Narrative:

After left engine start with pushback from gate the #1 flight director system failed. The QRH procedures were accomplished and no circuit breakers were popped. We returned to a new gate to have maintenance look at the problem. Maintenance placarded the #1 flight director system; wanting the captain to view the #2 flight director information also. The aircraft had numerous electrical issues already this day. It had failed an autoland test in the morning; the first officer radio altimeter had failed the flight before; and the electrics on the auto brakes had been placarded; downgrading the aircraft to not cat 2. In 14;000 plus hours on MD80's the captain had never seen a flight director completely die on a simple power shift. The captain and first officer repeatedly asked maintenance to just look at the problem. While standing with the first officer the maintenance supervisor told the mechanic that under no circumstance was the mechanic to ever look at our aircraft even though the mechanic wanted to evaluate the problem. The captain tried repeatedly to get a spare aircraft or an aircraft that was terminating for the evening. The dispatcher tried to get an aircraft; none were available. The destination had 700 to 1000 ft ceilings; lowered visibility and it was night. The forecast called for a ceiling of 500 ft for 5 hours; and the dew point spread and 2 degrees with the temperature dropping. Poor visibility was a definite possibility if the dew point merged. I did not have confidence this aircraft would not lose more electrical systems without maintenance first doing their checks. If the #2 flight director system had failed the captain and first officer would have been completely blind to altitude captures; airspeed and mach selections; and ILS capture and ILS track/track. The captain refused the aircraft because blind flying and blind approaches in to the weather at night would have been extremely dangerous for my passengers; my crew; my aircraft; and my company.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: After a Flight Director failed a MD80 crew refused an aircraft with a history of previous electric and avionics problems. The destination weather was forecast to be marginal.

Narrative: After left engine start with pushback from gate the #1 Flight Director system failed. The QRH procedures were accomplished and no circuit breakers were popped. We returned to a new gate to have Maintenance look at the problem. Maintenance placarded the #1 Flight Director system; wanting the Captain to view the #2 Flight Director information also. The aircraft had numerous electrical issues already this day. It had failed an autoland test in the morning; the First Officer radio altimeter had failed the flight before; and the electrics on the auto brakes had been placarded; downgrading the aircraft to Not Cat 2. In 14;000 plus hours on MD80's the Captain had never seen a flight director completely die on a simple power shift. The Captain and First Officer repeatedly asked Maintenance to just look at the problem. While standing with the First Officer the Maintenance Supervisor told the Mechanic that under no circumstance was the Mechanic to ever look at our aircraft even though the Mechanic wanted to evaluate the problem. The Captain tried repeatedly to get a spare aircraft or an aircraft that was terminating for the evening. The Dispatcher tried to get an aircraft; none were available. The destination had 700 to 1000 FT ceilings; lowered visibility and it was night. The forecast called for a ceiling of 500 FT for 5 hours; and the dew point spread and 2 degrees with the temperature dropping. Poor visibility was a definite possibility if the dew point merged. I did not have confidence this aircraft would not lose more electrical systems without Maintenance first doing their checks. If the #2 Flight Director system had failed the Captain and First Officer would have been completely blind to altitude captures; airspeed and mach selections; and ILS capture and ILS Track/Track. The Captain refused the aircraft because blind flying and blind approaches in to the weather at night would have been extremely dangerous for my passengers; my crew; my aircraft; and my company.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.