eventually 5000 FT. The First Officer did a fabulous job of communicating our situation to Tower and Approach. We did the after takeoff checklist except for the flaps and then ran the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) for Trailing Edge Flap Asymmetry which directed us to move the flap lever to the nearest; smallest position which was 5 degrees. Neither flap moved. We then continued with the checklist which set us up for a Flap 5 landing; using Flaps 40 +40 for reference. Once the checklist was complete; the First Officer attempted to call Operations; which never did answer us throughout the flight; and Dispatch who computed our landing distance for our configuration and stated we were within the available distance for 16L. As he was doing that I informed ATC of our situation and declared an Emergency and requested the equipment to standby. I was primarily concerned with a possible brake fire or blown tire. I believe our reference speed was 169 KTS. Once he was done with that; he took over ATC and I called the flight attendants and had them plan for a normal landing and they had no questions. I then made a PA explaining our condition to the passengers. We completed the Descent and Approach Checks on the QRH Checklist and continued for the approach. We completed an ILS to 16L and landed on the thousand foot markers on speed with minimal flare; I selected and used autobrakes-2 and briefed the First Officer I would not use manual braking unless required; so as to limit our brake heat build up. We stopped fine and cleared the runway and stopped. We requested the Fire Department to inspect our wheels and brakes to which no smoke or fire was noted. We taxied to gate under our own power with a Fire truck following us. Deplaned normally and de-briefed flight attendants's and maintenance. No flight attendants indicated any type of concern and we were complimented by them and several passengers on our informative PA and handling of the situation. Several also commented they didn't even know we went around. Two jump seating pilots also said there appeared to be no apprehension in the cabin. I called the Dispatch and Chief Pilot's office immediately after deplaning. My First Officer did an outstanding job.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.