Narrative:

We arrived at the hotel for our overnight when scheduling called and asked if we would be willing to take one more flight. I said that I would have to talk to my crew and I would get right back to them. She stated that 'I can call (the chief pilot) and he won't be happy if you guys don't do this'. I told her that this was not my decision alone to make and that I had to talk with the crew. We talked about it and despite the outright intimidating threat of contacting my chief pilot; we agreed to take the flight if they would provide us with all of the information. We all climbed back into the van and upon arriving we were told that there was a 2 hour delay due to maintenance. I asked what the problem was and they said some kind of anti-ice issue. The aircraft was delayed another hour and finally was towed to the gate unpowered. We started the APU and reviewed the aml and understood that this airplane had experienced an anti-ice duct master warning at 300 AGL on the previous flight. The corrective action showed that they had trouble-shot this problem and it 'operations checked good'. I thought to myself 'ops checks good on the ground'! It had failed at 300 ft! The first officer and I discussed this and we both agreed that given our past experience with 'operations checks good' we should come up with a plan of action because we were about to depart into known icing conditions. We reviewed the QRH on the ground and found it to be insightful for our plan of action but with known icing condition on the departure if our anti-ice duct message came on we would be in icing conditions with no protection. We agreed that we would return to the takeoff runway immediately and we briefed the return to field before we left the gate. This proved to be wise. We boarded and taxied out without any need for de-icing. There were no delays as we were cleared for takeoff. We were given a 290 heading from tower and told to contact departure. Through 1;000 AGL the after takeoff check list was interrupted by the triple chime of the master warning as I was checking on with departure. We both looked at each other and said 'back to ZZZ'. I told departure that we needed to stop the climb and return for an immediate landing. They confirmed our request and we leveled at 5;000. The first officer took the radios and I ran the QRH. After I completed the QRH I contacted the company and told them we were returning to the field with a bleed air problem. They wanted to know my tail number and asked who I was again. At this point we received a 'low fuel pressure' cas warning.I discontinued my conversation with the company and ensured that we had all fuel pumps on and the EICAS page low fuel press to the left engine. I was thinking; multiple system failure as the first officer said 'there is something really wrong with this plane; we need to declare and get on the ground'. Without answering him I nodded and told ATC that we now have multiple system failure and that we were declaring an emergency and I asked them to roll trucks. I set speeds for an overweight landing of 49;200 pounds and the first officer briefed the approach with ignition on for LLWS; one cycle of the standby wing anti-ice to clean the wing; shallow decent rate with soft touchdown for the overweight landing and a turn and stop off the runway for the emergency vehicles to inspect the aircraft. I made an announcement to the passengers that we had experienced a system failure in-flight that had forced us to return and that the emergency vehicles were only there as a safety precaution and that we would be taxing to the gate shortly. We had one truck follow us to the gate. The agent boarded and made the announcement that all passengers were to proceed to another gate where another plane was waiting for them and that the crew would be there shortly. I had not spoken to my crew about their mental state after this emergency; nor had I gotten a report on how all the passengers had fared through this emergency.I had not spoken to the fire chief; the station operations manager nor to maintenance or dispatch and; yet; someone had promised these passengers another plane and a crew. This made me very upset as I knew that we needed time to comply with far regulations; company obligations; airport procedures as well as evaluating our own mental condition. We all needed a few minutes to complete the last flight and see if we were willing to continue given the circumstances but there was no consideration for this by the agent or any other department involved with the decision. Before we could make this decision I was told that the NOTAM for the runway closure would be in effect that night and the airport would be closed before we could get there. We canceled and went back to the hotel.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ200 flight crew accepted an additional flight after arriving at the layover hotel and soon regretted doing so.

Narrative: We arrived at the hotel for our overnight when scheduling called and asked if we would be willing to take one more flight. I said that I would have to talk to my crew and I would get right back to them. She stated that 'I can call (the Chief Pilot) and he won't be happy if you guys don't do this'. I told her that this was not my decision alone to make and that I had to talk with the crew. We talked about it and despite the outright intimidating threat of contacting my Chief Pilot; we agreed to take the flight if they would provide us with all of the information. We all climbed back into the van and upon arriving we were told that there was a 2 hour delay due to maintenance. I asked what the problem was and they said some kind of anti-ice issue. The aircraft was delayed another hour and finally was towed to the gate unpowered. We started the APU and reviewed the AML and understood that this airplane had experienced an ANTI-ICE DUCT Master Warning at 300 AGL on the previous flight. The corrective action showed that they had trouble-shot this problem and it 'OPS CHECKED GOOD'. I thought to myself 'ops checks good on the ground'! It had failed at 300 FT! The First Officer and I discussed this and we both agreed that given our past experience with 'OPS CHECKS GOOD' we should come up with a plan of action because we were about to depart into known icing conditions. We reviewed the QRH on the ground and found it to be insightful for our plan of action but with known icing condition on the departure if our ANTI-ICE DUCT message came on we would be in icing conditions with no protection. We agreed that we would return to the takeoff runway immediately and we briefed the return to field before we left the gate. This proved to be wise. We boarded and taxied out without any need for de-icing. There were no delays as we were cleared for takeoff. We were given a 290 heading from Tower and told to contact Departure. Through 1;000 AGL the after takeoff check list was interrupted by the triple chime of the Master Warning as I was checking on with departure. We both looked at each other and said 'Back to ZZZ'. I told Departure that we needed to stop the climb and return for an immediate landing. They confirmed our request and we leveled at 5;000. The First Officer took the radios and I ran the QRH. After I completed the QRH I contacted the company and told them we were returning to the field with a bleed air problem. They wanted to know my tail number and asked who I was again. At this point we received a 'Low Fuel Pressure' CAS warning.I discontinued my conversation with the company and ensured that we had all fuel pumps on and the EICAS page low fuel press to the left engine. I was thinking; multiple system failure as the First Officer said 'There is something really wrong with this plane; we need to declare and get on the ground'. Without answering him I nodded and told ATC that we now have multiple system failure and that we were declaring an emergency and I asked them to roll trucks. I set speeds for an overweight landing of 49;200 LBS and the First Officer briefed the approach with Ignition on for LLWS; One cycle of the standby wing anti-ice to clean the wing; shallow decent rate with soft touchdown for the overweight landing and a turn and stop off the runway for the emergency vehicles to inspect the aircraft. I made an announcement to the passengers that we had experienced a system failure in-flight that had forced us to return and that the emergency vehicles were only there as a safety precaution and that we would be taxing to the gate shortly. We had one truck follow us to the gate. The agent boarded and made the announcement that all passengers were to proceed to another gate where another plane was waiting for them and that the crew would be there shortly. I had not spoken to my crew about their mental state after this emergency; nor had I gotten a report on how all the passengers had fared through this emergency.I had not spoken to the Fire Chief; The Station Operations Manager nor to Maintenance or Dispatch and; yet; someone had promised these passengers another plane and a crew. This made me very upset as I knew that we needed time to comply with FAR regulations; Company obligations; Airport procedures as well as evaluating our own mental condition. We all needed a few minutes to complete the last flight and see if we were willing to continue given the circumstances but there was NO consideration for this by the agent or any other department involved with the decision. Before we could make this decision I was told that the NOTAM for the runway closure would be in effect that night and the airport would be closed before we could get there. We canceled and went back to the hotel.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.