Narrative:

ECAM message indicating fwc #1 failure shortly after takeoff (prior to 10;000). No chime/crew awareness caution lights. Review what would be consequences if second fwc were to fail. Notice that aurals/master warn & caution and ECAM would be out. Because no chime had sounded with initial fwc failure I tested engine & APU fire warn. No ECAM; no master warn or caution; no chime. (Same symptoms that could be expected with a dual fwc failure). Set altimeters to gross difference. No ECAM/no chime. Put spoilers out in cruise. No ECAM amber after 1 minute/no chime. Pulled one throttle out of detent. No ECAM/ no chime (only asym thrust on FMA). Determined that any fault on aircraft would possibly go undetected and no ECAM guidance would be available. Numerous ACARS messages between dispatcher who relayed to maintenance control. It was finally agreed by maintenance control that fwc #2 was also faulted. They queried aircraft and could get no data from fwc's. Near ZZZ I tried to contact the dispatcher on VHF/ no response. Called ZZZ ops and told them to call and get dispatcher on the radio. Talked with dispatcher on VHF who relayed from maintenance control that they felt both fwc's were faulted. I pulled fwc #1 circuit breaker per QRH and reset after 90 sec. Loud squeal heard in cockpit that wouldn't quit. Re-pulled #1 fwc breaker to silence squeal. (Duplicated for maintenance on the ground). I advised the dispatcher that I was diverting into ZZZ. On ground maintenance began running tests. They replaced both fwc's and tested them with both showing faults remaining. I was told after about 30 minutes of testing that elac #1 had failed. I disagreed since no ECAM nor overhead indication had occurred to indicate such. Approx 15min after that maintenance told me that facility #1 had failed and caused the problem; again I disagreed since no ECAM; overhead nor pfd indicated such a failure. Maintenance then decided that a complete power down was required. Passengers were deplaned for this 8 min. Required power down. During power down; maintenance extended flaps and did a overweight landing inspection; no problems found. After reboot; all computers were working except sdcu. All smoke detectors inoperative. Maintenance wanted to issue a deferral. I said that wouldn't be acceptable since the MEL permits only crew members to use aircraft lavs and we were looking at a 4:45 flight time. Maintenance then replaced sdcu which cleared that issue. Both cids then failed. I delayed refuel up to this point because of concern that if flight canceled aircraft would have 36;000 lbs of fuel and be overweight for any landing except west coast (trying to avoid cost of a defuel). All crew members except me timed out at xa:50. I initially had calculated xa:28 but made an arithmetic error which I corrected and called scheduling back and agreed that xa:50 was the drop dead time. Passengers were reboarded. Cids reset with pax on board; got one of them back. Departed gate with cids class 2 message on ECAM. Snow had begun; went to 'south' pad for contamination check; no ice on aircraft. Taxied to runway but still had no clearance because flight plan had timed out (despite asking dispatcher earlier to 'keep it alive'.) first officer had problems with computer and getting new flight plan in system. We taxied toward runway when clearance and reroute came. Loaded FMS's with new route. 'Taxi into position and hold.' release parking brake and add thrust; plane won't move. Reduce thrust; turn on dome light to confirm parking brake is released; it is; but ECAM shows the brake is on and plane won't move. Call tower and decline 'position and hold' clearance. Cycle parking brake lever numerous times until parking brake releases. Advised ops that we were returning to gate. P/a to passengers that plane was not 100% ; crew was over projected on duty time limits and could not continue to lax. Called dispatcher from gate and told him I would not fly aircraft because of continuous unexplainable computer and system failures. Seven computer failures; 3 of which were replaced. Note that two reports are associated with same flight. This one being the diversion; the other being the return to gate following brakes not releasing issue. I've included the narrative of what transpired after safely landing in ZZZ; the actions taken by maintenance; departing gate and subsequently returning to gate after more mechanical problems. Aircraft had too many unexplainable computer failures followed by system failures. I feel that maintenance never found the true cause of what was taking individual computers out in succession. Seven computers failed over a span of about 4 hours; 3 of which were replaced in ZZZ. Additionally maintenance's explanation of what caused the original dual fwc failure was contrived and inaccurate relative to the indications that we had in flight. I have reason to suspect a data bus as the common denominator in the series of failures by multiple computers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain experiences dual FWC (Flight Warning Computer) failure and after conferring with Maintenance diverts to a suitable airport for repairs. When cleared into position on the next departure the parking brake fails to release when selected off. Multiple attempts are eventually successful but flight returns to gate for further trouble shooting.

