Narrative:

In cruise flight at FL410; a single chime master warning tone accompanied by an amber spoilers fail C.a.south. Message occurred. I was pilot flying (left seat); and after 5-10 seconds smelled and saw electrical smoke which caused a slight reduction in visibility. I called smoke verbally which the other captain acknowledged. We simultaneously removed our headsets and donned our oxygen masks; by which time no visible evidence of smoke remained. There was at no time any visible evidence of fire. Neither I nor the captain activated 'emergency depress' or donned smoke goggles at this point. The captain removed his mask to advise the passengers that he was deploying the passenger oxygen masks and that they were welcome to use them if they desired. He then advised me that the smoke had cleared; so I removed my mask. I estimated at this time no more than 1-2 minutes had passed since the initial C.a.south.. As he began the checklist; I requested a lower altitude from a.T.C. And reported that we had a spoiler malfunction. We proceeded through the checklist as we descended to FL290. No circuit breakers had tripped. In the checklist process; we chose not to reset the system; but otherwise adhered fully to the checklist. In stable flight; after a brief discussion we agreed that the electrical malfunction was no longer present and chose to divert to an airport suitable for maintenance support. We did not complete the cockpit/cabin smoke or fire checklist due to the fact the smoke had cleared. The flight continued with no further incident. While examining the airplane on the ground; it was determined that the spoileron computer had failed causing an internal short. The 3 amp 'splr control' circuit breaker protecting the circuit then failed to trip and burned internally and melted the insulator on the power wire terminal; causing the smoke. Avionics technicians calculated that the computer had a 20+/- amp internal short that was still present. It is believed that what physically opened the circuit was the internal disintegration of the circuit breaker itself due to excessive heat. Circuit breaker panels appeared normal at all times in flight. After having the spoileron computer and the circuit breaker replaced; the system again functioned normally. After preliminary findings of what had happened with the components; it occurred to me that the event could have been much worse. Should the failure have involved a larger circuit breaker; I believe there could easily have been a serious fire. Knowing that the source was electrical; I began to research what could be done; should it be extremely time critical to isolate an unknown circuit without affecting the ability to continue basic IFR flight; as well as transition the aircraft from high altitude cruise to approach/landing effectively. The lear 45 cockpit/cabin smoke or fire checklist; beyond the memory items; seems overly complicated should an immediate need arise to remove all unnecessary electrical load from the aircraft (i.e. 'Gangbar'). It would seem prudent to me; in such an event; to have an extremely quick reference guide for quickly configuring the aircraft so that an IFR descent and landing could be safely accomplished solely on emergency power items; or at least remove the source of heat long enough to be able to de-isolate certain circuits with a careful power-up procedure. Perhaps this would allow more positive recognition of the source; or even allow total avoidance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LJ45 First Officer reports SPOILERS FAIL CAS message at FL410. This warning is accompanied by electrical smoke and smell which quickly dissipates. The Crew elects to divert to an airport where repairs can be made.

Narrative: In cruise flight at FL410; a single chime master warning tone accompanied by an amber SPOILERS FAIL C.A.S. message occurred. I was Pilot Flying (Left Seat); and after 5-10 seconds smelled and saw electrical smoke which caused a slight reduction in visibility. I called SMOKE verbally which the other Captain acknowledged. We simultaneously removed our headsets and donned our oxygen masks; by which time no visible evidence of smoke remained. There was at no time any visible evidence of fire. Neither I nor the Captain activated 'EMER DEPRESS' or donned smoke goggles at this point. The Captain removed his mask to advise the passengers that he was deploying the passenger oxygen masks and that they were welcome to use them if they desired. He then advised me that the smoke had cleared; so I removed my mask. I estimated at this time no more than 1-2 minutes had passed since the initial C.A.S.. As he began the checklist; I requested a lower altitude from A.T.C. and reported that we had a spoiler malfunction. We proceeded through the checklist as we descended to FL290. No circuit breakers had tripped. In the checklist process; we chose not to reset the system; but otherwise adhered fully to the checklist. In stable flight; after a brief discussion we agreed that the electrical malfunction was no longer present and chose to divert to an airport suitable for maintenance support. We did not complete the Cockpit/Cabin Smoke or Fire checklist due to the fact the smoke had cleared. The flight continued with no further incident. While examining the airplane on the ground; it was determined that the Spoileron Computer had failed causing an internal short. The 3 amp 'SPLR CTL' circuit breaker protecting the circuit then failed to trip and burned internally and melted the insulator on the power wire terminal; causing the smoke. Avionics technicians calculated that the computer had a 20+/- amp internal short that was still present. It is believed that what physically opened the circuit was the internal disintegration of the circuit breaker itself due to excessive heat. Circuit breaker panels appeared normal at all times in flight. After having the Spoileron Computer and the circuit breaker replaced; the system again functioned normally. After preliminary findings of what had happened with the components; it occurred to me that the event could have been much worse. Should the failure have involved a larger CB; I believe there could easily have been a serious fire. Knowing that the source was electrical; I began to research what could be done; should it be extremely time critical to isolate an unknown circuit without affecting the ability to continue basic IFR flight; as well as transition the aircraft from high altitude cruise to approach/landing effectively. The Lear 45 Cockpit/Cabin Smoke or Fire checklist; beyond the memory items; seems overly complicated should an IMMEDIATE need arise to remove all unnecessary electrical load from the aircraft (I.E. 'GANGBAR'). It would seem prudent to me; in such an event; to have an extremely quick reference guide for QUICKLY configuring the aircraft so that an IFR descent and landing could be safely accomplished solely on emergency power items; or at least remove the source of heat long enough to be able to de-isolate certain circuits with a careful power-up procedure. Perhaps this would allow more positive recognition of the source; or even allow total avoidance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.