Narrative: ECAM message indicating FWC #1 failure shortly after takeoff (prior to 10;000). No chime/Crew awareness caution lights. Review what would be consequences if second FWC were to fail. Notice that aurals/master warn & caution and ECAM would be out. Because no chime had sounded with initial FWC failure I tested engine & APU fire warn. No ECAM; no master warn or caution; no chime. (Same symptoms that could be expected with a dual FWC failure). Set altimeters to gross difference. No ECAM/no chime. Put spoilers out in cruise. No ECAM amber after 1 minute/no chime. Pulled one throttle out of detent. No ECAM/ no chime (Only asym thrust on FMA). Determined that any fault on aircraft would possibly go undetected and no ECAM guidance would be available. Numerous ACARS messages between Dispatcher who relayed to Maintenance Control. It was finally agreed by Maintenance Control that FWC #2 was also faulted. They queried aircraft and could get no data from FWC's. Near ZZZ I tried to contact the Dispatcher on VHF/ no response. Called ZZZ ops and told them to call and get Dispatcher on the radio. Talked with Dispatcher on VHF who relayed from Maintenance Control that they felt both FWC's were faulted. I pulled FWC #1 circuit breaker per QRH and reset after 90 sec. Loud squeal heard in cockpit that wouldn't quit. Re-pulled #1 FWC breaker to silence squeal. (Duplicated for Maintenance on the ground). I advised the Dispatcher that I was diverting into ZZZ. On ground Maintenance began running tests. They replaced both FWC's and tested them with both showing faults remaining. I was told after about 30 minutes of testing that ELAC #1 had failed. I disagreed since no ECAM nor overhead indication had occurred to indicate such. Approx 15min after that Maintenance told me that FAC #1 had failed and caused the problem; again I disagreed since no ECAM; overhead nor PFD indicated such a failure. Maintenance then decided that a complete power down was required. Passengers were deplaned for this 8 min. required power down. During Power down; Maintenance extended flaps and did a overweight landing inspection; no problems found. After reboot; all computers were working except SDCU. All smoke detectors inoperative. Maintenance wanted to issue a deferral. I said that wouldn't be acceptable since the MEL permits only crew members to use aircraft lavs and we were looking at a 4:45 flight time. Maintenance then replaced SDCU which cleared that issue. Both CIDS then failed. I delayed refuel up to this point because of concern that if flight canceled aircraft would have 36;000 lbs of fuel and be overweight for any landing except west coast (Trying to avoid cost of a defuel). All crew members except me timed out at XA:50. I initially had calculated XA:28 but made an arithmetic error which I corrected and called scheduling back and agreed that XA:50 was the drop dead time. Passengers were reboarded. CIDS reset with pax on board; got one of them back. Departed gate with CIDS class 2 message on ECAM. Snow had begun; went to 'S' pad for contamination check; no ice on aircraft. Taxied to runway but still had no clearance because flight plan had timed out (despite asking Dispatcher earlier to 'keep it alive'.) First Officer had problems with computer and getting new flight plan in system. We taxied toward runway when clearance and reroute came. Loaded FMS's with new route. 'Taxi into position and hold.' Release parking brake and add thrust; plane won't move. Reduce thrust; turn on dome light to confirm parking brake is released; it is; but ECAM shows the brake is on and plane won't move. Call tower and decline 'position and hold' clearance. Cycle parking brake lever numerous times until parking brake releases. Advised ops that we were returning to gate. P/A to passengers that plane was not 100% ; crew was over projected on duty time limits and could not continue to LAX. Called Dispatcher from gate and told him I would not fly aircraft because of continuous unexplainable computer and system failures. Seven computer failures; 3 of which were replaced. Note that two reports are associated with same flight. This one being the diversion; the other being the return to gate following brakes not releasing issue. I've included the narrative of what transpired after safely landing in ZZZ; the actions taken by Maintenance; departing gate and subsequently returning to gate after more mechanical problems. Aircraft had too many unexplainable computer failures followed by system failures. I feel that Maintenance never found the true cause of what was taking individual computers out in succession. Seven computers failed over a span of about 4 hours; 3 of which were replaced in ZZZ. Additionally Maintenance's explanation of what caused the original dual FWC failure was contrived and inaccurate relative to the indications that we had in flight. I have reason to suspect a data bus as the common denominator in the series of failures by multiple computers.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.